



Daily Report

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Central Eurasia

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Daily Report

Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-95-015

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Kovalev Urges Council of Europe Membership Postponement

AU2401092395 Munich ARD Television Network in German 2130 GMT 23 Jan 95

[Interview with Sergey Kovalev, Russian Human Rights Activist, in the Moscow ARD studio by Sabine Christiansen in the Hamburg ARD studio on the Tagesthemen program on 23 January "a good hour ago"; Kovalev answers in Russian with superimposed German translation—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Christiansen] Sergey Kovalev, I am happy to welcome you to the Moscow ARD studio tonight. Good evening. How much do the attacks and even insults by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and others hurt you?

[Kovalev] Well, I am used to being confronted with such statements. I consider them quite a high compliment. In the final analysis, calling me an enemy of the people does not stigmatize me. To me such an assessment or insult only means that I am acting correctly.

[Christiansen] You have witnessed the bombing attacks on Grozny; you have seen and experienced the dead and the suffering of the civilian population in Chechnya; and you have denounced the use of force time and again. Boris Yeltsin used to like to see you as an ally by his side. Now he refuses to listen to your criticism. What has happened? What has changed Boris Yeltsin so much?

[Kovalev] Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin has made a fatal mistake and he does not have the strength to say so and admit it. This is a mistake that may become fatal for our country. It is our task to prevent this.

[Christiansen] Is it correct that, as many are speculating, he had to give up power long ago and that others are acting on his behalf?

[Kovalev] I do not know what the power situation in the Kremlin is. Nor is it very important. The current political situation in the country is such that, basically, Europe's fate is being decided now, as well as the fate of the international community. The worst thing is that this country is currently being led by people who deliberately lie. One cannot live in a country where political leaders lie. One cannot live in a country that is afraid of its own intelligence services. One cannot live in a country where contacts with foreigners and foreign travel are viewed with suspicion.

[Christiansen] Mr. Kovalev, you have just mentioned the international community and its responsibility. What should the international community now do to prevent the development that you have just talked about and to stop the bloodshed? What are your demands?

[Kovalev] Regarding the international situation, we must keep in mind something very simple. Russia cannot get out of this nadir using its own strength.

[Christiansen] Much will depend on the speech that you are going to deliver to the European Parliament by the end of January. The climate in Russia will be largely assessed on the basis of this speech. What are you going to say?

[Kovalev] Owing to the Chechen crisis, Russia cannot currently be admitted to the Council of Europe. This question must be postponed. This means that tough conditions must be set for Russia. Russia must solve its internal problems in terms of European democratic standards in order to become a member of the Council of Europe.

[Christiansen] Thank you very much, Mr. Kovalev.

Ingushetia Air Raids Reported; Aushev on Chechnya Support

BR2301164395 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 23 Jan 95 p 7

[Report by Jan Blomgren in Nazran, incorporating interview with Ingushetia President Ruslan Aushev: "The War Threatens To Spread to Ingushetia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Nazran—The war in Chechnya has so far concentrated on the capital, Grozny, but there is a clear risk that the armed clashes will spread increasingly to the countryside. If so, they will also spread across the republic's border into Ingushetia.

"The Chechens are our brothers. It is true that today we have somewhat different documents, but everything else we have in common. The Russians thought that they could frighten us by dropping bombs here in Ingushetia too, but it has had the opposite effect. We will do everything to support the Chechens," Khamsat Karsamov said at the hospital in Ingushetia's capital, Nazran.

With his right arm in a bandage and his right hand completely destroyed after an air attack on a small village 20 km from Nazran, Khamsat Karsamov is one of the victims of the Russian aggression. During a morning visit to the hospital we saw many more, but those worst hit have been buried for several weeks now.

The eyewitness accounts of the air attacks on civilian targets are unanimous. However, from the Russian side there have not even been any attempts to explain the bombings against Ingushetia.

Perhaps they were revenge for the fact that the Ingushetian civilian population tried to block the roads when the Russian Army began its march into Chechnya on 11 December.

Perhaps they were warning shots indicating what could happen in practice if Ingushetia begins to support Chechnya militarily.

Perhaps it was just individual pilots engaging in target practice with left-over ammunition on their way home to base....

"We are a little republic which would of course be easily conquered by Russia. But I do not think that the Russian

Army has the power to put down all the other republics if they rise up. If certain Russian so-called military strategists believe that they can resolve the conflict quickly in their own way, they are completely wrong. And if there is not a political solution soon, it will be a very long conflict," Ingushetian President Ruslan Aushev told SVENSKA DAGBLADET.

In television interviews Ruslan Aushev has made a sensible and balanced impression. An impression which was reinforced when we met surprisingly next to a column of refugees in Nazran, and the Ingushetian president took the time to speak to a foreign journalist.

He enjoys very strong popular support, but now finds himself in a terribly difficult position: on the one side Moscow's strong pressure urging neutrality, and on the other a seemingly united Ingushetia.

Ruslan Aushev has been one of the most assiduous peace-makers together with people like human rights champion Sergey Kovalev. And when Ruslan Aushev returned early last week from talks with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin he was cautiously optimistic.

"I believed that I had reached an agreement with the possibility of a lasting peace after my talks with Viktor Stepanovich [Chernomyrdin]. But the Russians had changed the terms even before I had arrived back here."

Ruslan Aushev has not given up, but he fears increasing powerlessness because the Russian side is refusing to negotiate with Aushev's childhood and army friend, Dzhokhar Dudayev.

"I view Dudayev, the government, and the Chechen parliament as legally elected and therefore natural representatives."

Ingushetia has had to take in more than 100,000 refugees in the last two months and this places enormous demands on the little republic which normally only has 300,000 inhabitants. Ingushetia is a natural place of refuge for fleeing Chechens. Here they have family and friends and here Chechens really are treated like family members.

Ingushetia and Chechnya formed a single republic up to 1991, when Dudayev was pushing the demand for independence from Russia so hard that Ingushetia broke away. The republic had received a promise that it would have returned to it land areas which it had earlier lost to North Ossetia. But Ingushetia has not been given much for this loyalty and is now greatly affected by the war in Chechnya.

"The tragedy in Chechnya is also our tragedy. They are our blood brothers and we must support them. But I sincerely hope that we can achieve a peaceful agreement," Ruslan Aushev said. If not, Ingushetia will not hesitate a second to take up arms to fight the Russians. And then the Chechen conflict will have crossed a republic border. And many people fear that in that case the conflict could spread across even more borders.

CIS Chiefs To Discuss 'Peace and Accord Pact'

LD2301151495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1341 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 23 (INTERFAX)—The Council of Heads of State and Council of Heads of Government of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are having their next joint meeting in Almaty on February 10, Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev said.

Nazarbayev told a news conference in Almaty Monday that the date and venue had been set by him and his Russian counterpart, Boris Yeltsin, and approved by other CIS leaders.

The Kazakh president said he and Yeltsin had also decided to put on the CIS summit agenda a draft "Peace and Accord Pact" for the Commonwealth, which "would be a blessing for all peoples in the post-Soviet area."

Nazarbayev said he had once again offered his mediation in the Chechen issue, which the Russian leadership had agreed to accept "if it became necessary."

He said the accords signed between Kazakhstan and Russia last Friday "create an essentially new model of integration, of which I have been an active champion throughout the period after the Soviet Union fell apart." "Many Commonwealth states are already willing to follow that example," he said.

Nazarbayev: CIS Integration 'Imminent'

LD2301152195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1341 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 23 (INTERFAX)—Closer integration of CIS member states is imminent, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev is convinced. Speaking Monday to journalists on the package of Russian-Kazakh documents signed last Friday, he said that they had stepped up bilateral cooperation. Nazarbayev emphasized that the two countries had set their foreign policy priorities straight.

He believes that bilateral agreements between former Soviet republics will grow into multilateral structures. Nazarbayev explained that Russia and Belarus had agreed on a customs union and now Kazakhstan and Russia had done so, and an essentially new league was emerging. In Nazarbayev's words, Russia has an overriding role to play in all the integration processes. He said that Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan were capable of creating a powerful integrating field and Ukraine would grow to joining it. Nazarbayev believed that integration ideas had always been on the minds of the people in the Commonwealth member states but statesmen had been lagging behind.

He expected "other fraternal republics" to follow in the footsteps of Russia and Kazakhstan. Nazarbayev argued that one should not be frightened by the word or notion

of "a fraternal republic." Answering an Interfax question, he said that he could not share the views of his neighbors, notably the leaders of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, who believed that integration of equals endangered their independence. Nazarbayev described their position as pure politicking which reflected the fact that the sovereignty euphoria had not been overcome. He admitted that theoreticians of this kind were still going strong in his own Kazakhstan.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 24 Jan.

LD2401071495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0544
GMT 24 Jan 95

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 24 TASS—Today's Russian newspapers continue to concentrate on the Chechen events. The military phase of the operation will be completed by the end of January, forecasts Commander of the Russian Airborne troops Yevgeny Podkolzin in an interview with the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper.

According to his information, the numerical strength of Dudayev's army is 18,000. Paratroopers lost 186 men during the operation. According to data of the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA newspaper, 3,800 mercenaries operate on Dudayev's side, more than 2,000 of them arrived from Moslem countries.

The rest are from former Soviet Republics. Valentin Kovalyov, head of the watchdog commission on constitutional rights and freedoms, confirmed the use of mercenaries in an interview with KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

He refuted rumours about the use of chemical weapons in Chechnya. The Russian president's assistant Georgiy Satarov expressed regret in an interview with KRASNAYA ZVEZDA that "organisational qualities and skills" of Dudayev's forces were not correctly assessed in due time.

Director of the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FCS) Sergey Stepashin precludes any chance of a civil war in Chechnya. In an interview with the ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI newspaper, he pointed to a striving of the majority of Chechen population for peaceful life.

Substantiating the use of the regulars in Chechnya in his interview with the ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA newspaper, FCS officer Aleksandr Zdanovich informs its readers of Dudayev's plans "to open the second front in the Caucasus".

According to Zdanovich, "he looked for allies against Russia among radical elements at the Confederation of Caucasian Peoples and Moslem fundamentalists".

The IZVESTIYA newspaper writes that "the Kremlin's shadow advisers" suggest "forming national guards" as "an instrument of struggle for power".

According to the daily, a certain Moscow information and analytical centre which fathered the idea of forming national guards and which is headquartered at 5, Varvarka Street, Moscow, sent its proposals to the Russian president.

The newspaper writes that national guards are called upon to be the Russian president's bulwark "under the conditions of domestic political crises".

An article in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA deals with prospects for the development of Russian industry in 1995. In the newspaper's opinion, a further economic slump threatens "to turn Russia into an arena of struggle for sources of export raw materials".

Privatisation according to Chubais opened the gate for Russia's colonisation, writes Chairman of the State Property Committee Vladimir Polevanov in his report to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. The RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA newspaper runs the full text of the report.

"The foundations of Russian statehood and national security have been undermined" as a result of the first stage of privatisation, Polevanov notes.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA calls attention of its readers to the Russian bill on interstate adoption approved by the Russian parliament but vetoed by the president. "The president's office cares more for the interests of intermediary agencies and less for the well-being of the nation", the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper comments on the situation.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA quotes a demand by Conny Foster, president of the association of American non-commercial adoption agencies, to put "Russian orphans on auction under a threat of depriving Russia of financial aid" and to set up a network of private agencies and intermediary offices on adoption.

The PRAVDA and SOVetskaya Rossiya newspapers comment on the third Congress of the Russian Communist Party which was held in Moscow on January 21-22. Both newspapers publish the key report by Communist Party Chairman Gennadiy Zyuganov.

"The Russian Communist Party has become an influential political force in society. This is the main result of the congress," PRAVDA sums up.

"Communists advocate peaceful socialist changes" by "creating a coalition government of people's confidence", the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA newspaper notes in its commentary.

Mikhail Poltoranin chairman of the lower house committee on information policy and communications, called on Russian journalists to refrain from "libelling and vociferous cock-sure statements". In his interview with ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, he described work on bills called upon "to strengthen independence of the mass media".

EU Foreign Ministers Call For End to Chechnya Hostilities

LD2301221895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2143 GMT 23 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksandr Mineyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Brussels January 24 TASS—Foreign ministers of 15 member-states of the European Union called on Russia to put an end to hostilities in Chechnya immediately on Monday.

Participants in Monday's meeting of the European Union's council declared for beginning talks with a view to political settlement of the conflict as soon as possible. They passed a statement on the issue.

The European Union continues to watch the developments in Chechnya closely, which indicate serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, the document says.

The European Union makes the move within the framework of the principles of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) [as received] and with respect to sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia, the statement says.

They expressed hope that CSCE mission, which is due to visit the conflict area with Russia's approval, will be given all opportunities to carry out all the tasks assigned, including unrestricted travelling across Chechnya. The CSCE mission will focus on issues related to observation of human rights, with restoration of the constitutional order and preparations for liberal and just elections when possible, the statement says.

The European Union which attaches much importance to its relations with Russia, and to continuation of democratic reforms in the country, is concerned about possible consequences of the crisis, the statement says.

It recalls that these relations should be based on principles of the UN and CSCE, which were included in the wording of the agreement on bilateral partnership. The European Union goes on monitoring the developments in Chechnya and it does not rule out that further demarches will be made, the statement says.

Grachev Remarks Said Damaging to Russia's Prestige

MM2301155695 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 95 p 3

[Report by Maksim Yusin: "Pavel Grachev's Loutishness Strikes a Blow Against Russia's International Prestige"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The endless scandals connected with the name of the Russian defense minister had until recently remained a domestic political problem, without creating any particular difficulties for Moscow in the

international arena. Last Sunday [22 January] the situation changed: Pavel Grachev's loutish remarks aimed at human rights campaigner Sergey Kovalev and Duma Defense Committee Chairman Sergey Yushenkov struck a blow against Russia's relations with Germany, to which the Kremlin traditionally attaches great significance.

Bonn resorted to an unprecedented diplomatic demarche. Defense Minister Volker Ruehe stated that his Russian colleague's planned visit to Munich in February is undesirable. Grachev was to have taken part in an international conference on security matters. And although the Germans have not formally revoked the invitation issued earlier, the meaning of Ruehe's statement is unequivocal: The Russian defense minister has become persona non grata for Germany. Bonn officials explained that this decision was taken in connection with Pavel Sergeyevich's notorious press conference.

The coarse language that Grachev came out with in front of the TV cameras seriously undermined Russia's international prestige. Not only the defense minister himself was humiliated, but also President Yeltsin, and ultimately the Russian state, since the door was slammed in Grachev's face not as a private individual, but as an official representative of his country, who moreover occupies one of the key posts in the Kremlin hierarchy.

If even Germany, one of Russia's closest allies, has taken such a resolute step, one can guess what kind of a reaction there will be from other West European countries and the United States. All the indications are that the majority of civilized states will henceforth ignore Pavel Grachev, freezing military cooperation with Moscow as long as the post of defense minister is still held by a man who permits himself to call his political opponent a "scumbag."

Special relations with Russia do not prevent Germany from moving in the orbit of Western diplomacy, which is slowly but surely stepping up its criticism of the Kremlin over the Chechen conflict. Addressing journalists at the end of his talks with Andrey Kozyrev in Berne 22 January, FRG Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel was categorical: "The bloodshed in Chechnya must stop immediately."

Shumeyko Meets With Finnish Prime Minister Aho

LD2001125395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1149 GMT 20 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 20 TASS—The Chechen crisis revealed that "the renovated Russian state was unprepared to deal with such a situation," the Federation Council's Speaker Vladimir Shumeyko told visiting Finnish Premier Esko Aho on Friday.

Shumeyko accounted for this by saying that "many things were broken during the year of democratic reforms in the country".

In this connection, "for the sake of reinforcing the state, serious amendments must be made (in many fields) including the legislation".

We must urgently tackle "the task of restoring manageability of the state, of reviving a number of abolished institutions", he emphasized.

"It is very difficult to establish democracy, and western countries must realize the difficulties experienced by Russia," Aho, the former Finnish parliament speaker, said in response.

Aho Holds News Conference

LD2001194295 Helsinki Suomen Yleisradio Network in Finnish 1530 GMT 20 Jan 95

[Report by Jyrki Saarikoski Moscow from Moscow—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Jyrki Saarikoski] Yeltsin said that there is now a new tripartite grouping consisting of the European Union, Finland, and Russia. He then expressed the hope that Finland will now promote Russian entry into the European Union. The Russian news agencies ITAR-TASS and INTERFAX have quoted Yeltsin's request. However, the Finnish side thought that Yeltsin expressed his wish in a light-hearted manner, and Prime Minister Aho did not mention the matter at the news conference arranged immediately after the meeting in the Kremlin.

[Aho] We also dealt with bilateral relations between Russia and the European Union and Russian participation in European cooperation. Finland also believes that close Russian involvement in European cooperation in the future is important, and I told Yeltsin that I explained Finland's stance on the matter of Chechnya to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.

[Saarikoski] Aho emphasized that Finland's membership in the European Union does not put relations with Russia at risk but opens up new possibilities. However, the discussions concerning current economic problems did not make any progress during Aho's visit. A decision on Russia repaying some of its debt, which Finland had hoped for, was once again postponed.

[Aho] I am not disappointed, but there was a possibility that we could have reached an agreement on this matter. The few extra weeks we need to take care of these matters are not a very big problem because these are arrangements which will be implemented in the next few years. So the agreement would not have brought immediate relief in the debt matter, but it would have been a long-term partial solution. [passage omitted]

[Saarikoski] The crisis in Chechnya was taken up only in passing in the Kremlin. Aho mentioned to Yeltsin that he had explained the stance of the European Union to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin yesterday [9 January], and the Russian president did not comment on the

situation in Chechnya at all. Yeltsin seemed to be more interested in an idyllic picture of Russia becoming part of the European Union, although the whole project now seems farther away than before because of the current crises and looming threats.

Nazarbayev: Agreements Make Almaty, Moscow 'Partners'

LD2301214095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1855 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 23 (Interfax)—The latest package with Moscow will help Kazakhstan and Russia to come out as partners but not rivals in the world market, President Nursultan Nazarbayev told reporters on Monday. He said the question was not one of an agreement regulating the two countries' exports of crude oil and strategic materials.

The package will help speed up the laying down of a huge oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea to the Russian port city of Novorossiisk and provide better incentives for the development of gas oil fields in the Caspian Sea, Nazarbayev said.

He spoke of Russia's active involvement in prospecting local oil and gas fields having proven reserves of 3 billion tonnes of crude and 4-5 billion cubic meters of natural gas.

Nazarbayev said that if the two countries managed to work out common stand on the use of Caspian Sea resources, other littoral countries will join them as well. "We are not going to do anything to bypass Russia's interests in the region", he said. "Why bring in the United States to develop the local oil fields while Russia is at hand?", he asked the audience.

Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev on Euro-Asian Union

LD2301225495 Moscow NTV in Russian 1900 GMT 23 Jan 95

[Report by correspondent Mikhail Svetlichnyy]

[FBIS Translated Text] President Nazarbayev understands very well that there are quite influential forces within Russia itself and within Kazakhstan which, to put it mildly, are critical about his Euro-Asian initiative. This is what President Nazarbayev said about such criticism in an exclusive interview for our program:

[Begin Nazarbayev recording] I even know from which sources it originates. They say something like: that cunning Asian politician Nazarbayev has some scheme or other there—and so on. But I must say frankly: There is not an iota of political game playing here. It is only a matter of the life that we can observe around us: a united state has fallen apart and the peoples each have their own separate pieces, blocks of this state, and they cannot work out what is going to happen to them tomorrow and what will happen to their children. I am aware that the

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idea of nationalism is being promoted by some politicians in Russia and in Kazakhstan, and I think this is natural. All in all, for every politician, friendship ends where national interests begin. [end recording]

Moscow-Berlin Transport Agreement Signed in Berlin

LD2301174795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1541 GMT 23 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Leonid Vorontsov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Berlin January 23 TASS—Although the Iron Curtain between the East and the West has gone, transport links between Moscow and Berlin remain a problem. Transportation ministers of Russia, Belarus, Poland and Germany, and a European Commission official today signed an agreement on the development of a transport link between Moscow and Berlin which will run across Warsaw and Minsk.

The 1,800-km link, to communicate regions with a population of over 20 million, will shorten the time of travel between the two capitals from 30 to 20 hours, German Transportation Minister Matthias Wissmann

said at the signing ceremony. The project is to be funded not only by interested parties and European Union states but also by private investors. Wissmann said the agreement was an important contribution to the establishment of closer relations between EU states and their eastern neighbours.

Russian Railway Minister Gennadiy Fadeyev said a political basis for closer relations was laid down in last year's may by President Boris Yeltsin and Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Fadeyev said the agreement would help further integration of two national transport systems and cut the distance between Moscow and Berlin.

Russian Transportation Minister Vitaliy Yefimov expressed confidence that in the future this transport link would be extended to Samara, Volga Region, and further to Yekaterinburg, Ural, where the geographic border of Europe runs.

Director of the European Commission's Transport Directorate Robert Colman said a coordinating committee which is set up under the agreement to attend to project implementation would meet in its first session on January 31, 1995 in Brussels.

Political Issues

Yeltsin Said Using Covert Security Service

MM2401100395 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Valeriy Vyzhutovich: "Shadowy Kremlin Advisers Step Up Their Influence. They Are Proposing Formation of National Guard as Instrument in Power Struggle"]

[FBIS Translated Text] IZVESTIYA has received a report from confidential sources that an information and analysis center is in operation three minutes' walk from the Kremlin at No. 5, Ulitsa Varvarka. The building where it is located is part of the complex of well-known buildings embraced by the concept "Staraya Ploshchad."

Numerous attempts to get this report officially confirmed or denied did not meet with success. And then on the morning of 23 January an IZVESTIYA commentator and photographic correspondent set off for the above address. They were stopped at the entrance by a guard in civvies who said that this was the home of the establishment in which the newspaper was interested.

I will tell you about the activity of the mysterious information and analysis center a little later. Right now let me tell you about a document that our sources attest emerged from there.

The draft has already appeared in the press. It did not cause a sensation. But there is reason to trust the source, who claims that this document is destined for the Russian president and is being held in reserve.

Here is what is being proposed: the formation of crack special-purpose armed units in Russia—a National Guard.

To defend whom, and against whom? With what kind of authority? On what legal basis? Under whose control and supervision?

The questions no longer arise once you have studied the draft, key fragments of which need to be reproduced verbatim.

"The political expediency of a National Guard resides in the fact that during historical periods of transition it is the armed organization of a class or stratum of society contending for power and is an instrument in the political power struggle. During a period of stability a National Guard constitutes armed support for the state's political leader.

"A National Guard as an integral part of the country's armed forces can (and most likely should) come under the direct jurisdiction of the president and thus be associated in society with his name and will act on behalf of the head of state. It is very important that there be comprehensive study of the question of whether the formation of a National Guard will help the president to

exercise the functions of head of state, whether threats to the president exist, and how they can be averted as they arise or subsequently neutralized.

"A National Guard can assume functions which the Army does not exercise, associated more with internal problems and threats, and can combine armed formations scattered around various departments under a unified command.

"The deployment of National Guard units across the territory enables the situation in the regions to be tracked and influenced by forces loyal to the president.... Regional units, particularly in border areas, could be manned by armed detachments of Cossacks, who would become an integral part of the National Guard and not the Defense Ministry....

"National Guard units should be small, but elite. Their special status should be confirmed not only by their affiliation to the president but also by their actual conditions of service.

"A National Guard could be an armed force on which the Russian Federation president could rely in political crises within the country."

Who is planning the gigantic new special service, and under whom? We can find the answer in the draft itself: "When adopting a decision we must act on the basis of the political and military expediency of forming such armed formations, mindful of Russia's historical experience... and the state's potential for forming and maintaining these units, and also bear in mind other aspects, including the interests of Russia's special services, **primarily the interests of the Russian Federation presidential service (author's emphasis).**"

For that read: "the Russian Federation Presidential Security Service"—no other presidential service is yet ranked among the special services. One word tactfully omitted (either on grounds of security or with a view to not taking the name of a powerful department in vain) does not effectively change things: The new organization is being created by General Korzhakov, chief of the Presidential Security Service. Experts employed in the closed information and analysis establishment are giving this undertaking an ideological foundation.

The first attempts to get to the people compiling the plan resembled a bad thriller. The secret analysis were asked—via an intermediary—to satisfy, as far as state secrecy permits, IZVESTIYA's interest in the planned formation of a National Guard. Via third parties the author was told that they seemed to have agreed to talk and was instructed to be patient and wait for a telephone call. After three days' wait the editorial office received a call. A man's voice cautiously enquired what specifically the esteemed newspaper was interested in. When asked to introduce himself officially the interlocutor declined. He then said roughly the following:

"Aware of the attitude of certain mass media to certain services, we would not want false interpretations. The plan for a National Guard has nothing to do with the organization that I represent. But we would like this idea to meet with an appropriate assessment in the press in order that it can be correctly understood...."

[Editorial Office] "Can we meet and talk in more detail?"

[Caller] "I must consult my bosses."

When asked to leave his telephone number, he refused: "I will call you."

The call never came.

...Recently the staff of the presidential analysis center have begun to be conscious of invisible rivals at their back. And they have realized that they are losing whatever influence they had over their customer.

Analysts from Mark Urnov's department say that they have had no real mission since about last October. Previous development plans are not being put to use. Strategic studies are lying unclaimed. All serious studies are mixed up with a flood of notes and reports to the bosses in response to all manner of transient bureaucratic requirements. Many personnel recruited to the president's intellectual team from academic institutes are talking increasingly frequently and increasingly frankly about quitting, and one has already quit.

"It is impossible to work even technologically," one of the president's analysts complained to the author. "Everything is classified! We are only authorized to use open sources, but they carry such 'disinformation....'"

The purely decorative nature of the official analysis center becomes clearer, the more obvious its shadowy counterpart's real influence over policy becomes.

IZVESTIYA failed to obtain any official information about the work of the unknown experts and consultants. Andrey Oligov, the Presidential Security Service staffer responsible for press relations, gave a categorical answer when asked directly whether there is some kind of analysis center within the bowels of this department: "No. What are you talking about?" But probably sensing that the author had some knowledge, he moderated his answer: "Well, a small group of analysts, but you get them everywhere nowadays...." The interview promised by Mr. Oligov—day in, day out, for a week—regarding the work of this "small group" did not take place either. And it was only from sources close to the FCS [Federal Counterintelligence Service] and other special services that the author managed to unearth some information (now that the Presidential Security Service press leadership is at liberty to confirm or deny its authenticity) regarding the activity of the extremely interesting establishment that operates without a nameplate.

Funded out of the Presidential Security Service budget, the information and analysis center (that is what we shall

call it) appeared around a year ago. With no material or cadre difficulties its staff, initially confined to what was indeed a small group of specialists, is estimated by some to have risen to 60 people and by others to 100. Virtually all the staff here are former special service personnel.

According to our information, Georgiy Ragozin, deputy chief of the Presidential Security Service, who was at one time discharged from the KGB, is directly in charge of the center.

The leadership of the Presidential Security Service is the customer and consumer for the center's output. Experts and consultants have unlimited access to any sources of information. They have an extensive staff of informers, including paid informers.

Some notes and reports reach the president. Some material is directed at particular officials whose interest in a certain information product is either obvious or assumed. The product is stamped "Based on Presidential Security Service Material" and is never signed.

From time to time the center's leadership organizes a "leak" of disinformation. Then the Russian press is filled at a stroke with sensational reports from "reliable sources" regarding impending cadre reshuffles, resignations, and reorganizations.

In the view of certain analysts, it was this center that emitted the rumor—picked up by the newspapers and soon denied by the president himself—of the impending dissolution of the FCS and the transfer of its component directorates to various ministries and departments. And last March "Scenario No. 1" was published regarding an alleged plan for a coup d'état. A "scenario" on which Sergey Shakhrai commented: "This is not a leak but a good piece of disinformation. It is professional and clears the way for a number of federal politicians who are now undertaking something or other...." The question of the authorship of "Scenario No. 1" has not hitherto been fully cleared up but, as sources within the FCS attest, there are good grounds to seek the authors in a certain building on Ulitsa Varvarka.

Lastly, another kind of product turned out by the center is the "aktivka." (For the uninitiated, an "aktivka" is a rumor, a piece of slander, a denunciation, which enables active measures like bugging, visual surveillance, opening of correspondence, etc) to be initiated against a stated target. Sources attest that there is an "aktivka" stamped "Based on Presidential Security Service Material" on virtually all Russian leaders and senior personnel within the presidential and government staff.

It would be appropriate here to mention staffers' new method of communicating with one another's offices—unprecedented even in the CPSU's time—that has recently gained a foothold in the Kremlin, the White House, and on Staraya Ploshchad. Nowadays, should interlocutors want to tell one another something not designed for outside ears, they use memos. An epistolary

epidemic has encompassed all offices and Russian corridors of power. Against this backdrop the recent admission by Vladimir Kvasov, former leader of the government staff in an interview with OBSHCAYA GAZETA no longer seems sensational: "In my view everyone is bugged, even the premier."

Criminal Proceedings Against Yeltsin's Security Service

LD2301155695 Moscow 2x2 Television in Russian 1454 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] POSTFACTUM agency reports that the military procurator's office has instituted criminal proceedings against the presidential security service on charges of exceeding its authority and using incommensurate means in an incident outside the Moscow mayor's building on the Novyy Arbat at the beginning of December. Moscow mayor Yuriy Luzhkov told newsmen this at a news conference in Moscow today. He described the security service's action as disgraceful and criminal, and stressed that it was impossible to leave it without any legal action being taken.

New FCS Moscow Head Ready To Move on 'Most' Group

MK2001122095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jan 95 p 1

[Report by Andrey Streletskiy under the "Appointment" rubric: "'Most' Group in for Big Troubles"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lieutenant General Anatoliy Trofimov was appointed new chief of the Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS] Moscow and Moscow Oblast Directorate yesterday.

Mr. Trofimov's predecessor in this post is known to have been fired by Russian President Boris Yeltsin's edict of 2 December in the wake of the incident outside the Moscow City Hall building where members of the presidential special services and guards of the "Most" Group Limited Company clashed. According to rumors, the country's top leaders resented the resolute actions of the Moscow FCS Directorate that rose to protect a privately owned structure.

In a curious coincidence, Anatoliy Trofimov's appointment came the day after the interview for ARGUMENTY I FAKTY by Major General Aleksandr Korzhakov, chief of the Russian president's Security Service, in which he spoke in extremely sharp terms about the "Most" Group and its head Vladimir Gusinskiy. This interview and NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's own information give grounds to presume that the new head of the FCS Moscow Directorate may jump into this standoff. Lt. Gen. Trofimov may try to put the record straight by saying which person in the past contributed to his discharge from the Russian Federation Security Ministry, where he was in charge of the Directorate for Combating Smuggling and Corruption. The very same

background [last word in English] on "Most" Group's connections in the government of Moscow and the city's law and order organs mentioned in yesterday's NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA story, "Russian President's Security Service Versus 'Most' Group," may be brought to the lieutenant general's attention. Aleksandr Trofimov is mentioned in this document in the context of efforts by some "Moscow team" in implementing successful personnel actions in Moscow's Main Internal Affairs Directorate and the Russian Federation Security Ministry.

Gusinskiy Said Facing Extradition from UK

MK2001121095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Jan 95 p 1

[Report by Igor Andreyev under the "Standoff" rubric: "'Most' Group in for Big Troubles. Major General Korzhakov Announces Opening of 'Goose Hunting' Season"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A well-informed source in the Kremlin has told NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA that one of the Russian Federation special services is planning to carry out measures aimed at weakening the positions of Vladimir Gusinskiy in international and Russian banking circles. It is expected that this may result in a number of European financial institutions' discontinuing correspondent relations with Most-Bank, an outflow of major Russian and foreign clients, massive withdrawals of deposits, and refusals to provide interbank credits.

Being prepared are newspaper and television exposes (based on materials of operational videotaping) depicting in negative terms the activity of the "Most" Group and its leaders, as well as that of politicians, business people, and officials and members of the "power" structures connected with it. After a campaign to brainwash public opinion and having received sanctions from the General Prosecutor's Office, possible are the arrests of rather high-placed officials on charges of corruption and abuse of office, and of financiers on charges of bribing members of the law and order organs.

It has come to light that Vladimir Gusinskiy, now living in London, is under close control of officers of a number of Russian secret services in foreign countries. Work is on to discover his private bank accounts and real estate in the West. Special groups have been created and are standing by to follow and monitor Mr. Gusinskiy's movements in case he takes a plane to Switzerland. According to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA information, Mr. Gusinskiy is planning to go there, but before that, to Spain. In the next few days perhaps, correspondents of leading Western mass media accredited in Moscow will be offered exclusive materials on Vladimir Gusinskiy's sins regarding his initial accumulation of capital, and other damning evidence in order to sway public opinion in Great Britain. In the next move, a criminal case is supposed to be instituted against the Most-Bank chief,

and the British authorities will be asked for his extradition. To insure the success of what is being contemplated, it is possible that there may be a personal conversation by one of Russia's top leaders with Prime Minister John Major to ask him for cooperation. Well, next is Lefortovo Prison and a show trial of the Moscow financial genius.

To all appearances, there are grounds to believe that some Most-Bank employees have entered into contact with the authorities and are briefing them in detail on their chiefs' plans to overcome the current predicaments. It is not ruled out that the question of restructuring NTV and handing to the state the controlling bloc of that company's shares may be raised once more. In order to block the presidential chief of staff's attempts to prevent this decision, Boris Yeltsin will be briefed on some sort of documents; after he sees these, Sergey Filatov, in the source's words, "will be booted from the Kremlin."

Thus, Vladimir Gusinskiy's [whose last name derives from "goose"] titanic struggle with Aleksandr Korzhakov (whose favorite pastime is goose hunting) will, in all likelihood, end in favor of the omnipotent general. Using the sad lesson of the "Most" Group, Russian bankers should clearly realize that their work is to make money rather than engage in politics.

Kovalev Says Grachev's Remarks 'Declarations of a Lout'

LD2301203195 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 23 Jan 95

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] In an interview with our program today, Sergey Kovalev said that he was extremely flattered by Pavel Grachev's sharp remarks about him and regarded them as a proof that his work in Chechnya had been successful. Kovalev does not intend to sue Grachev.

[Begin Kovalev recording] I would like to express my profound gratitude to the German defense minister [Volker Ruehe], who has reacted to this incident as a cultured general should react to the declarations of a lout who has gotten out of hand. [end recording]

According to Kovalev, the idea that the president's entourage is deceiving him is naive and no longer plausible.

[Begin Kovalev recording] I think Yeltsin was probably drawn into this game, but now he has gone so far along this road that he can no longer see. Unfortunately, he can no longer see any way out of it for himself. [end recording]

Sergey Adamovich's proposals remain the same: to put pressure on the Russian leaders demanding talks on a truce and a cease-fire, which—in Kovalev's opinion—can be conducted only with Dudayev's administration.

The human rights activist is convinced that there is no other force in Chechnya capable of controlling the armed groups.

[Begin Kovalev recording] The only real achievement is that the public and the press—which does not keep its mouth shut and which it has not been possible to silence—has realized what is happening. [end recording]

Filatov Calls Grachev Remarks 'Inadmissible'

LD2301191895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1715 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 23 (Interfax)—Kremlin Chief of Staff Sergey Filatov today said he considers inadmissible "offensive statements of parliamentarians, ministers and other officials in each other's address." This was Filatov's comment to an Interfax correspondent on the statements made by Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev about Commissioner for Human Rights Sergey Kovalev, Chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee Sergey Yushenkov and other Russian officials.

Filatov said that such a tone of speech "humiliates not only the authors of offensive statements but Russia as a whole."

When asked about his attitude towards Sergey Kovalev, Filatov said "Kovalev may not be a convenient human rights defender but the country must have at least one such man."

More on Gen. Kondratyev's News Conference

MK2101084095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Jan 95 p 1

[B.G. report under the "In Brief" rubric: "Col. Gen. Kondratyev Confident He Is Right"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The occasion for Colonel General Georgiy Kondratyev's meeting with the press was the removal from positions in the Defense Ministry of Colonel Generals Boris Gromov, Valeriy Mironov, and Kondratyev himself.

The fired generals, to Gen. Kondratyev's mind, enjoyed high prestige in the Armed Forces and were capable of leading the army. Since June 1992, Georgiy Kondratyev had been in charge of organizing peacekeeping activity in hot spots of the former Union. Also developed under his guidance in that period was a concept for the employment of peacekeeping units in peacekeeping operations. The experience of Russia's peacekeeping forces' operation was recognized by the United Nations and the CSCE.

Gen. Kondratyev thinks that, like the other generals, he became unacceptable to the defense minister because he disagrees with the preparation for and methods of carrying out the military operation in Chechnya. Nor does

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the colonel general agree with the modes of conduct of combat operations inside Grozny, of which the defense minister has been told.

"I am still in charge of the Armed Forces' peacekeeping activity in the conflict areas," the colonel general stated, and "it is unclear why Col. Gen. Valeriy Toporov has been appointed to this position without my official discharge by presidential edict."

In Kondratyev's words, the Military Collegium [of the Supreme Court] has not been taking part in solving personnel questions in the Defense Ministry for three months now, being replaced by a narrow circle of aides to the defense minister. Gen. Kondratyev hopes that the State Duma, Federation Council, and their defense committees will take up this question and see what is going on in the Defense Ministry.

Communists Seek 'Voluntary Reunification' of USSR

LD2101162995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1513 GMT 21 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 21 (INTERFAX)—Russian Communist Party leader Gennadiy Zyuganov has proclaimed "voluntary reunification" of former Soviet republics, "restoration of power by the people and the ouster from power of the 'high treason party'" as the Communists' goals.

Today "total chaos" reigns in Russia's government system, the country being ruled by a regime which has "usurped power" and pursues aims "contrary to the people's interests," Zyuganov said in a report to the Communist Party's third congress, opened in Moscow on Saturday.

He said the party had been able "to restore its organizational structures and rebuild its vertical and horizontal links."

"Political education of the working class," today "lacking internal unity," remains an important task for the Communists. To intellectuals, the party must be able to offer "prospects of cultural revival," and to the rural population, a concrete program for the revival of the countryside, to be drawn up jointly with sympathizers from the Agrarian Party, for "without a union of hammer and sickle the people's power is impossible in our country."

Young people in Russia are worse off than anyone else, having been "deprived of equal opportunities." But not all of them "choose Pepsi," Zyuganov said in an ironic allusion to a once frequent television advert. Youth organizations are getting more closely involved in the activities of the Communist Party and other left-wing organizations. Last year 9,000 people under 28 joined the Communist Party, Zyuganov said.

The agenda of the congress, to continue on Sunday, includes debates on the leader's report and on a new program and charter for the party.

In an interval between sessions, delegates laid wreaths at the Lenin Mausoleum on Red Square.

Zyuganov Calls for End to Chechen Conflict

LD2101133795 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 21 Jan 95

[Remarks by Russian Communist Party leader Gennadiy Zyuganov to the Communist Party Third Congress in Moscow on 21 January; from the "Vesti" newscast—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The events in Chechnya, which are fanning the flames of a new Caucasian war and a Bosnia-type confrontation between Slavs and Muslims, can only be seen as another step toward the destruction of Russia's unity. You know very well the position that the central committee has taken on this matter: We resolutely demand that the combat actions on both sides cease, the necessary negotiations are held, and there is an investigation into the causes of this unprecedented bloodbath.

Kuptsov on Communist Party Plans

954F0949A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jan 95 pp 1, 2

[Interview with V. Kuptsov, first deputy chairman of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Central Executive Committee, by Valentina Nikiforova; place and date not given: "Hard School of Opposition: Communist Party of the Russian Federation Before the Congress"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Third Communist Party of the Russian Federation Congress will take place 21-22 January in the Hall of Columns of the House of Unions in Moscow. Some 800 delegates and guests and representatives of overseas Communist Parties from 45 countries will be present.

The congress will adopt the party program, which confirms fidelity to the ideas of socialism. Constructed as a program-minimum and program-maximum, it characterizes the development of Russia in the third millennium and outlines a program of the specific actions of the party in opposition up to the accession to power and after the taking of power together with progressive and patriotic forces. It defines the priority tasks: organizational reinforcement, party discipline, rejuvenation, the systematic political training of the communists, and the education of nonparty people.

Not even two years have elapsed since the second, special, congress in February 1993, but this has been an entire history for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. How does V. Kuptsov, first deputy chairman of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Central Executive Committee, assess this period?

[Nikiforova] You, Valentin Aleksandrovich, have acquired a difficult area—organizational work. The assignment given at the second congress was the restoration of the party and the creation of a network of party organizations and organizational structures and their preparation for political struggle. Has it been accomplished?

[Kuptsov] Yes, it may confidently be said that the congress' main assignment has been accomplished. The party has been restored. More than 20,000 primary organizations encompass all territories, and vertical structures have been created. And a second, very important, conclusion: In the two years there have been qualitative changes within the party itself. There was a change in the tone of the speeches at the report and election meetings, city, rayon, and oblast conferences, and republic congresses that were held: There was virtually none of the nostalgia, leftist extremism and carping, and the showering of heads with ashes characteristic of 1993. Constructive and meaningful conversation is taking place, as a rule. The majority of the communists understand that the party has to be reconstituted as a renewed party and must imbibe the best traditions of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR and take account of the bitter lessons of defeat and the new realities. People have already encountered problems of operating under the new conditions as a political organization in opposition to the ruling regime. This is why we have heard everywhere the questions of how to operate under these conditions and what to do to restore people's trust, head the organized struggle of the opposition, expand its influence among the population, and organize a real bloc of forces of the left.

[Nikiforova] The most important thing that defines fellow thinkers, allies, and fellow travelers, though, is ideology.

[Kuptsov] I would not put it that unequivocally. The unification of a broad bloc of forces of the left and public associations and movements is possible on the basis of popular, Soviet patriotism, love for the motherland, and the sense of impending general misfortune—the collapse of the Union and Russia and the loss of our statehood. Ideology and goals are, however, important for a political mass organization, of course. This is why the broad alliance of our Communist Party with patriotic movements, and within it, unification not on the basis of frozen dogmas but on the fundamental principles of scientific Marxism-Leninism as a developing teaching, is strengthening increasingly. This has become a part of all our documents. But we do not renounce all that is positive that has been accumulated by the communist movement in other countries. Primarily in such areas as the unification of forces of the left, reliance on the patriotic movement, and a realistic attitude toward forms of ownership, whence also the formulation of tactics. This is a difficult recognition, but the bulk of communists understand that they have to live and work in the real life of a specific city or village where there are

legalized private enterprises and stock companies. Any ultra-communist itch here (the confiscation of a tractor or bakehouse or workshop, the closure of private enterprise) only increases social animosity and harms our cause. For this reason our Communist Party recognizes the diversity of forms of ownership and the multiple structure of the economy. But the determining share even in the transitional period is assigned state, cooperative, or any collective ownership excluding the exploitation of wage labor. Our position is reflected both in the draft program and in the proposed amendments to the rules.

[Nikiforova] The version of the draft program that was approved at the Central Executive Committee Ninth Plenum on 22 October is a sound, serious, and interesting document.

[Kuptsov] But it also has already been reworked. It has to be said that there is continuous debate around the program....

[Nikiforova] Because, possibly, a program in our unstable times is not so essential that the party cannot operate without it? PRAVDA readers have proposed that we confine ourselves to a statement, a manifesto.

[Kuptsov] We are a serious political force setting serious goals of struggle against the regime, and a program is essential. We have been criticized repeatedly for procrastinating, for not adopting it. But it took us two years to arrive at it—from a program statement adopted at the second congress to the theses approved at the April conference and to the fact that we are preparing for the third congress. It has to be said that hundreds of scholars and practical experts have commented on it. We received more than 100 different versions—thanks to everyone! In Khabarovsk, Samara, Perm, Leningrad Oblast, and in Moscow RUSO scholars have discussed and argued and, perhaps, before the congress and at the congress everyone will still be revising the wording.

[Nikiforova] But you can cite the basic propositions?

[Kuptsov] The draft program makes a brief analysis of the lessons of Soviet history and the reasons for the crisis of socialism and the party. It shows that a bourgeois counterrevolution, whose second stage began in October 1993, is being undertaken at the present time. The draft program of the party confirms that it is true to its main goals and is now struggling for the socialist path of Russia's development. And we will make use of all the forms available to a political party, including those specified by international human rights conventions. The program affirms that at the stage of the national liberation process the communists, struggling against the antipopular regime, will operate together with their allies. We make no secret of the fact that the defense of national-state interests has nothing in common, as we understand it, with the pseudo-statists who have given notice of themselves as of late in the highest echelons of power. It is, as we understand it, a struggle against

imperialist expansion and counterrevolution and for socialism and Soviet forms of democracy.

[Nikiforova] And, of course, the defense of all those struggling against the regime and support for the national liberation movement. And only a highly disciplined organization is capable of this, of course. Is this contained in the amendments to the rules?

[Kuptsov] More, even. They contain a disclosure of the content of the work. One of the main issues that has not been tackled in the two years is the youth question. We are helping to restore the Communist Youth Union and are working with various youth organizations. But young men and women are not pouring into the Communist Party of the Russian Federation as yet. The intake of young people is not even compensating, however distressing, for the departure of veterans. We are proposing a lowering of the age of admission to 16 and the creation of youth sections in the party. It is a shame that veterans' experience is being wasted. Here the young people would be both alongside them and at the same time independent.

Discipline is something else. Yes, we respect the opinion of the minority. But if a decision has been adopted, the party operates as a single organism. Under the conditions of opposition a party must be united. This is not today the case, unfortunately, and for this reason we are frequently unsuccessful and are losers even. We could have achieved more at the last elections: The constitution would not have been adopted and more of our people would have been elected to the Federal Assembly had we fulfilled the conference's decision on participation in the elections. But certain party committees succumbed to the boycott temptation. We do not have a single deputy of ours in the Moscow City Duma even. Everyone understands this now, but time has been lost.

Or a recent action—the general poll on early presidential elections. This was the principal occupation from 21 September through 21 December, and many party organizations did the work and collected 3.106 million signatures plus a further 1.4 million subscribing contributors. Voronezh, Belgorod, Krasnoyarsk, Smolensk, Altay, Khabarovsk, Krasnodar—more than 100,000 signatures were collected in each of these organizations.

One-third of the amendments are connected with the creation of horizontal structures. The conditions are such that without financial support the organization of large plenums and various seminars and conferences is unrealistic. Our purpose, therefore, is to create inter-rayon, inter-oblast coordination centers, which will be the organizers of work with different categories of people. This will make it possible to expand democratic principles and bring the leadership of the party closer to the territories. Although we are not just sitting here as it is: Zyuganov has visited more than 30 krais and oblasts, and I have visited 23. Deputies of the State Duma travel regularly. But this is not enough. Meetings with a group of rayons could be held more frequently, and they would

obtain more first-hand information, and the leadership, critical observations and proposals, which is extremely necessary for the party. And one further appreciable point in their favor: savings.

[Nikiforova] Well, now, Valentin Aleksandrovich, it is over two years since the ruling of the Constitutional Court even, and the assets and finances of the party have not been returned. We note with distress that communists (heroes of labor and war among them!) are, at best, huddled together in small veterans' rooms and some basement premises. The Central Executive Committee does not have permanent headquarters even. Perhaps the Presidium is involving itself insufficiently insistently in the return of the party's assets? And the authorities are shamelessly availing themselves of this....

[Kuptsov] Yes, the Constitutional Court granted party organizations the right to seek the return of party property. It constitutes, according to the specialists' estimates and documents found in the CPSU Central Committee, 93 percent. It should be complied with, it would seem. But only in Buryatia, perhaps, have the communists been treated in human fashion. The republic's leaders returned the party organization's premises and provided it with transportation. There are a few similar examples. A recent case is Bashkiria. But in the vast majority the immoral authorities are resisting in every possible way and are not even accepting documents from the party committees. Why are they directly violating legislation? The administration of the regions knows that much of the party's assets have been stolen. And were a trial to begin, the court would look for the guilty parties, those who violated the law on property, who seized the property of others. It would not be to their advantage. But there is a barrier to us also—the 10 percent costs. And the party has, to be blunt, little money. We will continue the struggle for the property, but we are proposing that the authorities give some of it back voluntarily. This would be honest and proper.

[Nikiforova] Aside from ideology, the party undoubtedly needs funds and personnel. Does it not seem to you that the regulations on the payment of membership dues, when 50 percent remains with the primary organizations, is not contributing to the creation of material resources. What can a primary organization do with such a negligible sum? But pooled, this would amount to something.

[Kuptsov] At the congress we want to raise the question of a redistribution of contributions—in order to concentrate them in the city and oblast committees. They are needed for the accomplishment of purely political assignments, the publication and distribution of newspapers, the mounting of election campaigns, and the support of at least a small staff.

[Nikiforova] Here is a question that is clear, it would seem, but the accents need to be inserted, nonetheless. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation is frequently accused of having become a parliamentary party.

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[Kuptsov] What is needed, more precisely, is a characterization of what the Communist Party of the Russian Federation is today. It is, first, we have already spoken of this, a network of primary party organizations. They work with the population daily: explain, propagandize, persuade, stage demonstrations, and organize picket lines and protest actions. After all, communists participated on 27 October in the unions' protest in an absolute majority of oblasts. It is not fortuitous that 40 percent of the 8.4 million participants supported political demands. A second example: More than 10 million persons turned out on 7 November for meetings organized by the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. The demonstrations were held mainly under red flags as a protest against the political and economic policy of the president and the government. A third example, the most passionate: the protest against the war in the Chechen Republic. A fourth—support for the strike, stoppage, and trade union committees. Is this only parliamentary activity?

But after the elections we will be able to bolster this activity by parliamentary activity. For we see that, aside from the forces of the left, there is no one to defend the interests of the working people. We will approach the elections actively, therefore, and fight for seats in the representative organs of power. And lest there be any doubt, we state once again: The faction is a part of the party with an opportunity to present a legislative initiative (abrogation of the Belovezha agreements, for example) and express its attitude toward matters of principle (no confidence in the government, a protest against the budget, an end to combat operations in the Chechen Republic). Not everything is carried but it is necessary to seek allies and work with the deputies and factions. How, for example, was the law on fighting organized crime passed? At first: "No!" "No!" Only subsequently did it muster the requisite number of votes. We are accumulating experience of combining extra-parliamentary and parliamentary methods.

[Nikiforova] The all-Union party meeting with the agenda of a return of power to the people was part of the canvas of these actions also. What form of power of the people does the Communist Party of the Russian Federation defend?

[Kuptsov] The soviets. This form is connected with experience, traditions, and its latent potential. It is important at this time because it affords an opportunity for control of the executive. Although I do not rule out reality engendering some other form of power of the people also. The main thing is that this is the power of the working people, representative, legislative power.

[Nikiforova] But the working people are not as yet displaying much of an interest in power. How else to explain the fact that instead of the clear-headed Vasily Shinkarev, repairman of the ZIL, a worker rayon elected to the State Duma the know-it-all Artem Tarasov? Or a recent example—Mavrodi's victory....

[Kuptsov] Our misfortune. We have been unable to create an organized workers' movement. Although this should have been one of the main aims. A start has been made: We have held an all-Russia workers' congress and formed the All-Russia Coordinating Committee.

[Nikiforova] Among the unresolved tasks, one of considerable importance, perhaps, is this: The Communist Party of the Russian Federation has not united the opposition forces and become a vanguard party.

[Kuptsov] It could not have become a vanguard party under these conditions, however much we might have wanted this, inasmuch as we have no primary organizations in the industrial labor outfits, and a majority of the electorate is not voting for us as yet. And as regards the unification of the opposition—this is a more complex question. This is a new problem for the party, we have no experience of the formation of opposition blocs or alliances. It is paradoxical, but all opposition movements are being created not from below but from above—on the basis of... leaders. They met, they reached agreement. They needed subsequently to mount organizational structuring locally, but the majority of parties lacks all structures. This work is being shifted involuntarily onto the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. It has been forced to cobble together blocs from its own people and individual friendly members of the opposition. And this at times causes perplexity and suspicion: Will power in this bloc not be seized by the communists. And the leaders also behave strangely at times: They met—they reached agreement. But they did so without prior study in the parties, not having discussed this in a single body. Thus the Kaliningrad Declaration and the entire Accord in the Name of Russia movement also were left hanging.

[Nikiforova] The question of the leaders is the most serious one, perhaps.

[Kuptsov] The two years have shown that it is not possible to be a formal leader these days. Selfless work is needed today. What, for example, is Byransk's Oleg Shinkarev doing? Insatiable passion. Five days in the Duma, and Saturdays and Sundays, morning till night, he works in the organizations. And as a result seven out of the nine deputies at the by-elections to the oblast Duma were ours, two, agrarians. Such people as Alevtina Aparina from Volgograd, Aleksandr Mikhaylev from Kursk, the Far Easterner Gennadiy Gamza, the Astrakhan Yuriy Poldnikov, and Valentin Shurchanov from Chuvashia. We have raised many new people, they lack experience as yet, but they have faith in the idea and conviction.

[Nikiforova] And I could in addition mention several dozen activists whom I know well: Grigoriy Kuzmich Rebrov, Ivan Pavlovich Osadchiy, Lidiya Vasilyevna Vorobyeva, Vitaliy Aleksandrovich Safronov.... Valentin Aleksandrovich, two years ago, in an interview prior to the second congress, you said that you would work for the party wherever you happened to be. You have honorably kept your word. What is your frame of mind now?

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[Kuptsov] A work frame of mind. All my thoughts are centered on how best to hold the congress and adopt the necessary documents and a program of specific actions of the struggle for socialism, the power of the people, a united fatherland, and the social and economic rights and safeguards of the working people.

Resolution on Communist Congress

954F0949B Moscow GLASNOST in Russian No 1-2,
1-15 Jan 95 p 2

["Resolution of the Union of Communist Parties-CPSU plenum: Preparations for the 30th Union of Communist Parties-CPSU Congress"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The plenum notes that the broad and concentrated offensive against the intra-Union market of international corporations and foreign goods and services signifying the demise of domestic production has become distinctly palpable for broad strata of the people's masses, the leaders of industries and enterprises, and all business circles.

The interdependence of all the republics of the former USSR has become just as keenly palpable. The peoples, primarily the working people, are coming to understand the need for a strong Union state guaranteeing the defense of their interests. This is creating the conditions for the cohesion around the communists of a broad bloc of people's forces and a real substantive opposition.

The ruling regimes are becoming nervous and are preparing intensively for themselves insurance versions of survival—authoritarian, social democratic, nationalist, and monarchical even.

An internal fight for power with reliance on various lobby groups is under way in their ranks. Not one of the so-called "independent states" has proven its capacity for defending its interests in the face of the diktat of the West or for safeguarding its independence and territorial integrity.

Under these conditions it is becoming clear that only a strong united socialist state, the question of whose reconstitution has switched to a practical plane, can defend the vital interests of the peoples.

The communists, united in a single party and operating under a leadership capable of confronting the external and internal forces causing the collapse and capitulation of the country, can and should be the driving force of this process.

The 30th SKP [Union of Communist Parties]-CPSU Congress should be a historic landmark in the creation of such a party.

The SKP-CPSU Council plenum resolves:

to continue work on fulfillment of the resolution of the SKP-CPSU Council plenum of 10 July 1994;

to instruct the SKP-CPSU Council Political Executive Committee to form working groups to prepare documents for the congress;

that questions concerning the representation quota for delegates to the 30th SKP-CPSU Congress and its agenda and time and venue shall be decided at the next SKP-CPSU Council plenum.

Communists Call for Unified Party

954F0949C Moscow GLASNOST in Russian No 1-2,
1-15 Jan 95 p 2

["Appeal of the Union of Communist Parties-CPSU Council Plenum to Communists of the Russian Federation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Comrades! The political and economic situation in the Russian Federation is being understood by increasingly large strata of the population as the failure of the bourgeois transformations. The attempt to consolidate the counterrevolutionary coup and to return the country to the capitalist path of development is encountering the working people's growing resistance. Increasingly frequent are the mass expressions of no confidence in the ruling regime, increasingly insistent are the nationwide demands for the restoration of Soviet power, socialism, and the Soviet Union. But the actions of the working masses are frequently of a disconnected, spontaneous nature. Their cohesion around the communists is being hampered by the fragmented nature of the communist movement.

The multiparty character of the communists on the territory of Russia is the main obstacle to the winning of the working people's trust, is holding back a growth of the party ranks, and is contributing to the penetration in the masses of an ideology that is alien to us.

Yet an analysis of the party programs and political statements of the Communist Parties of the Russian Federation that arose on the membership base of the CPSU shows that they are all united on the main point: They are guided by Marxist-Leninist ideology and they seek the restoration of the power of the soviets of working people, the socialist path of development, and the reconstitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Disagreements on questions of the tactics of the achievement of the common goals may be overcome successfully by joint efforts within the framework of a unified Communist Party that recognizes its historical responsibility to the working masses.

The SKP-CPSU Council plenum appeals to the leaders of the Communist Parties of the Russian Federation and all communists of Russia for the speediest unification in a single republic Communist Party—the basis of the preservation of the integrity of the Russian Federation and the reconstitution of the Soviet Union and a unified Communist Party of the USSR.

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Communist Party Congress Proceedings Reported*MM2401105195 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Jan 95 p 1*

[Unattributed report under general heading: "Third Communist Party of the Russian Federation Congress Has Completed Its Work in Moscow; Program Adopted Defines Aims and Tasks of the Party of Communists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The third congress of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF] was at work for two days in the Hall of Columns of the capital's House of Unions. Russia's largest political organization was represented by 363 delegates. They included 10 percent under the age of 40. And in all together with the guests 125 young Communists took part in the forum's work. The working class was widely represented—42 delegates and 60 guests. The delegates included 70 academy members and doctors and candidates of sciences, 68 economic leaders, and 73 deputies from the Federal Assembly and regional representative organs.... Delegations from over 47 communist and left-wing parties from the countries of the near and far abroad came to the congress.

The very composition of the congress is evidence of the increase in trust in the Communists among the most diverse strata of our society and of the CPRF's growing international authority. This was convincingly confirmed by the two-day discussion on the party's fundamental tasks.

The congress opened on the day commemorating the founder of the communist party and the world's first worker and peasant state. CPRF Central Executive Committee Chairman G.A. Zyuganov delivered a brief and penetrating speech about V.I. Lenin. The congress supported the statement of the participants in the meeting of communist parties on the celebration of the 125th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth 23 April 1995.

G.A. Zyuganov delivered the CPRF Central Executive Committee political report to the congress (published in today's issue of the newspaper). The report of the Central Control and Auditing Commission was delivered by its chairman, L.N. Petrovskiy. A.A. Shabanov, chairman of the working commission for the party program, told how work on the completion of this document in the party organization has ended. V.A. Kuptsov, first deputy chairman of the Central Executive Committee, generalized the proposals from the localities for changing the party Rules. V.I. Zorkaltsev informed the congress of the work of the Communists of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly.

During the keen constructive discussion of the reports and announcements the party's operational aims and strategic tasks were determined. Serious attention was paid to the Communists' participation in the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections and in the overcoming of the political and economic crisis in the country.

The congress adopted the Party Program.

Additions and amendments were introduced to the CPRF Rules.

The congress adopted decrees on the CPRF Central Executive Committee political report, the Central Control and Auditing Commission report, "against repressions against Communists in the states formed on USSR territory," and "on the 50th anniversary of the Victory over German fascism," a statement "on the 125th anniversary of the birth of Vladimir Ilich Lenin," resolutions "on the fratricidal war in the Chechen Republic and a way out of the crisis which has emerged" and "on the further consolidation of the Communists' unity of actions and solidarity" and appeals "to the country's youth" and "to Russia's citizens."

The congress elected the party's leading organs—the Central Committee and the Central Control and Auditing Commission.

CPRF Central Committee Election Results*MM2401111595 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 24 Jan 95 p 1*

[Unattributed report under general heading: "Third Communist Party of the Russian Federation Congress Has Completed Work in Moscow; Program Adopted Defines Aims and Tasks of the Party of Communists"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Joint Plenum

A joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control and Auditing Commission was held 22 January.

The plenum examined organizational questions.

The plenum elected Comrade G.A. Zyuganov chairman of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF] Central Committee, Comrade V.A. Kuptsov first deputy chairman of the Central Committee, and Comrade A.A. Shabanov deputy chairman of the Central Committee.

A Central Committee Presidium of 19 members was elected, including A.V. Aparina, Yu.P. Belov, V.M. Vildmanov, G.Ye. Gamza, V.I. Zorkaltsev, G.A. Zyuganov, L.A. Ivanchenko, A.V. Ionov, V.A. Koptuyug, G.V. Kostin, V.A. Kuptsov, A.I. Lukyanov, I.I. Melnikov, V.I. Nikitin, V.P. Peshkov, S.A. Potapov, M.S. Surkov, K.A. Tsiku, A.A. Shabanov.

N.G. Bindyukov, I.I. Melnikov, V.P. Peshkov, S.A. Potapov, and G.N. Seleznev were elected Central Committee secretaries.

L.N. Petrovskiy was elected chairman of the Central Control and Auditing Commission.

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Two Republican Parties Hold News Conferences

MK2101103095 Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian 21 Jan 95 p 2

[Report by Gleb Cherkasov under the "Parties" rubric: "Various Approaches Toward Caucasus Problem. Some Republicans Fear a 'Yugoslav Variant,' Others Fear Islamic Threat"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russia is known to have two "republican" parties functioning in it: the RPRF [Republican Party of the Russian Federation] (democratic trend) headed by State Duma deputy Vladimir Lysenko, and the National-Republican Party of Russia [NRPR] also headed by a State Duma deputy, Nikolay Lysenko. Yesterday, both V. Lysenko and N. Lysenko each held a press conference devoted to the situation in the Caucasus.

Vladimir Lysenko detailed his plan for a peaceful settlement to the Chechen crisis. According to the plan, it is necessary first to reach a cease-fire agreement following which the warring sides should be separated "at a distance between them that would rule out the use of arms." Mr. Lysenko believes that "peacemaking forces of CIS countries" should stand between the Russian troops and the Chechen militia. Following an exchange of hostages and POW's, it is necessary to withdraw heavy weapons from the conflict zone. Upon completion of the disarmament procedures, Vladimir Lysenko proposes the calling of a peace conference to be attended by not only the Chechen and the Russian sides, but also by representatives of the bodies of state power of the krais and oblasts of the Northern Caucasus, as well as by representatives of public organizations and so on. Mr. V. Lysenko thinks that a national "roundtable" of the Chechen Republic should be held under the aegis of this peace conference which would form a delegation for talks with federal authorities and launch preparations for free elections and a referendum "to determine the Chechen Republic's status."

The RPRF chairman believes the continuation of the armed conflict may result in a repetition in Russia of the Yugoslav variant. To his mind, the "centripetal" behavior of the leaders of a number of republics, components of Russia, which, in particular, were reflected in the results of the 5 January conference in Cheboksary, is nothing but a reaction to the president's actions in Chechnya. Vladimir Lysenko assessed the position of "regional elites" as being "one of the last hopes" for halting the military operations, and described the idea for a congress of the peoples of Russia put forward at the notorious conference in Cheboksary as "a desperate gesture."

For his part, thinking that the crisis in the Caucasus has been caused by "Russia's weakening," Nikolay Lysenko is confident that "criminal-separatist forces" are currently trying to instigate a "religious" and "ethnic" conflict in the region. In the words of the NRPR leader,

most of the Islamic states that aided Dudayev's regime have become "stuck" in Chechnya. A man who thinks the same as Mr. N. Lysenko, Federation Council member Yevgeniy Pavlov, stated that the creation of a Council of Heads of Republics (one of the initiatives heard at the conference in Cheboksary) would lead to a "Chechenization of Russia." The speakers warned the journalists of a serious threat coming at the present time from the Islamic world, and announced the creation of a "Tsaregrad Union" intended to "unite all Eastern Christian peoples."

Regional Party Faction Files Suit Against Polevanov

LD2001160895 Moscow *INTERFAX* in English 1141 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Blagoveshchensk, Jan. 20 (INTERFAX)—The Amur division of the Russia's Democratic Choice Party decided to file a legal suit against Vice-Premier Vladimir Polevanov. It accuses Polevanov of corruption.

For the first time, the Amur division of the Russia's Choice Party lashed out against Polevanov three months ago. Polevanov, who served then as the governor of the Amur region, rejected the corruption charges and said the charges rested on forged testimony.

The Amur legislature formed an ad hoc commission which put together those important documents that the Russia's Choice activists are planning to present in court hearings.

'Rash' Reformers Jeopardizing National Unity

MM2301080195 Moscow *ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA* in Russian 19 Jan 95 First Edition p 2

[Article by RIA NOVOSTI political observer Vladimir Reznichenko: "Gaydar Risks Losing. By Their Rash Actions Radical Leaders Are Jeopardizing the Democratic Movement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The radical reformers' move into opposition to President Boris Yeltsin and his administration has given rise to quite a few questions and has puzzled society. Was this step dictated purely by electoral considerations?

If this really is the case, then by dissociating themselves from the president the democrats have evidently decided to turn themselves into a fully autonomous political force and to rely henceforth on themselves alone. On an independent voyage, under their own flag, to victory in the parliamentary elections due at the end of this year: This is the outward appearance of the course they have set.

At the same time the possibility that the democrats' position is based on emotion rather than on fine tactical

reckoning certainly cannot be ruled out. Everyone knows that resentment is a quite unacceptable feeling for a serious politician.

But it is possible that Gaydar and his colleagues have simply decided to "punish" Yeltsin, who has recently listed noticeably away from radical ideas in the direction of moderation and centrism. At the same time, of course, they have to a considerable degree punished themselves. The point is that Yeltsin and the democrats have always been strong in tandem, but if they act separately, their chances of achieving success will be far smaller.

In any case, it was evidently a major miscalculation by the democrats that they chose disagreement with the official policy being carried out in respect to Chechnya as the grounds for breaking with the president. It may be assumed with a high degree of certainty that Gaydar and his team will not succeed for long in playing on antiwar feelings in society.

In fact, whereas Russians' first reaction to the Army expedition to Chechnya was shock, as people learn the truth about the excesses and atrocities being perpetrated by Dudayev's mercenaries, their attitude to what is happening is changing substantially. It is quite likely that a patriotic mood of support for the state will prevail in the country in the near future, and then the proclaimers of defeatist ideas could find themselves completely isolated.

In general, truckling before separatists can hardly be the linchpin of the election program of a party which seriously aspires to a leading role in Russian politics. In the situation which is taking shape the slogan of defending human rights in Chechnya, particularly if that defense is frequently perceived as concealed support for Dudayev's followers, certainly will not unite the broad masses around it.

The chief mainstay of "Russia's Choice" and of other organizations close to it in spirit today are the major television channels, radio stations, and press organs that are under their influence. But the strong support which they give to the democrats could fall off sharply if the authorities start to implement a tougher policy in the information sphere.

Then the general tone of the press will change substantially. Gaydar's followers now seldom criticize the executive's actions, but they themselves could become a target.

In particular, they could well be accused—and are already being accused—of:

1. First breaking up the USSR and now setting about breaking up the Russian Federation.
2. Robbing the ordinary people with their ill-considered reforms—like the notorious "shock therapy."
3. In general being geared more to the West in their policy than to the interests of their own people.

Specific charges connected with the recent events in Chechnya could well be added to these charges of a general order:

1. It was the democrats who handed over to Dudayev's followers the mountains of weapons which they are now using to kill Russian soldiers.
2. It was they who with their frenzied anti-Army propaganda undermined the Army's morale and combat ability—which is now telling in its failures in Grozny.
3. In addition, by setting public opinion against the power structures, the democrats are already hindering the successful completion of the operation to render the bandits harmless.
4. On an international plane they are damaging national interests by setting the West against Russia.
5. Finally, the democrats' position is thoroughly hypocritical: In October 1993, when tanks were firing at the Russian Supreme Soviet, these people clapped with joy, but now—when the same tanks are firing at Dudayev's palace—they are protesting angrily. Why is this?

It is probably possible to advance convincing refutations of many such charges, but it does not fall within the remit of this article to ascertain whether or not they are just. Something else is important: By their rash actions Gaydar, Yushenkov, Kovalev, and other radical leaders are jeopardizing the broad people's movement for the country's renewal, which came into being with the start of perestroika with truly democratic and patriotic aims. Russia would lose a great deal if this movement were sidelined because of someone's shortsightedness or political ambitions.

Supreme Court Justice Doubts Acting Prosecutor's Authority

MK2101130095 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY
KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 21 Jan 95 p 1

[Unattributed report under the "Hold the Front Page!" rubric: "Supreme Court Declines To Recognize Ilyushenko's Prosecutor Powers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS has come to learn about a major scandal flaring up between the Supreme Court of Russia and the General Prosecutor's Office.

The other day Supreme Court Justice Viktor Belyavskiy returned for additional investigation a case of a military judge charged with a double murder. The justice did not recognize the powers of acting General Prosecutor Aleksey Ilyushenko. Victor Belyavskiy said in a telephone conversation with a MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS correspondent yesterday that he thinks Aleksey Ilyushenko was appointed to his position in violation of Article 129 of the Russian Constitution, and hence has no powers to confirm charges in cases calling for special treatment.

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Chuvash President Rejects Yeltsin's 'Strange' Decree

LD2101124395 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 21 Jan 95

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Russian President Boris Yeltsin's decree suspending the decree issued by Chuvash President Nikolay Fedorov on protecting servicemen has caused an unambiguous reaction in the republic. [passage omitted]

[Begin Fedorov recording] It is a strange decree. I think I can call it that. Boris Nikolayevich simply did not read our decree, and I see no reason why we should take any notice of his decree. We will continue to pursue the policy we were pursuing before. [end recording]

Shumeyko, Finnish Prime Minister Discuss Chechnya

LD2001180195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1526 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 20 (INTERFAX)—Russia has proven to be unprepared to respond adequately to the situation following the armed conflict in the Chechen republic and flaws in legislation are partially to blame for that, Speaker of the Federation Council Vladimir Shumeyko has said. He was speaking at a meeting with the Finnish Prime Minister Esko Aho in Moscow on Friday.

The meeting took place behind closed doors. The chief of the Federation Council's press service Yuriy Algunov quoted Shumeyko as saying that the events in Chechnya had highlighted the need to dramatically improve the effectiveness of government control and restore the ruined institutions of state power. Shumeyko believes that to strengthen the state major amendments to legislation will have to be made. Algunov said that Russian-Finnish relations were not discussed.

Yegorov Following Chechen Developments From Hospital

LD2001194195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1702 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, 20 January. INTERFAX—Government officials told Interfax Vice-Premier Nikolay Yegorov, who is minister for nationalities and regional policy, is being treated for pneumonia in the left lung in a Kremlin hospital.

Yegorov's doctor said the minister would not be able to return to work for three weeks, although Yegorov himself, the doctor continued, was more optimistic.

Yegorov's ministry told Interfax its head "was not feeling uncomfortable and spending time after therapy working out how regional executive bodies in the

Chechen Republic would work with the legitimate interim government there led by Salambek Hajiev.

"The vice-premier also continues to look for ways to settle the Chechen crisis politically," a ministry spokesman said.

The ministry said Yegorov shared President Yeltsin's view that the military operation in Chechnya had practically ended with the seizure of the Presidential Palace in Grozny. Yegorov himself believes, the ministry said, that this is the "prologue to the serious work ahead to stabilize the situation and mend the damage which has resulted from Dudayev's government."

"Economic restoration," Yegorov was quoted, "is vital, but the mentality of a people which, during the three years of the Dudayev regime, has been forced to use arms and violence to get its bread, must also be changed."

Yegorov plans to travel to Grozny after being discharged from hospital to supervise further efforts to settle the Chechnya crisis.

Official on 'Final Act' of 'Chechen Tragedy'

LD2001195495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1701 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 20 (INTERFAX)—The capture of the Presidential palace in Grozny by federal troops "can certainly be considered as the final act of the Chechen tragedy," Head of the President's Administration Department on Interaction with Political Parties and Parliamentarians, member of the commission of observers on human rights in the zone of the Chechen conflict Andrey Loginov told Interfax in an interview today.

Loginov said he believed that the capture of the Presidential palace "which should have been carried out much earlier will seriously undermine the intensity of resistance offered by illegal armed formations." He said that when losing the Presidential Palace Dudayev supporters had lost "in fact, the single symbol which could be used by Dudayev's propaganda for recruiting new forces."

Loginov said he believed that resistance of Chechen militants would be local and "it will be motivated not by confrontation with Russia in the name of some ideals but by private interest of field commanders and groups in raising their status and authority." He said this would be done by field commanders "in order to present themselves better to talks with the federal power."

Loginov said the idea of the Russian president of enhancing dialogue with the "lower layers of Chechen resistance," including field commanders, was carried out by "professionals, primarily by special services: the Federal Counterintelligence Service and the Main Intelligence Department." He said the territorial department of the federal power in Chechnya backed all activities for this purpose.

Loginov said the next turning point in the development of the situation would consist in "pushing Dzhokhar Dudayev out of the game." He said "the factor of Dudayev is similar to that of Hitler remaining in the bunker of Berlin in April 1945" which would negatively affect the situation.

Loginov said the commission of observers on human rights in Chechnya must focus on showing to public opinion "the most unbiased picture of what is happening in the North Caucasian republic." "Any biased reporting could provoke negative aftermath," he added. He said he believed that the capture of Grozny had become more slow as a result of the media "demoralizing our troops with rather a success."

Gorbachev: Chechen Way of Life 'Destroyed'

LD2001212095 Moscow NTV in Russian 1900 GMT 20 Jan 95

[Video report by Vladimir Karamurza, with recorded remarks by former USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Karamurza] Mikhail Gorbachev, president of the former Soviet Union, was the hero of the day today at a meeting of the Free Word Club of the Filmmakers' Union. The room where the meeting took place could not accommodate everybody who came. The theme of the 10th anniversary of perestroika was no less exiting for its architect himself, and for other participants, than the events in Grozny today.

[Gorbachev] In fact, the war has been waged against the people, under the pretext of fighting bandit formations. So the republic, and the whole way of life of people, of an ancient nation, have been destroyed.

[Correspondent] The speaker anticipated possible reproaches over his own sins in the matters of ethnic policy.

[Gorbachev] I regret the decisiveness which I displayed during the Kazakh events. But I acted in such a way that 40 minutes later all the Kazakhs ran back home, poor souls.

[Correspondent] The analysis of bygone days made the last general secretary [of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] recall his former ideals.

[Gorbachev] Yes. I still consider myself a follower of the socialist idea. I will not renege on it even if they cut me in two.

[Correspondent] It is expected that as the [tenth] anniversary of the April plenum approaches, there will be a new upsurge of interest in the personality of the creator of the new political thinking.

Interviewed on Chechnya, Need for Elections

BR2401130195 Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 24 Jan 95 p 9

[Interview with former USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev by Luigi Ippolito in Moscow on 23 January:

"Yeltsin Must Resign Immediately"—first seven paragraphs are CORRIERE DELLA SERA introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow—The tracks of Russian tanks are crushing distant peoples again, a new Politburo sits in the Kremlin, and the face of power is again covered by impenetrable masks. This winter of 1995 seems to have swept away the last of the hopes raised in Moscow 10 years ago, when the words "glasnost" and "perestroika" became familiar throughout the world, announcing a new dawn in the East.

There is bitterness now in the voice of the man who sparked that century's-end revolution: "This regime is making a pretence of openness in the media and of democracy itself," Mikhail Gorbachev said, "and now they will do their utmost to ensure that there are no more elections."

But deep inside he still wants to struggle, to prevent everything from being nullified: "I will struggle to the last to ensure that it does not succeed, to ensure that it is the people that decide, not a group of men acting behind everyone's backs."

When he is not traveling around the world as a most prestigious lecturer, these days Gorbachev works in his office at the foundation that bears his name.

He brought with him here his most trusted associates, the men who were with him during the exciting years that fired the world's enthusiasm. Here, in a plain room in no way reminiscent of his past as one of the world's most powerful men, except for the large number of books dedicated to him on the shelves, he receives the constant stream of delegations that come to convey their gratitude to him.

Yesterday it was the Italians of the Labris Association, who awarded him the "golden Labris"—a symbol of friendship and brotherhood between the peoples. A relaxed and friendly Gorbachev, in joking mood and in excellent form, as always, readily agreed to discuss the most pressing current issues.

"At present the situation is very difficult. We are again confronted by a choice. I think that in the near future some very important changes will occur, and some crucial decisions will be reached. But unfortunately I do not think that we will have only positive results; there will also be some negative results.

[Ippolito] Who do you deem responsible for this state of affairs?

[Gorbachev] It is this regime, which is unable to extricate Russia from the crisis. We need a new policy now, but the present leaders are incapable of implementing it, so they should leave, if only for that reason. For the sake of remaining in power, this regime is prepared to use violent methods, as the crisis in Chechnya has shown. When a political authority walks on blood, it no longer has the right to remain.

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[Ippolito] So are you demanding the resignation of the Russian leadership?

[Gorbachev] Yes. In situations such as this a politician must resign. These men are responsible for the blood-thirsty events of October 93 (when Yeltsin had Parliament bombarded—CORRIERE DELLA SERA editor's note) and are responsible now for what is happening in Chechnya. Now they no longer know what to do with the country. But since they refuse to leave their posts, this is a further proof of the kind of people we are dealing with.

[Ippolito] How, then, could a change of leadership be achieved?

[Gorbachev] We need an early free election. The prime objective now is to salvage democracy, and this is only possible through an election, though this regime will try to avert that in every possible way. But I will do my utmost to ensure that they do not succeed.

[Ippolito] So will you stand as a candidate in the presidential election?

[Gorbachev] As soon as the election date is announced you will have my answer to that question.

[Ippolito] How do you judge the government's attitude to the war in Chechnya?

[Gorbachev] They have done everything wrong, and now they are even trying to play down the losses. But they will not succeed. They must answer for it: The country cannot be treated like that.

[Ippolito] Answer in what way?

[Gorbachev] Politically, first and foremost. But whoever has violated the penal code must answer to a court, too. Everything must be decided in accordance with the law.

[Ippolito] In Italy you still enjoy great popularity, which is revived every time you visit.

[Gorbachev] Yes, even when I was chief of state and we began the reforms, the Italian people always said many things in my favor and made important decisions to support me. I have found great support in many countries, but I can say that Italy is definitely in first place.

Kalugin: Yeltsin Responsible For Chechnya Operation

LD2001205795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1943 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 20 (INTERFAX)—"The Russian president is personally responsible for the military operation in Chechnya," former KGB General Oleg Kalugin said at a press conference in Moscow today as a leader of the Defense Policy Commission of the Russia's Democratic Choice Party.

The Defense Policy Commission was created in December 1994. The Russia's Democratic Choice political council instructed it to apply to Russian President

Boris Yeltsin and to demand that measures be taken to immediately put to an end to military actions and that bilateral talks begin.

Kalugin said the Defense Policy Commission had demanded that Deputy Prime Minister Nikolay Yegorov, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, Director of the Federal Counterintelligence Service Sergey Stepashin and Secretary of the Russian Security Council Oleg Lobov be immediately dismissed.

The Defense Policy Commission also demanded that mass violations of human rights in Chechnya be investigated with the participation of international observers and criminal cases be instigated against those responsible for the military operation.

The Defense Policy Commission demanded that a large-scale reform of the military be carried out and an army of high military capacity and professionalism be created.

Human Rights Forum Warns of Authoritarian Threat

MK2101092095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 21 Jan 95 p 2

[Report by Lev Aleynik under the "Forum" rubric: "73 Percent of Russians 'Need a Leader With an Iron Fist.' Human Rights Activists Warn About Fascist Threat in Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A three-day international forum on the subject "Fascism in Totalitarian and Post-Totalitarian Societies: Ideological Foundation, Social Base, Political Activity" opened in Moscow yesterday. The forum brought together political emigrants, domestic and foreign politicians, law students, political scientists. Yuriy Orlov, a well-known human rights activist, who opened the forum with his report "What does threaten us?," characterized the situation in Russia as one fraught with the possibility of a harsh authoritarian regime's being imposed. This view was shared by sociologist Yuriy Levada, who cited some results of polls conducted by the "Public Opinion" center: "A total of 73 percent of Russians think that Russia needs a leader with an iron fist..., while two-thirds think that 'the West is trying to turn the Russian Federation into a raw-material appendage.'" In Mr. Levada's view, such views are the "bricks by which fascism can be made."

Sergey Kovalev, Russian Federation human rights commissioner, who has just returned from Chechnya, said that "currently Russia is being ruled by those whose paramount objective is to please those standing half a rung above them. I do not know whether or not fascism is a system, but if it is, one cannot live in it... Our hope of living in a rule-of-law state has ended;" but he urged "not to put up" with that.

Sergey Gryzunov, chairman of the Russian Press Committee, spoke in his report "Fascist Propaganda and the Authorities' Non-Resistance" about "the inaction of

prosecutor's office bodies with regard to Nazi publications" and drew parallels between the current Russia and Germany of 1925-1933. Lawyer Genry Reznik said that "the time of counting on the state, which will solve things all at once, is past" and told the audience about the possibilities of fighting racism provided for in current Russian legislation. In his opinion, these mechanisms have not been activated because "a persistent contempt for the judicial authority is still present on high."

Yesterday the forum was also addressed by Alla Gerber, Larisa Bogoraz, Vuk Draskovic (Yugoslavia), Sergey Yushenkov, Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, and Zoya Krakhmalnikova, who delivered reports or participated in the debate.

Stavropol Pledges To Keep Out 'Dudayev's Bandit Units'

LD2101150595 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English* 1352 GMT 21 Jan 95

["Dudayev's Bandits Will be Kept out of Stavropol Territory"—*ITAR-TASS* headline; by *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Nikolay Styazhkin]

[*FBIS* Transcribed Text] Stavropol January 21 *TASS*—"The Stavropol authorities will not allow the remnants of any Dudayev's bandit units to infiltrate the territory," head of the interior department of the Stavropol territorial administration militia Major-General Viktor Medveditskov told *ITAR-TASS* today. He said that every measure was taken to rule out the spreading of contraband weaponry from Chechnya, to prevent the possible breakthrough of Chechen militants into the territory to stage terroristic acts there.

General Medveditskov said that seven additional militia control posts were set up early this January in Kursk District, which borders on the Chechen Republic. According to information, furnished by the chief of the territorial interior department, the setting up of militia control posts in Stavropol Territory was started practically immediately after the advent of Dudayev's regime in Chechnya, because armed raids of inveterate bandits became quite frequent in districts of the territory, bordering on Chechnya. They robbed the local population, collective and state farm machine and tractor stations, rustled cattle from stockbreeding farms. The three most cynical crimes, Medveditskov recalled, were committed by Chechen bandits in Mineralnyye Vody, where they captured motor coaches with hostages.

The work of the control posts, which check the freight and guard passengers round-the-clock, has greatly improved the criminogenic situation in the territory. "The series of crimes, committed in the Mineralnyye Vody airport, has stopped," General Medveditskov stressed in particular.

Rounding of the interview, the chief of the territorial interior department noted that there were so far no attempts of Dudayev's fighters to break into Stavropol Territory.

FCS Head Stepashin Interviewed on Chechnya

MM2301202995 Moscow *ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI* in Russian 24 Jan 95 pp 1-2

[Interview with Sergey Stepashin, director of Russia's Federal Counterintelligence Service, by Vladimir Georgiyev; place and date not given: "The Chechen People Are for a Peaceful Life"]

[*FBIS* Translated Text] [Georgiyev] Sergey Vadimovich, despite the fact that the presidential palace has finally fallen, the fighting in Grozny is continuing. Dudayev has declared that he will fight "to the last Chechen." How is the bloodshed to be stopped? Is the possibility of talks really completely ruled out?

[Stepashin] I do not doubt that Dudayev is ready to wage war against the federal authorities "to the last Chechen." Only what the mass of the Chechens themselves want least of all is such an end for their people. We are conducting intensive talks with the clan elders, opposition leaders, and people who are held in high authority among the Chechens, in order to stop the bloodshed as quickly as possible. But I am categorically opposed to negotiating with Dudayev. He heads a criminal regime which has brought the republic to a catastrophe and which is essentially waging a war to annihilate its own people and its own city. For the fire which his gunmen are directing at the Army is coming from districts where civilians, mainly Russians, live. They fire and leave, after which comes a salvo against the building.

[Georgiyev] Where is Dudayev now?

[Stepashin] According to our data, he is somewhere in the region of Grozny. Unfortunately, we do not know his exact location, but he is most likely changing it constantly.

[Georgiyev] What measures are being taken to prevent a guerrilla war?

[Stepashin] I believe that there will not be a guerrilla war. There will be disarmament of the gunmen who are leaving for the south, for the mountains. They will hardly lay down their arms voluntarily. As for the Chechen population in those regions which the Army has liberated—this is over half the Chechen Republic's population—no one there is thinking of a civil war; they are dreaming of a normal, peaceful life. I personally was convinced of this during meetings with them. Here is an interesting detail—in Urus-Martanskiy Rayon, where Dudayev's own clan lives, residents have told the gunmen: If you want to fight, go to the mountains. They have banned them from going into the villages. The situation is the same in Gudermes, Shali, and other regions. Therefore it is possible to speak not of a guerrilla war but of the liquidation of armed gangs.

[Georgiyev] What are your impressions from your last meeting with the president?

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[Stepashin] Boris Nikolayevich is concerned about two questions: The first is, of course, the speediest conclusion of the combat operations in the city itself. The second is the speediest restoration of normal social and economic living conditions in the republic and the restoration of the practically totally destroyed national economy. No, not destroyed by the war but by the policy which the Dudayev regime implemented for three years—much has been written about this. The sooner the plants, the petroleum complex, the hospitals, the schools, etc. start working, the sooner all the preconditions for the guerrilla war you asked about will disappear. Because ordinary people, I repeat, want to lead a normal life, to work, to get wages, and to feed their families. The federal authorities must ensure that they have this opportunity.

But blood is continuing to be shed. Maybe, seeing the senselessness of resistance, Dudayev will now nonetheless agree to talks, for even Shamil [19th-century Chechen leader], finding himself completely surrounded in the village of Gunib, surrendered, was taken to St. Petersburg, was received and even treated with affection by the emperor, spent the rest of his life peacefully in Kaluga, and just before his death, in 1870, set out for Mecca, where he found eternal rest. It has to be said—and this is very important—that toward the end of his life Shamil was reconciled with the Russians and no longer saw them as enemies either of his own people or of his own faith.

If it is a question of laying down arms and ending combat operations, I am in favor of such talks with anyone, even Dudayev. There can be no question of talks of a political nature or of going back to the so-called zero option, as Dudayev proposed in November, when N. Yegorov and I were entrusted with negotiating with him. Nor must the question of an immediate Russian troop withdrawal be discussed, but the basic condition must be fulfilled: Dudayev's recognition of the Russian Federation Constitution. Particularly as local organs of power are actively being formed today and are already working in practically all major rayons of Chechnya.

[Georgiyev] The events in Chechnya, all aspects of the conflict, will be comprehensively analyzed, but the first conclusions can already be drawn. In particular, about miscalculations by the FCS [Federal Counterintelligence Service], which you head. Why, for example, do our servicemen not have city maps of Grozny or plans of underground communications, i.e. they have essentially ended up blind in street-fighting conditions?

[Stepashin] Following its transformation into the FCS, Russia's former Ministry of Security lost its power subdivisions, including the celebrated "Vypel" [counterterrorist] group. Incidentally, General Gerasimov, its former leader, spent some six weeks in Grozny with 20 fighters and did tremendous work, but, understandably, 20 people were unable to do anything serious. Now we understand that the special services must have special subdivisions to resolve local questions of the struggle

against bandit groups and particularly dangerous criminals who head criminal structures, etc. As for the plan of the city, I totally disagree with you: Maps of city communications, streets, air raid shelters, and bunkers—all this was provided to the military command by the Counterintelligence Service. The fact that these maps were not passed on in time to the field commanders represents, of course, a tremendous omission. But there is another nuance: During the three years of his rule Dudayev has considerably reinforced the city militarily. He constructed a lot of new bunkers and underground passages, which naturally could not be shown on the civil defense maps drawn up prior to 1991.

[Georgiyev] Has Dudayev received assistance from abroad?

[Stepashin] We have plenty of documents and materials relating to assistance for Dudayev from abroad, and the special services are now tackling this. It is generally known that he pays his fighters \$800-1,000 a day—you will agree that such money does not fall from the sky.

[Georgiyev] How sincere is the Chechen population's loyalty? Or is it purely outward?

[Stepashin] Let's not speak for the whole population of the Chechen Republic. The majority, I repeat, do not want to fight, believe me. The "intransigents," as they call themselves, will account for about 8 percent, no more, although even this is quite a lot, particularly as they are all experienced, hardened fighters and war professionals. They are mainly "highland Chechens," who generally, as far as history recalls even before the Caucasus war of the last century, lived constantly by means of raids against neighboring peoples. As for the inhabitants of the flatlands, the military operations in Chechnya, the destruction of Grozny, and the casualties among the civilian population have, of course, left a deep mark on their consciousness. But their negative mood will change as soon as the military operations end and the Dudayev regime falls once and for all. The second, most important thing, the overriding task, is the restoration of the national economy, so that the people of Chechnya feel that they have begun to live considerably better than under Dudayev. It is then that people's mood will change drastically. Let us recall postwar Germany and the Germans' attitude to the troops of Britain and, in particular, America in 1945 and in 1949. It was, you will agree, totally different.

[Georgiyev] What accounts for the fact that the propaganda support for the sending in of troops into Chechnya proved quite helpless or, rather, totally nonexistent? When the military operations began, our mass media showed them only from one side—Dudayev's.

[Stepashin] Yes, you are right, we began the operation in Chechnya without having prepared public opinion for it at all. There are both subjective and objective reasons for this. I would include among the former the simply absurd ban on journalists working among our troops,

while Dudayev was granting them that opportunity and creating a most-favored setup, as it were. Journalists were his invited guests, and they were taken care of, sometimes so expertly that they received information which from a propaganda viewpoint worked exclusively for Dudayev.

Unfortunately, we realized this too late, when the public consciousness had formed a negative and even hostile attitude toward the Army's actions in Chechnya. It will not be easy to change this attitude, but the more the truth about the Dudayev regime's mocking of the Russian population and of Chechens who disagree with him is revealed, and the more people find out about Dudayev's perfidy and his constant duplicity throughout these three years, the more everyone will realize that we were dealing with a war criminal who was ready for anything for the sake of his own political ambitions. Even nuclear terror. He said so two years ago: "The hundreds of thousands of Chechens who live in Russia must become 100,000 soldiers.... Every Chechen must be prepared to die. Vulnerable places [as published]—1,000 men would be enough to turn Russia upside down and wipe it out in a nuclear catastrophe." This statement of his was recorded and seen by millions of television viewers. They are not just threats. If it were in Dudayev's power, nothing would stop him from carrying out that monstrous design. Think about another aspect too: Turning the Chechens into a nation of people prepared to die. Most unfortunately, he is succeeding to some extent in carrying out this no less monstrous design.

It will be still harder to change the psychological stereotype drummed by Dudayev's ultranationalist propaganda into the consciousness of ordinary Chechens, particularly rural inhabitants. But, I repeat, this will be possible when the military operations end and normal, peaceful life begins.

Interior Minister Yerin on Tasks in Chechnya

LD2301205295 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 23 Jan 95

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] Internal Affairs Minister Viktor Yerin gave an interview today for the first time during the Chechnya conflict. The main tasks of his department are:

[Begin Yerin recording, in progress] ... to provide for the maintenance of law and order in accordance with requirements throughout the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the adjacent regions; and to begin paying the wages, at last, of the militia staff who will work on the territory of Chechnya. One must say that quite a good, professional detachment has actually been retained in Chechnya's internal affairs bodies, which was essentially pushed aside by the forces of Dudayev's regime. We are rendering them all kinds of support and assistance. This work will ultimately lead to the rayon

and municipal internal affairs departments functioning on the territory of Chechnya. [end recording]

Panskov Says Chechnya Not To Increase Budget Deficit

LD2401110195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0957 GMT 24 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Robert Serebrennikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 24 TASS—On the eve of the consideration of the 1995 draft budget by the State Duma, Russian Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov reiterated that the Chechen crisis would not affect the key 1995 budget figures and that the expenses for Chechnya will be covered by redistributing the already envisaged appropriations.

Panskov told BUSINESS-TASS on Tuesday that Chechnya will demand 3.5 trillion roubles (over a billion U.S. dollars) plus minus half a trillion roubles.

"It is very difficult at present to exactly assess the figure", he said adding that the money will be appropriated during several years.

"The additional expenses linked with Chechnya will be covered in the limits of the 1995 budget. We see no necessity to increase the budget deficit", Panskov stressed. The latest draft budget envisages a deficit of 73.1 trillion roubles.

The minister explained that budget reserve and capital investment funds, as well as finances earmarked to various ministries and industries will be sufficient to cover the Chechen expenditures.

The Russian State Duma is expected to reconsider the draft budget under the second reading on Wednesday.

Government Report on Chechen Operation, Losses

LD2401055995 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0500 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] According to an advance report from the Russian Government press service, since the beginning of the Chechen armed conflict Russia's interior troops have confiscated 87 armored vehicles, 416 sawed-off guns, 114 smoothbore weapons, and about 70,000 rounds of ammunition. They have destroyed 131 armored vehicles and disarmed 620 militants, killing 500 of them and wounding 120. Six illegal armed formations have been neutralized. The interior troops have also suffered casualties: 40 servicemen were killed and 197 wounded.

Correction: Korzhakov on Security Service, Politics

WA2401170495

The following pertains to the item headlined "Korzhakov on Security Service, Politics," published in the 19

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January Central Eurasia DAILY REPORT, pages 13-15. The excerpted passages below are supplied to provide the full text of this item.

Page 14, right column, last sentence of first full paragraph make read: ...made by politicians.

[Uglov] The talk about the Presidential Security Service's omnipotence did not begin in a vacuum. By analogy: This sort of activity—protection of the highest USSR officials—was the responsibility of the KGB's Ninth Directorate. This is where its functions ended. On what legal documents rest other functions of the Presidential Security Service?

[Korzhakov] Let us recall the law on security—this is the legal base of all special services' activities. As its extension, a law on state protection of the supreme bodies of state authority in the Russian Federation and their officials was adopted. Article 11 of this law gives the president of the country the right to make decisions on the Russian Federation Security Service. Based on this, our service was created by a Russian presidential edict, which also defined its tasks, responsibilities, and its personnel's rights.

Measures to ensure security of the head of the state should be considered as a most important component of the general system of measures to ensure national security. This is key to understanding the entire set of tasks with which we are dealing. It is not accidental that we are called the Security Service—not the personal protection service.

Now about "omnipotence." You are not entirely correct in limiting the KGB Ninth Directorate's functions only to protection. In those times, too, its work did not end with this, since counterintelligence support was being implemented in the entire sphere of state administration. Those who are engaged in corruption with impunity these days, especially at the top, would like to see a Latvian rifleman in puttees at the office door instead of a Security Service officer. If he happens to be a former peasant, cannot write, and does not know Russian well, so much the better. A person who could be told: Look, here is a seal and a signature, and he would pin the pass on his bayonet and let you in. As in Lenin's time. And it is not his concern that at the same time the national wealth is being pilfered—frequently in the form of a permission, a piece of paper, a resolution attached to it. Plunder which undermines state security is in progress, while the rifleman valiantly guards Comrade Lenin's body. Do you understand?

An effective security service with a good technical, informational, and analytical base is not built to suit a particular person or a particular president. The interests of stability of the state authority in principle require it.

[Uglov] How are the [supplying dropped paragraphs]

Page 15, left column, last sentence of fifth paragraph make read: ...of government programs. The criminal

symbiosis of corruption and organized crime in its quest to penetrate the highest bodies of state administration acquires qualitatively new features one may call "shadow policy-making." This phenomenon has outgrown the bounds of the current criminal law.

The fight against... [supplying dropped sentences]

Media Issues

Chernomyrdin Wants New Legal Basis for Television

LD2001173895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1522 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 20 (INTERFAX)—Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin has called for putting State Television on a new legal basis so that the rights and duties of the state and of television are clearly defined.

Meeting with the leadership of the All-Russia State TV and Radio Company in his office in Moscow Friday, he stressed that he was not an advocate of making the state the boss of Russian television as a whole. On the contrary, he argued, the information market should have TV companies with various forms of ownership, commercial structures included.

He is convinced that state television has every right to criticize the authorities. However, criticism should be backed by unbiased facts and professional analysis of events, so that the authorities can learn the truth about the state of affairs in the country.

On recent speculations about the possible dismissal of Oleg Poptsov from the post of Russian TV company head, Chernomyrdin assured his audience that the authorities had "not set the task to dismiss Poptsov." If we wanted to do so, he continued, we could have sacked him long ago in line with the current legislation.

Chernomyrdin urged journalists to cover events in Chechnya and elsewhere without bias.

Filatov Wants 'New Ways' To Deal With Press

LD2301194195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1900 GMT 23 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS Correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 23—New ways of dealing with the press should be sought instead of administrative reshaping of structures and subordinations, presidential administration chief Sergey Filatov told a news conference today.

Filatov said authorities should "help rather than hinder the media" and create conditions for free access of reporters "to everything."

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The authorities "are largely to blame for the way the media behaved" over the Chechnya crisis, Filatov admitted. Europe was alarmed over Russia's possible return to totalitarianism and an end to its reforms, Filatov said.

"We tried to quench this alarm: the president asked us to say that there will be no end to Russian reforms or any changes in the domestic and foreign policy," Filatov added.

Reporter Refuses To Name Murder Suspect or Source

MM2001154795 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jan 95 p 8

[Report by Igor Korolkov: "IZVESTIYA Correspondent Interrogated in 'Kholodov Case'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 18 January the author of these lines was officially interrogated as a witness in the case of the murder of the MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS correspondent. The interrogation lasted about four hours and was conducted in a proper manner.

The reason for the IZVESTIYA journalist's being invited to Malyy Kiselnyy Lane—home of the Russian General Prosecutor's Office operational investigation team looking into the murder case—was my 6 January article entitled "The Name of Dmitriy Kholodov's Killer Is Known to the Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS]."

Quoting a reliable source, the newspaper reported that FCS Director S. Stepashin had sent a letter to Russian President B. Yeltsin outlining several details surrounding the circumstances of Dmitriy Kholodov's death and providing the name of the putative criminal—a serviceman from an airborne regiment stationed in Sokolniki. As the source confirms, this serviceman is today in the combat operations zone in Chechnya as a member of a military unit.

The operational investigation team's personnel chief, Leonid Kononov, who conducted the interrogation, was interested first and foremost in two matters: the name of the murderer, and the name of the person who told the editorial office about the FCS director's letter. The Law on the Mass Media gives journalists the right not to disclose either the source of information or the information furnished by it. I invoked that right.

Apart from this, in refusing to name the putative murderer the author of these lines proceeded from the fact that the editorial office's information was of no particular interest to the investigation. This is the reason why. If S. Stepashin's letter to B. Yeltsin really does exist, we should turn to it and extract all information of interest to the investigation. But if the letter does not actually exist, the whole story of the suspect from the airborne regiment

is a clever game. At this L. Kononov unhappily pointed out that unfortunately by no means all documents are available to investigations.

An interesting detail emerged during the interrogation. L. Kononov stated that the investigation does not at present have any suspect. If that really is true, and not just a tactical move in the interrogation, then the investigation proves to have bogged down. An obvious question arises: On the basis of what information did FCS Director S. Stepashin announce publicly last fall that he would name the murderer by the new year?

It is hard to believe that a high-ranking official could venture to make such a crucial statement without first possessing information about a suspect. Otherwise yet another question arises—about the FCS director's professional qualities.

Record Set Straight on Solzhenitsyn Publication

MK2101091095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Jan 95 p 2

[Statement by Aleksandr Mikhaylov, chief of the Federal Counterintelligence Service Public Relations Center, in the "In Brief" column, titled: "Correction"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

The Oleg Panfilov report "Prosecution of Journalists and the Press on the Territory of the Former USSR: December 1994" says that I impounded the print-run of the seventh issue of the Federal Counterintelligence Service journal SLUZHBA BEZOPASNOSTI, while the majority of editorial staffers led by the chief editor offered to resign.

This information does not correspond to reality. The release of the seventh issue was delayed till February 1995 because journal Chief Editor S.N. Smelyanskiy included in it an article about A.I. Solzhenitsyn at his own discretion, without notifying the editorial board. This article contained tactless comments on the author, affecting his honor and dignity. The publication was signed by "analysts" of a nonexistent journal department. It needs to be noted that the material had nothing to do with the subject matter of the special services departmental journal.

After a probe into this case S.N. Smelyanskiy offered to resign of his own free will. No one else from the editorial staff has done so.

After rework, the journal will go on sale with the requisite editorial insets.

[Signed] Aleksandr Mikhaylov, chief of the Federal Counterintelligence Service Public Relations Center

Military & Space Issues

Defense Ministry Personnel Changes Still 'Unsettled'

LD2301194995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1858 GMT 23 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

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[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 23 TASS—The problem of personnel changes in the Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation which emerged against the background of a disagreement in its high leadership on the Chechen conflict is remaining unsettled yet.

While the new staff structure of the Ministry envisages six deputy defence ministers, actually ten generals occupy these posts.

By his decree the Russian president appointed Colonel-General Vladimir Churanov a new deputy minister—commander of the Armed Forces rear, and Colonel-General Anatoliy Solomatin—deputy defense minister—commander of construction and troops quartering.

Andrey Kokoshin and Mikhail Kolesnikov were appointed first deputy ministers, and Vladimir Toporov—deputy defense minister. General of the Army Konstantin Kobets, chief military inspector of the Russian Federation, remains deputy minister as before.

In addition to these six deputy ministers, the same post is occupied by former commander-in-chief of the Western Group of Russian Troops Matvey Burlakov, who was temporarily removed from his office by the defense minister's order.

At the same time, so far there have not been any presidential decrees on the removal of another three deputy ministers: Boris Gromov, Georgiy Kondratyev and Valeriy Mironov. The new manning table of the Defense Ministry does not include them.

The structures headed by Boris Gromov and Valeriy Mironov have been reformed, and the functions which were earlier carried out by Georgiy Kondratyev, were handed over to Vladimir Toporov.

As is known, Boris Gromov and Georgiy Kondratyev publicly expressed their "special opinion" about operations of Russian troops in Chechnya.

Colonel-General Georgiy Kondratyev told ITAR-TASS one of these days that he "continues to fulfill his duties and heads peacekeeping activities of Russian troops", adding that nobody has spoken with him about his possible release from his duties.

It is not ruled out that Defense Minister Pavel Grachev who has just returned from the region of the Chechen conflict will clear up this situation in the Ministry.

Cosmos-3M Successfully Launched 24 Jan

LD2401042895 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0412 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [No dateline as received] At 0654 [0354 GMT] today, the Russian military space forces successfully carried out the launch of the Cosmos-3M light rocket carrier with three satellites on board from the Plesetsk cosmodrome.

Further on Satellite Launch

LD2401052695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0511 GMT 24 Jan 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Viktor Gritsenko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 24 TASS—The Russian space military forces launched a light Cosmos-3M booster rocket from the Plesetsk cosmodrome on Tuesday [24 January] at 06:54, Moscow time. The booster will put into orbit the Tsikada navigation spacecraft as well as the U.S. Fisat and Swedish Astrid subsatellites.

The Tsikada will disengage from the booster at the 63rd minute of the flight. The Astrid will disengage from the Tsikada 24 seconds later. This will happen over the Princess coast (Antarctic).

The Tsikada-Fisat "cluster" will enter the zone of radio visibility of land command-instrumentation complexes of the Russian space military forces in Russia 1 hr 40 min after the launching.

Federal Assembly

Duma's Ilyukina on Grachev's Remarks, Prospects

LD2301192295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1717 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 23 (Interfax)—Chairman of the State Duma Security Committee Viktor Ilyukhin (Communist), believes Russian President Boris Yeltsin is likely to soon sacrifice Defense Minister Pavel Grachev "to assuage general dissatisfaction with the ruling regime, foremost with the president himself."

Commenting on the situation in Chechnya, Ilyukhin remarked that Grachev had "become too odious a figure, causing general aggravation and protest due to the armed forces' unprepared and unskilled actions in the Chechen republic."

At the same time, Ilyukhin is "deeply convinced that it is the president who is the main person to blame for the Chechnya tragedy, who has to be the first to tender his resignation instead of hiding behind the backs of his generals and advisors."

Ilyukhin described as "insulting and unfounded" Grachev's criticisms against Russia's Human Rights Commissioner Sergey Kovalev and Chairman of the State Duma Committee for Defense Sergey Yushenkov, at a news conference in Mozdok last weekend. Grachev called Kovalev "an enemy of Russia" and Yushenkov "son of a viper."

State Duma Amends Tax Legislation

LD2001155795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1443 GMT 20 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 20 (INTERFAX)—The State Duma introduced a number of amendments into the federal tax legislation Friday.

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The value-added tax law now applies to many more commodities which will now be subject to a 10-percent preferential tax. The new list of commodities, endorsed by the government, now includes meat and its products (delicacies excluded), dairy products, fattening and vegetable oils, eggs, bread, sugar, salt, fish and sea products, vegetables, baby food, flour, noodles, and clothing and food for children. For other goods and services, the 20 percent tax remains in force.

The amended tax on profit law provides for lowering the upper limit of this tax from 38% to 35%.

Lawmakers refused to postpone enforcing for a year their decision to abolish a special tax on the positive difference arising from a change in the ruble rate against other currencies.

Earlier, the State Duma decided to abolish all export and import tax privileges with the exception of those provided by the federal laws "On Custom Tariff," "On Value Added Tax," "On Excises" and by Russia's Taxation Code.

State Duma Will Not Pass Dissolution Amendment

LD2301153495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1444 GMT 23 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow January 23 TASS—It is certain that the State Duma will not pass the constitutional amendment which envisions dissolution of the State Duma, ITAR-TASS was told by chairman of the State Duma Law and Judiciary Reform Committee Vladimir Isakov.

Last week the Federation Council, or the upper parliament chamber, motioned this amendment to the State Duma. The amendment entitles the Federation Council to pass key laws if the State Duma is dissolved and a new one has not been elected.

"This draft law became an extension of speeches of Vladimir Shumeyko (Federation Council chairman—ITAR-TASS) concerning greater roles of the Federation Council," Isakov said. Shumeyko's chairmanship of the upper parliament house began with his attempts to hinder the State Duma by a one-chamber legislation, Isakov said. Now the idea is surfacing again, he added.

With a heated atmosphere in the Russian society, attempts are being made to forge an impression that the legislature can perform without the lower parliament chamber, Isakov continued. The State Duma's answer to the Federation Council may be only consolidation on the ground of adherence to constitutional norms and principles, Isakov stressed.

Isakov said the dissolution of the State Duma is possible under the Constitution, but law-making by one parliament chamber is "a malformed legislative process which no one would accept with enthusiasm".

Regional Affairs

Chechnya Blames Russia for Failed POW Exchange

LD2301165495 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1530 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] It was the Russian side's fault that the planned exchange of POWs did not take place today, an IMA Press correspondent was told by Magomet Dargayev, former lieutenant colonel of the Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs, presently a pensioner. He had held talks on his own initiative with the envoys of Deputy Prime Minister Nikolay Yegorov, and had reached an agreement that on Monday, on the border between Chechnya and Dagestan, Groznyy would get 70 irregulars in exchange for 70 Russian servicemen, of which 43 were paratroopers. However, for reasons as yet unknown, said Dargayev, the Moscow representatives had not brought over their prisoners at the appointed time.

Dudayev Comments

LD2401104195 Moscow 2x2 Television in Russian 1000 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev said that during the conflict, the Russian side has lost at least 12,000-13,000 servicemen, while the Chechen homeguard losses were one hundred times less. The former general made these statements in a telephone interview to Ekho Moskv radio. He said that he is in Groznyy.

Touching upon the fate of the Russian prisoners, Dudayev noted that the question of what will become of them will be decided after a truce. Dudayev also said that Groznyy is like a puff-pastry pie now. Russian troops are not in control of anything. They are simply gathered in various places and are completely surrounded.

Dudayev Interviewed on Son, Other Victims

LD2301220995 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskv in Russian 2040 GMT 23 Jan 95

[Telephone interview with Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev by unidentified correspondent on 23 January; place not given—recorded; monitored in progress]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Dudayev] I have more problems to think about than my Avlur [Dudayev's son]. It makes one's heart ache to think of all the people's sons who have been killed here, and Avlur is a rank and file soldier, just like everyone else, perhaps even less remarkable than the others. I have here 30,000 innocent victims—children, old women, women in maternity homes. Do I have time to think about Avlur? My heart is bleeding for all these unfortunate people whom I have been unable to protect from this vandalism. I have failed, though I did my utmost to protect them. I have

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opposed all sorts of mafia for four years, and all the terrorism, the entire arsenals of this disgusting empire, this evil empire, and the vile center you set up there using force. But I failed to defend my citizens—this is my tragedy, and not Avlur.

Two Chechnya Districts Ask to Return to Russian Rule

LD2301150795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1341 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Jan 23 (INTERFAX)—As INTERFAX learned from government sources, residents of the Naur and Shelkov districts in Chechnya sent a letter to President Boris Yeltsin, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and the Speakers of the two chambers of Russia's parliament Vladimir Shumeyko and Ivan Rybkin.

Signed by 50,000 people, the letter calls for cancelling the decision of the former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to place their districts under Chechnya's jurisdiction. It says that the local people no longer want to be pawns to Dudayev or his successors, since "in the three years under Dudayev's rule their districts were turned into a reservation."

"In the past three years all ethnic Russians heading economic facilities were banished; collective and state farms were ruined; forest belts were devastated," the letter says. All these years the local people received neither wages nor pensions.

"Ethnic Russians have been robbed, killed, raped, humiliated. Mosques have been turned into headquarters for coordinating propaganda campaigns," the document asserts. According to it, "in the past 12 months alone the staff of a technical school, leaders and workers of a state farm and several families in two villages of Naur district were shot or stabbed."

Besides, "it is impossible to count how many flats and basements were robbed, how many people were beaten up. Almost all of them were Russian speakers."

The 50,000 people who signed the letter realize that each of them could be killed for this at any time, the letter says. Nevertheless, despite this risk they request the Russian leadership to "help them regain their motherland."

Chechen Atrocities Detailed; 'New Types of Weapons' Cited

MM2301181595 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Jan 95 p 1

[Report by special correspondents Olga Gerasimenko and Vasily Ustyuzhanin: "On 41st Day of the War First Wedding Is Celebrated in Grozny"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] Literally 100 meters from [Grozny's Severnyy] Airport is a

military hospital. The wounded are brought here from the battlefield. According to the medics the biggest influx of wounded, not counting the bloody night of New Year's Eve, was the night of 7-8 January, when doctors operated on 47 people with severe wounds. Many doctors had to perform five or six operations. Special medical units were deployed here from Solnechnogorsk and Krasnogorsk.

Hospital chief Aleksandr Rzhevin told us about the unusual nature of the wounds. Children are coming to the hospital with so-called blind wounds: There are entry holes, but no bullets or shrapnel can be found in the body.

"It is entirely possible that they are testing new types of weapons in Chechnya."

The Grozny hospital is situated literally 700-800 meters from the "greenbelt"—a dense forest strip beyond which the "Rodina" Sovkhoz [state farm] begins, where volunteer militiamen are still in taking shelter.

Here is what we were told by Vladimir Belyashevich, the hospital's deputy chief.

"The Chechens tried to break through to our hospital 11 through 13 January. There were around 1,000 of them—they tried to block the only pass connecting us with the outside world. A second group—around 400 men—came from the direction of the 'Rodina' Sovkhoz. They were hauling self-propelled artillery pieces and 'Grad' launchers. It so happened that at the time no one had been guarding us for two days. But there was no need to shoot. Our troops arrived in the nick of time."

According to the testimony of officers who saw service in the Afghan war, many of the atrocities being committed in this war were unheard of even there. On the outskirts of the airfield are three tents where the bodies of the fallen lie. It is impossible to look on them without shuddering. Throats have been cut, noses and ears cut off, scalps removed, arms severed, bodies charred.

On the following day we spoke with 18-year-old Andrey of the Ivanovo Airborne Division. His battalion, together with battalions from Samara and Volgograd, stormed the Presidential Palace and the Council of Ministers building.

"There were 400 of us. We arrived in Mozdok 14 December. We were sent into Grozny 29 December. Now less than 100 remain of our battalion. Two of my friends were wounded and captured. A few hours later their bodies were thrown toward us. One man's heart had been cut out. The second had had his stomach cut open and stuffed with cartridge cases."

Guys who have taken part in the fighting claim that the Chechens strung up our wounded by their feet in the windows of the Council of Ministers building and aimed their fire from behind their bodies. [passage omitted]

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Task of Federal Forces in Grozny 'Basically Completed'*LD2301175495 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1600 GMT 23 Jan 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Federal forces have basically completed their tasks in Grozny, a high-ranking spokesman of the war department announced in Mozdok today. In his opinion, the city will be fully under the control of interior troops by the end of January. After that, only subunits of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and troops of the North Caucasus Military District will be left in Chechnya. In the opinion of the Russian military, the resistance by Chechen fighters in Grozny has tangibly weakened in the last few days.

However, journalists in the conflict zone see the situation differently. St. Petersburg TV correspondent Andrey Tumanov reports from Nazran:

[Tumanov] No particular changes have been observed in Grozny in the past 24 hours. Bombing and artillery shelling of the right-bank districts of the city continue. Some of the Chechen home guard have been ousted from the left bank of the Sunzha River, and some are fighting in the area of the railway station.

Russian forces currently face a task that is very difficult to carry out. If they continue to oust the home guard from the city, then they will have to make a forced crossing of the Sunzha River. Although the river is not deep, it gives the Chechens a splendid opportunity to sharply increase the Russian troops' losses, as it is known from practice that the advancing side suffers big losses during forced crossings of water obstacles.

This whole taking of Grozny is a rather senseless action, as this does not solve the problem. Our forces in the occupied city—I cannot employ any other word—are already subject to killings and sabotage.

Interior Troops Spokesman on Grozny Operations*LD2301185395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1800 GMT 23 Jan 95*

[By ITAR-TASS Correspondent Aleksandr Kharchenko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mozdok (North Ossetia) January 23—Russian Interior Ministry troops throughout Monday carried out an operation to clear the Chechen capital Grozny of illegal armed bands.

In one of the city's districts, they exposed two bases and a hideout of separatist fighters. An ammunition and weapons depot was destroyed on Khmelniyskiy street, where militants kept Strela-1m anti-aircraft missile systems, anti-tank rocket projectiles and other weapons, a spokesman for Interior Troops in Mozdok told TASS on Monday.

According to the same source, two Chechen snipers and three grenade-launcher operators were killed, and a group of militants driving armoured personnel carriers was destroyed at the water intake on Sovetskaya Street.

Since the beginning of the military campaign in Chechnya, Interior troops destroyed 131 armoured vehicles, killed 500 and wounded 120 Chechen separatist fighters. In addition, they disarmed six armed units loyal to Dudayev, and seized 86 tanks, armoured personnel carriers and combat vehicles, over 400 automatic rifles and machine-guns, more than 70,000 pieces of ammunition for small arms and artillery systems.

According to the press centre, no casualties among Russian Interior Troops have been reported in Chechnya over the past twenty-four hours.

Grozny Situation Described; Casualty Figures Cited*MM2301165195 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 95 pp 1, 2*

[Report by Boris Vinogradov: "Here Soldiers Die Not With a Smile But With a Curse on Their Lips"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Grozny.—The rapture with which Pavel Grachev described on television the death of 18-year-old soldiers, who are dying in Grozny "with a smile on their lips for Russia," was obviously designed for an audience which has a confused picture of what is being perpetrated there.

But even among this audience of many millions I believe that we will hardly find even one sober-minded person who will believe the head of the military department. Incidentally, his extraordinary moves and actions are a subject for special discussion. We are not talking about them. In Grozny I saw something else.

Back in Mozdok I had met with a wounded officer of the 131st Maykop Brigade, which had been smashed during the night of New Year's Day. He did not tell me his surname, like many people with whom I have met, but, cursing the "stupid generals" and all who cooked up this "Chechen porridge," he also said: "You journalists do not write the truth either. All lies!" Well, you have only to drive to the forward line for the truth. Incidentally, nobody puts any obstacles in the way of those who wish to go there. If you have found a seat in a helicopter and then in a vehicle going your way, reckon that you are at your goal.

In the hell of Grozny, where scorched signs on the exit roads bid you "welcome," the cannery seems a paradise lost and found. Only when you reach it and make your way to the basement do you not doubt that you still have some connection with the human race and are sitting not in the next world but in this.

A couple of minutes ago I, a consummate atheist, devoutly crossed my forehead in the dark belly of the

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armored personnel carrier which had picked me up at the airport. But not even here, in "the cans," as the soldiers nick-named the plant, will anyone give a full guarantee, with the possible exception of an insurance policy or the Lord God. Even if the guns' salvoes have not merged into a long drawn-out wailing, they thunder incessantly and it is impossible to figure out who is shooting at whom.

The plant resembles a Noah's Ark, where the Northern Grouping's command and control facility, bases of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the Internal Troops, the FCS [Federal Counterintelligence Service], and "Alfa," the office of Salambek Khadzhiyev, head of the Chechen government of national rebirth, bunkers, and dumps take shelter on a small territory. Here you will also meet refugees, soldiers' mothers in tears, and Duma people—mainly Zhirinovskiyites and Russia's Choice supporters. All active life takes place underground. It is dangerous to be up above—snipers fire from the eye-sockets of surrounding buildings.

From conversations with generals it is hard to ascertain the scale of the losses or to make out the strategy. Officers themselves are starting to argue among themselves as to who has how many men left "in commission," and the question "What now?" is followed by unintelligible answers, whose essence boils down to one thing—only total defeat can bring Dudayev to his knees, not individual actions, even victorious ones. In this regard the taking of the presidential palace was not a turning point. Fighting is continuing in the city center and in adjacent districts.

Whereas it is impossible to fathom out the strategy, the tactic has more or less already been defined. Buildings have to be won back with the help of heavy guns. A captured building is a destroyed building. The so-called signal towers [blok-posty], which are constantly being mentioned in conversations, are small groups of Russian soldiers, those very 18-year-old heroes who sit there in basements and storm the floors. It is possible to take them ammunition and food and to take out the injured only with the onset of darkness.

The night in Grozny—which, according to official summaries, "passed off relatively quietly"—is the time for removing bodies and evacuating the injured. Medics from the field hospital, which is in an air raid shelter that still bears the sign "Civil Defense Staff," say that they receive between 60 and 100 people every 24 hours. The most widespread injuries are fragmentation injuries and bullet wounds to the head.

People here do not feel like smiling. Both physicians—one from Murmansk, the other from Volgograd—were unable to speak: Their voice failed, and tears streamed from their eyes. According to their data, approximately 1,000 people in the Northern Grouping have died in 18 days of fighting, and over 5,000 have been injured. General Rokhlin, they said, came to take the palace and laid down almost the entire 255th Regiment and also the

33d Volgograd Regiment. His ambitions have been paid for with much blood. [passage omitted]

Nevzorov on New War Film on Invasion

954F0974A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 1, 8-15 Jan 95 p 8

[Interview with Aleksandr Nevzorov, State Duma deputy and TV film producer, by MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent Arkadiy Sosnov, in St. Petersburg; date not given: "The Presidential Eye"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

[Box, p 8]

The threat of dismissal of the leader of Russian television, Oleg Poptsov, and the instructions to Aleksandr Nevzorov, the singer of the war, to glorify the Chechen venture, are not simply a coincidence. These two facts are indicative of the direction in which the authorities are moving from democracy and the acceptance of universal human values to schizophrenic patriotism and statehood for the sake of which any lives can be sacrificed. [end boxed item]

Underlying Reason

Aleksandr Nevzorov's television film about the events in Chechnya was shown on Ostankino Channel 1 just before the New Year. How and under what circumstances did this occur? The author of the film answers this question in an interview with a MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent.

[Sosnov] Did you go to Chechnya at your own expense?

[Nevzorov] Entirely. Although I can assure you that I received patronage for this idea at the highest possible level.

I was assigned a colonel, we will call him "Sidorov," and two security guards, and an armored personnel carrier was issued. This was preceded by long conversations about where it was possible and where it was impossible to go, which I quickly stopped, because I can go everywhere as a deputy of the State Duma. All my requests were satisfied practically instantly. The support there was already 100 percent and excellent.

[Sosnov] With which of the leaders of the operation were you able to talk?

[Nevzorov] In general, with everyone. Proper personal relations were established with Yegorov and Stepashin, who were there at that moment. Yegorov is a kind of grand noble from Yekaterina's time, a terribly interesting fellow. He is a person of few words, somewhat somber, and a real master of war. It is very difficult to get him to talk, like trying to start up a car in freezing weather with a crank. But he is uncommonly rich in a human way. My attitude toward Stepashin changed completely...

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[Sosnov] But Grachev, who promised to cope in two hours with a paratroop regiment?...

[Nevzorov] The soldiers are laughing at him for this. Well, he is supposed to be such a Skalozub. But, in general, he is not in the post of minister of defense because of his ability to think. He is a Skalozub in a modern variant—the Skalozub of the paratroopers. At the same time, I admit that he is even not bad as an organizer of battles.

[Sosnov] But why, contrary to the strongly expressed state will, do journalists and the mass media come out against a resolution of the conflict in Chechnya by military means?

[Nevzorov] The majority of journalists are people of a kind and warm intelligent makeup. It is not even a matter of their being bought off, although a document exists, and I am familiar with it as a member of the security committee of the State Duma. They do not understand the awful inevitable reality that stands behind the word "war."

But, unfortunately, there is a number of most clamorous, most visible, and most qualified mass media that through inertia going back to 1991 really are fighting against any manifestation of statehood. Their composition is too well known.

[Sosnov] Were you ever in Chechnya before?

[Nevzorov] No, never, although I know various Caucasus wars, the Caucasus, and Asiatics well. Even if I did not know what was going on there, I have in my heart an idea about my state, and I will not let anybody destroy it, even if I am isolated.

And what I saw gladdened me, sincerely and seriously. I understood that this war is being conducted properly... This is a super-accurate war, where it is necessary to stop five kilometers from a village to camp and go make peace with the old men, for whom we are also a reality, like Dudayev. Moreover, the feats of diplomacy fell to the lot of ludicrous mustached majors of the Internal Troops, lieutenants, NCO's, and warrant officers... As for the bombardment of Grozny, this is also a reality: There are no wars in which the sides drop pies on each other.

[Sosnov] There, in Grozny, the Russians are also Russian citizens.

[Nevzorov] Quite right. You can be as horrified as much as you like in this regard. But it is not accidental that I end up each time with maniacal consistency in such places, demanding that I be allowed to go into battle—where people are being killed. Why? So that I may have the right to talk about it. I took part in a battle near Petropavlovsk station for two days—I make so bold as to assure you, absolutely honorably. We have on film the explosion of grenades three or four meters from the cameraman, and bursts of tracers were fired in our

direction—everything is beautiful. Therefore, I permit myself to talk about the bombardments in such a condescending tone.

But besides Russians, there are fine Chechens there. They are all in all a wonderful people—very intelligent, very clever, and very brave, the only people of all the Caucasians whom I really like profoundly.

[Sosnov] That makes it more surprising that you are accusing of being ugly not the Kremlin leadership which unleashed this carnage, but the press, which is reacting sharply to the ugliness.

[Nevzorov] The press did not have the right to react this way. In contrast to you, I, in the course of the year, was absent from my profession. I have far tougher relations with our leadership than all of the journalists of this country. Nevertheless, I was able to overcome, let us say, my dislike for it when the need arose, in contrast to people who work in the mass media and, in fact, fight against the army and against this war, and take a position that is absolutely not the government's.

[Box, p 8] "At this difficult time—when those who have always conducted themselves in a subservient way with respect to you, but now, in fact, have betrayed you—I—your adversary—offer you help." From Aleksandr Nevzorov's letter to Boris Yeltsin. [end box]

[Sosnov] Why do you consider their position antistate, but not your own? After all, it is exactly this kind of bloody suppression of the rebellious that can destroy the state and alienate from Russia people who just yesterday were leaning toward it. What kind of approach do you call the state approach?

[Nevzorov] One that proposes through force to unite a collection of people, land, krays, and oblasts that make up Russia. With force, because the world does not know another argument. No matter what you say, there is no other. After displaying weakness, we lost the Soviet Union with its phenomenal wealth—we received the lesson that diplomacy does not hold land through gentleness and persuasion. Remember: Yuriy Dolgorukiy, Aleksandr Nevskiy, and the Russian tsars did not read sermons—they sent soldiers. Fortunately, there was no mass media at the time.

[Sosnov] And massive destruction...

[Nevzorov] Incidentally, these means are quite relative. The mass media operates far more globally.

[Sosnov] We fell short of delivering a nuclear strike against Chechnya. Although, following the logic of the military, we could also act this way?

[Nevzorov] To be honest, I do not see the need for this. Until Chechnya itself buys such a bomb somewhere.

[Sosnov] You also met with the Moscow leadership. There, at the top, did they not try to suggest how to make the film?

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[Nevzorov] Absolutely not, although I talked in detail in this regard with Shakhrai, Filatov, and Satarov. Strange as it might seem, organizational questions were discussed at this level: airplanes, cameras, people, the possibility of influencing the leadership of St. Petersburg TV—that I be given technical assistance. In my opinion, only Satarov allowed himself to make a recommendation—that I try to direct “my inherent extremism” within a certain framework, and in a mild form. I am such a scandalous and regrettably well-known person, but nonetheless I am trusted on serious questions.

[Sosnov] The authorities very likely feared this.

[Nevzorov] I think that at the level of Filatov, Satarov, and Shakhrai there was no fear. Because they understood my inherent sense of responsibility. In addition to everything else, we made it clear that there was not that much between us that was alien and insurmountable.

[Sosnov] Anyway, did they obtain a mobile equipment truck for you?

[Nevzorov] No, despite the official request of the government—it came from Minister Sergeyev, who contacted Kurkova, and explained that this was a government order, but Bella Alekseyevna decided to stand to the end—she is such a little Dzhokar Dudayev here. I do not understand what moves her, if there is an agreement with the government to cooperate with me.

[Sosnov] And so, your attitude toward the authorities has changed?

[Nevzorov] It has changed in a better direction, specifically in connection with Chechnya. I saw the first state action. But the authority is not so firm that it can be consolidated; therefore, I am watchful. I fulfilled my duty, and clearly I do not expect any rewards or favors for it, just like a year ago. If you are talking about civil reconciliation: I accidentally met a person there who directed my arrest on 4 October. And we absolutely treated each other in a good-natured way. Even with warmth, as it should be on the frontline. So, too, with the government today, fraternal frontline relations are necessary.

[Sosnov] Where are you going now—back to Chechnya?

[Nevzorov] I think so. I cannot trust and leave this important information support to the press. In addition, I repeat, I have developed fraternal relationships with the leaders of the operation.

Edict Names First Deputy Prime Minister

954F0975A Kazan RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN in Russian 19 Jan 95 p 1

["Edict of the President of the Tatarstan Republic: On the Appointment of R.F. Muratov as First Deputy Prime Minister of the Tatarstan Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] To appoint Ravil Fatkhovich Muratov first deputy prime minister of the Tatarstan Republic, relieving him of his duties as deputy prime minister of the Tatarstan Republic.

[Signed] President of the Tatarstan Republic

M. SHAYMIYEV

Kazan, the Kremlin, 16 January 1995

Edict Appointing Agriculture Minister

954F0975B Kazan RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN in Russian 19 Jan 95 p 1

["Edict of the President of the Tatarstan Republic: On the Appointment of F.S. Sibagatullin as Deputy Prime Minister of the Tatarstan Republic and Minister of Agriculture and Foodstuffs of the Tatarstan Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] To appoint Fatikh Saubanovich Sibagatullin deputy prime minister of the Tatarstan Republic and minister of agriculture and foodstuffs of the Tatarstan Republic.

[Signed] President of the Tatarstan Republic

M. SHAYMIYEV

Kazan, the Kremlin, 16 January 1995

Edict Names Chairman of Economics Committee

954F0975C Kazan RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN in Russian 19 Jan 95 p 1

["Edict of the President of the Tatarstan Republic: On the Appointment of A.M. Gabutdinova as Deputy Prime Minister of the Tatarstan Republic and Chairman of the Tatarstan Republic State Committee on Economics and Economic Forecasting"]

[FBIS Translated Text] To appoint Alla Maksimilianovna Gabutdinova deputy prime minister of the Tatarstan Republic and chairman of the Tatarstan Republic State Committee on Economics and Economic Forecasting, releasing her from the position of chairman of the Tatarstan Republic State Committee on Statistics.

[Signed] President of the Tatarstan Republic

M. SHAYMIYEV

Kazan, the Kremlin, 17 January 1995

Edict Names Head of Cabinet's Secretariat

954F0975D Kazan RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN in Russian 19 Jan 95 p 1

["Edict of the President of the Tatarstan Republic: On the Appointment of N.B. Bakirov as Head of the Secretariat of the Tatarstan Republic Cabinet of Ministers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] To appoint Nazib Bagumanovich Bakirov head of the Secretariat of the Tatarstan Republic Cabinet of Ministers.

[Signed] President of the Tatarstan Republic

M. SHAYMIYEV

Kazan, the Kremlin, 16 January 1995

Decree on Tatarstan Local Elections

954F0975E Kazan RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN in
Russian 19 Jan 95 p 1

["Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatarstan Republic: On Elections to Organs of Local Self-Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In accordance with Article 131 of the Tatarstan Republic Constitution, and taking into account proposals received from the localities, the Supreme Soviet of the Tatarstan Republic decrees:

1. To schedule elections to city, settlement, and rural representational organs of local self-government for 5 March 1995, and conduct them on the basis of universal, equal, and direct right to vote under secret ballot.

To recommend that the elections of other organs and responsible officials of local self-government be conducted in cities and rayons of the republic during the period 5 March through 5 May 1995.

2. That rayon and city Soviets of People's Deputies and rayon- in-city Soviets of People's Deputies in the city of Kazan, their presidiums, and heads of local administrations establish and ensure the necessary conditions for free and democratic elections to the organs of local self-government.

[Signed] Acting chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Tatarstan Republic

Z. VALEYEVA

Kazan, 18 January 1995

Tatarstan Soviet Views Economic Issues

954F0934B Kazan IZVESTIYA TATARSTANA in
Russian 18 Jan 95 p 1

[Shamil Idiatullin report: "Pay and Elections—the Paramount Task"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday's Supreme Soviet session adopted its last decision on economic matters. Much in the actions of the members of parliament and of parliament as a whole has obviously been determined by the "bowing-out" syndrome. But they were stimulated even more actively by the coming elections—the majority of speakers alluded to this factor directly or hinted at it.

The report on the draft law on public spending from the republic budget in the first quarter of 1995 was delivered

by Dmitriy Nagumanov, minister of finance of the Republic of Tatarstan, and the supporting report, by Geliy Kobelev, chairman of the Planning and Budget-Finance Commission. Let us cite some of the main positions of these speeches.

The decline in production, which constituted 22 percent against the previous year, and the continuing nonpayments crisis have led to the formation of indebtedness to the republic's enterprises of approximately R5 trillion. The revenue side of the republic budget in 1994, excluding borrowed funds, was executed 74 percent, the expenditure side, 77 percent. With a revised forecast of revenue of R1.5 trillion, the budget shortfall was R375 billion. And the sum total of republic budget indebtedness to the construction workers, the "budget dependents," and the countryside constituted R350 billion.

By a strange continuity, the indicators of the republic budget approved for the first quarter were comparable with these figures: revenue, R328.839 billion, and expenditure, R354.8 billion.

The principal sources of revenue are taxes: on value-added, on profits, income tax, excise, revenue from privatization, and such. The deputies were quite quick to agree with the proposition of the Ministry of Finance that a search for additional resources is futile: There is simply nowhere for them to come from. The treasury took in R359 billion in the fourth quarter. But, unfortunately, the first quarter is in terms of receipts always worse than the last.

For your information: The treasury has received in taxes R40 billion in two weeks of the new year.

A priority direction of republic budget expenditure has traditionally been support for the agro-industrial complex. And, in addition to this, essentially, current spending will be channeled into the accomplishment of two tasks—support for the elections and the payment of wages, which are interconnected, for that matter. The funding of anything else is merely to keep it alive. The usual lobbying was uninspired, therefore, and was done out of habit, rather—there remain in the memory perhaps only the appeal, wages having been raised, for the introduction of coupons and also the uncoordinated, but harmonious speeches of the heads of the Kazan and Naberezhnyye Chelny administrations containing the idea that these cities be left the taxes collected on their territory. The idea did not carry, of course—"there is the agro-industrial complex also."

But at times one had the feeling that at their last session the deputies would resolve to abolish all taxes, raise the wages of the populace to an unprecedented level, reduce prices, and allow that same populace to partake for two months [half-line illegible].

Unfortunately, common sense prevailed, and paradise was canceled.

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The proposition with which Kamil Iskhakov, mayor of Kazan, began his speech was notable. It is reported that Russia has spent on military operations in Chechnya alone R800 billion—exactly as much as was collected in taxes last year in Kazan, he said. And he proposed an immediate suspension of the payment of taxes to the federal treasury—the bloody carnage cannot be financed by our taxes.

G. Kobelev also spoke of the need for a reconsideration of the unduly large payments to the federal treasury. Ravil Muratov, first deputy prime minister of the Government of the Republic of Tatarstan, also called attention in his report to the drain of capital outside the republic. The establishment by the Government of Russia of customs duty on oil exports of 23 Ecu per tonne will take from Tatarstan this year more than R700 billion, and aggregate payments to the federal treasury from the sale of oil alone will constitute for the republic more than R1 trillion. Money will flow out both via the high-interest credit of the Central Bank of Russia and the low deposit interest rate in the Savings Bank.

But this was more a digression from the main theme of Ravil Fatykhovich's report, which was devoted to the establishment of a minimum wage of R110,000 (a nuance that went totally unnoticed: first the session confirmed budget expenditure calculated with regard to a change in the minimum wage, then the minimum wage itself). The discrepancy between the actual subsistence level and the minimum wage today is an indicator of the efficiency of the reforms that are being undertaken. In the larger scheme of things, each worker should receive as much as he needs for a problem-free existence. For January this is, in Ravil Fatykhovich's opinion, R530,000.

IZVESTIYA TATARSTANA adduced in yesterday's issue arguments both for (the revitalization and development of production, a reduction in the burden on the budget, the transfer of hidden unemployment to unconcealed unemployment objectively working for an acceleration of the reforms) and against (the multiple increase in taxes, not wages, that same impending unemployment and bankruptcy, and, finally, the present shortage of money). It proposed a "roundabout option"—not locking in a tax-exempt wage between R110,000 and R180,000 (six times the labor compensation fund minimum) but agreeing to a compromise, having established a "ceiling" at the level of eight times the minimum. We were heard—the adopted law computes the "excess tax" on the basis of eight times the minimum wage of R30,000. This is gratifying. It is a little distressing, it is true, that \$60 is for us an indicator of "fattening." But not everything can be done all at once.

Tatarstan Cadre Reshuffling Previewed

954F0919A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jan 95 p 3

[Article by A. Ivanov: "Tatarstan: Reform Course"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Important personnel changes are being prepared in the upper echelons of power of the Republic of Tatarstan. Mintimer Shaymiyev, president of the republic, has adopted a final decision on offering the top positions in the republic government to people prepared to embark immediately on the active reform of the economy of Tatarstan.

Analysts note that Mintimer Shaymiyev began back last spring to shape a team of like-minded reformers prepared to assume responsibility for the republic's future. The president stated at that time at a session of the Supreme Soviet the importance of the elaboration of a republic program of the economic and social progress of the Republic of Tatarstan. It was in the course of work on this document that the reform team was to emerge. The president was given the most active support by Farid Mukhametshin, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan, and Ravil Muratov, vice premier of the government. The latter, incidentally, was entrusted with leading the work on the program. It was in that period, by all accounts, that the president made the internal decision to rely on Mukhametshin and Muratov in the course of further transformations in the republic.

Farid Mukhametshin will be offered leadership of the government, and Ravil Muratov will be appointed his first deputy and entrusted with taking charge of all areas of economic and social reform in the Republic of Tatarstan. It should be noted that for President Shaymiyev this will be a kind of compromise for the "red" corps of directors and many managers of various levels would hardly today admit to the office of premier in Tatarstan Ravil Muratov, who is known as a convinced marketeer. As one of the principal authors of the widely known program of the targeted social safety net of the republic, Ravil Muratov is overcoming the bitter resistance of the nomenklatura and populist groupings, whose actions are striking a serious blow at Tatarstan's living standard.

It is now clear that the president, as a convinced supporter of reforms, would never permit his sympathizers to be subjected to the attacks of the antireform forces. It is for this reason that Shaymiyev's wisdom is manifested in the fact that he is offering Farid Mukhametshin, another of his associates, the chair of prime minister.

Mukhametshin also has very considerable experience of work in the cabinet of the present premier, Mukhammat Sabirov, and has earned immense respect and authority in the role of speaker of the republic parliament. Mukhametshin has repeatedly provided cover for many reform bills and decrees, pulling them away from the fire ultimately aimed at the president and his sympathizers. Many people are certain that it is the Mukhametshin-Muratov tandem that will make it possible not only to neutralize the internal and external resistance to the reforms of President Shaymiyev but also to prepare the ground for realization of all the accrued reform efforts. Mintimer Shaymiyev can thereby achieve the maximum, namely, the steady implementation of reforms in all branches of power.

And, further, special mention should be made of departing prime minister of Tatarstan Mukhammat Sabirov. He has done a very great deal to strengthen economic stability and was an active author of the package of intergovernmental agreements of Tatarstan and Russia. It was under Sabirov that the team of reformers, which is to head the new stage of reforms, without breaking recklessly here with what has been produced thus far, was formed in the Government of the Republic of Tatarstan. And the fact that Tatarstan has up to now managed to avoid unattractive intra-government showdowns and a crisis in the relationship of the representative and executive authorities is largely to the credit of such politicians as Mintimer Shaymiyev, Farid Mukhametshin, Mukhammat Sabirov, and Ravil Muratov. It may be stated with confidence that Shaymiyev is one of the few leaders of the republics who can not only practically painlessly, given the above-mentioned arrangement, renew the government but also effect the transition to the next stage of reforms, not weakening but strengthening the reform team.

Tatarstan President, Ministers Hold Conference

954F0934A Kazan RESPUBLIKA TATARSTAN in
Russian 18 Jan 95 p 1

[R. Rashitov report: "Republic Conference"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A republic conference with the participation of the leaders of ministries and departments, city and district administration chiefs, and senior officials of the president's office, the Supreme Soviet, and the Cabinet of Ministers was held on 17 January in Kazan.

The conference was addressed by M.S. Shaymiyev, president of Tatarstan. He analyzed in detail the social and political and economic situation in the republic. Having dwelt on the current changes in the executive branch, the president emphasized that they had been necessitated by the transitional period and the progress of reforms in the economy, constitutional development, and other spheres of the life of our republic.

Major structural transformations, M.Sh. Shaymiyev observed, are impending in the administrative systems of the president and the Supreme Soviet, in the ministries and departments, and in the local administrations also. The main purpose of all these changes is a resolute and firm aspiration to a stimulation of the reforms and a considerable enhancement of the role of the ministries and departments. A tremendous burden and responsibility are borne in this connection by the government. Concerted actions, professionalism, high responsibility—these are the ingredients of success.

The economic difficulties of the transitional period require a significant reduction in items of expenditure and strict economies in terms of financial and material resources. This was expressed with the utmost clarity at the republic economic conference in Buinsk also. All

extravagances, the swelling of managerial structures, and nonproduction spending are impermissible in this situation. This year's budget, M.Sh. Shaymiyev observed, will be taut. We can count, as in previous years, only on internal resources. It is essential that we preserve relative economic stability in the republic at all costs.

Having touched on questions of the development of the agro-industrial complex, the president observed that it would be a priority. It is planned channeling R500 billion from the republic budget into the purchase of mineral fertilizer alone.

Unfortunately, certain negative trends have been making themselves felt in the agro-industrial complex as of late. The slump in animal husbandry production continues, and the head of cattle was allowed to decline last year. A number of administration chiefs are preferring to ship meat on the side, not sell it to the state.

Although this has been discussed repeatedly at our meetings and conferences, no work is being done on the purchase of animal husbandry product surpluses from the public. We deemed it expedient to confirm as deputy prime minister F.S. Sibagatullin, with his retention of the office of minister of agriculture and food, in order that he may tackle most important questions of the development of the agro-industrial complex at the new level.

The president went on to speak about the impermissibility of the lag in the sphere of construction. New approaches in management in this branch of the national economy, one of the most important, are essential. It is necessary to attract more actively the funds of individuals for the creation of the financial base of construction. These matters will be handled by N.D. Denisov—a new deputy prime minister and a person well acquainted with construction.

Serious attention in the speech was paid to questions of the impending increase in the minimum wage, which is in keeping with the law "On the Subsistence Level," which is in effect in the republic. With the adoption of the law on the minimum wage, there will be a considerable improvement in the living standard of an absolute majority of the population of the republic.

Of course, this will be a heavy burden on the republic budget. But the leadership of the republic is agreeing to this raise, and it is essential, having made a close study of this matter, to explain everything to the public in detail. Big tasks confront the news media also in terms of information support for this important matter.

Concluding his speech, President M.Sh. Shaymiyev shared his impressions of his participation in the international roundtable of prominent public figures and politicians held recently in The Hague (Netherlands), which discussed the international experience and forms of federalism and constitutional arrangement.

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F.Kh. Mukhametshin, prime minister of Tatarstan, and Vice President V.N. Likhachev took part in the meeting.

Yushenkov Scores Yeltsin on Chechnya

954F0978A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 3, 18 Jan 95 p 11

[Interview with State Duma Deputy Sergey Yushenkov by A. Pavlov; place and date not given: "Sergey Yushenkov: Yeltsin Still Has Not Stepped Out of the Airplane at Shanno:—the President Must Immediately Dismiss Those Responsible for the Chechen Tragedy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Pavlov] Everybody keeps talking about the urgency of stopping the bombing of Grozny. Yeltsin has already issued two orders to that effect. Although it appears the second one too, not to mention the first one, has not been carried out. Why such an emphasis on bombing? Artillery bombardment is no less dangerous. The deputies who were in Grozny said that the intensity of the artillery bombardment was as great as 15-20 explosions a minute. At the same time, nobody is talking about a moratorium on shelling the city, its civilian quarters.

[Yushenkov] Yes, this is true. Artillery bombardment is not being mentioned. Both bombing and artillery bombardment of peaceful cities and population points are crimes against humanity. By the way, this is the way bombing and artillery bombardment of peaceful cities were classified at the Nuremberg trial. And in our time, quite recently, the Hague International Court issued a ruling with respect to the equally barbaric bombing and bombardment of Yugoslav cities.

In my view, what Yeltsin is currently doing is simply incomprehensible. It is difficult for me to comment on this. I think that if we qualify his actions in terms of our Criminal Code, they would constitute exceeding official authority. Article 171.

True, the presidential edicts do not mention the bombing and artillery bombardment. But he bears responsibility for them under any circumstances. He personally is committing a crime by not stopping his retinue.

At the same time, there is a danger of a different kind: Since those around him have already lost their reason, if pushed into a corner they could inflict even more harm, commit mass crimes not only in a limited region of Russia but on the entire territory of the country. We also have to be careful not to push Yeltsin himself into a corner. In principle, he sometimes exhibits quite normal impulses. For instance, on 17 December he sent a proposal to Dudayev to head the Chechen delegation at negotiations (then the delegation that would be sent from Moscow would also be of a sufficiently high level). But the next day there was a meeting of the Security Council, which made a completely different decision. So the Security Council is already in a way exceeding its constitutional authority. It assumes command of the

country. And of course I would very much like to see Yeltsin recognize his guilt and responsibility and see him in the end at least dismiss Grachev, Yegorov, Lobov, Stepashin, and Yerin... And by doing so if not save his reputation—that would be difficult—at least soften the terrible consequences Russia is facing. The consequences are truly horrible, because it is clear that separatist moods and national-radical trends will now intensify in the Caucasus, which may spread beyond the North Caucasus—and not only to regions with a Muslim population...

[Pavlov] Yes, the first sign of this is the meeting of heads of seven republics in Cheboksary.

[Yushenkov] It demonstrated the trend quite clearly. In reality the Chechen war is a monstrous crime against that very integrity of Russia in the name of which this war is being conducted. It is also clear that this is a monstrous crime violating Article 2 of the constitution, which deals with human rights... All our attempts to prevent this have been fruitless. Sergey Adamovich Kovalev met with Yeltsin one on one—it did not help... But now, I repeat, we should not give them the excuse to act like criminals who have nothing to lose. A good way out for Yeltsin, in addition to firing those I already mentioned, is to sit at the negotiating table with Dudayev. Yes, he may see it as shameful, but this is his personal shame...

[Pavlov] I feel that lately he has been too sensitive to such matters as the level of negotiations and all sorts of protocol issues. Even Sergey Adamovich Kovalev was lectured by Ilyushin before meeting with Yeltsin on how the latter should be addressed and what he may or may not ask for... You start getting the feeling that they all come from nobility instead of lowly peasants.

[Yushenkov] This is obvious. This is what Shakhrai and Lobov are whispering into his ear... They keep telling him that. But these are Yeltsin's personal problems. It cannot be permitted to reach the point of total absurdity. And, of course, the best solution is for Yeltsin to step down voluntarily. Unquestionably, this would be the best solution. And all these questions: "Who could replace Yeltsin?" are simply laughable... Absolutely anybody! Chernomyrdin, for instance. In keeping with the constitution... If we, Russia's Choice, who are in opposition to Chernomyrdin, say this, it means that the situation has reached a point beyond tolerance.

We have set up a public committee to review crimes against the constitution. It held its first meeting... And immediately uncovered a whole host of violations—of both the constitution and other laws...

[Pavlov] Did Kovalev participate in this meeting?

[Yushenkov] He was not at the meeting, but agreed to chair the committee. At the time every minute of his day was committed. He tried to somehow influence the authorities to stop the massacre in Chechnya.

...What is happening there is monstrous. This truly is something for the international tribunal.

[Pavlov] You mentioned Yeltsin's retinue, which is responsible for the Chechen adventure. Who else did you have in mind, in addition to the people you mentioned?

[Yushenkov] In principle, all of them are responsible. Ilyushin, Korzhakov, Barsukov, Filatov, Pain, Satarov, Baturin... All, absolutely all... There is not a person there who is not responsible. To a different extent, of course, but each of them is responsible.

[Pavlov] You propose to get rid of them. But he cannot fire everyone at once. Perhaps two or three for starters?

[Yushenkov] Of course he cannot fire everyone. And even if he did, this would not save the situation. He has no political future now. But at least he can preserve—no, not his good reputation... Perhaps he can at least think a little about his children and grandchildren... The future of Russia... If he still has at least a shred of sense of responsibility, this is what he should do. He must repent, and ask for everyone's forgiveness. Initiate criminal proceedings against his retinue. It is clear that he did not make these decisions on his own... He did it at the prompting of various people close to him.

[Pavlov] You know, I have always had doubts about this frequently mentioned contention. "The retinue is at fault for everything..." A man must have his own mind! Remember, Tsar Sultan used to say: "What am I? A tsar or a child?..."

[Yushenkov] There is a saying that a king is hostage to his court; with respect to Yeltsin, this is the case. I participated many times in various meetings and conversations with president, during which we were able to change his position, convince him to make this or that step. Some time later, however, everything would be rearranged. Moreover, I was present in instances when he signed that or that edict, and then the document never came out. Or came out in a completely different form...

[Pavlov] Yes, this is really bad...

[Yushenkov] Therefore I have the right to say that the president does not make the decisions now. To all intent and purposes he still has not stepped out of the airplane at Shannon. He is still there. And in the same condition. But I do not know what can be done about it. When I learned that he was about to sign an edict on sending troops to Chechnya, I said: We have to start impeachment proceedings. I hoped that perhaps this step on my part, an act of desperation, would turn something in Yeltsin's head, make some connection there. It did not—nothing connected. Yeltsin never realized why he found himself alone with the fascists. Only the fascists support him. He does not understand why. He believes that we are all wrong, and he is the only one who is right.

[Pavlov] The whole unit is marching out of step, and only the lieutenant is in step.

[Yushenkov] Yes, yes, he completely lost his reference points. He already has developed the stubbornness of a man who does not control himself. Certain physiological aspects are now at work here. He is now very dangerous for the entire world. On top of that, we have to remember that he has his finger on the nuclear button...

[Pavlov] Do you feel any pressure from the authorities because of your position, because of your activities?

[Yushenkov] My ATS [automatic telephone communications]-1 government communications telephone is still dead. I was told blatantly that it had been shut off at the order of the Main Protection Administration. The ATS-2 is still functioning, but these days this is a very weak communication system. Many high-ranking officials do not answer even ATS-1 these days—only the special switchboard telephones. As to ATS-2, they consider it not worth their attention.

[Pavlov] Is your telephone tapped? Are you under surveillance?

[Yushenkov] It appears so, the telephone is actively tapped. Surveillance—I do not know. I do not think so. Otherwise they would have to put surveillance on too many people. It probably made sense to put surveillance on me from 27 November to 5 December—at the time I was practically alone in speaking against sending troops to Chechnya. This is in a way within my area of specialization... There are practically no prominent figures on the political arena now, however, who support this. So what do you do—put surveillance on everyone? Only the fascists support war in Chechnya.

Grachev, Others Blamed for Arming Chechens

954F0979A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 1-2, 11 Jan 95 p 11

[Article by Lyudmila Leontyeva followed by comment by Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov: "Cynics: Weapons Were Left Behind in Chechnya With the Permission of P. Grachev Following Consultation With B. Yeltsin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Groznyy-Mozdok-Stavropol—Christmas with the solemn laying of the stone at the construction site of the Church of Christ Savior was marked by the apogee of the diabolical possession of the Russian military, which this day bombed Groznyy with particular ferocity. It was avenging blood-stained Chechnya for its indomitable spirit! Russian society, for the howls of anger! For its own fear of losing its shoulder boards!

On the day of the appearance of the Savior dozens of innocent souls departed the lacerated bodies of 19-year-old soldiers and young officers, who had obtained from the authorities their first separate "apartment"—a lead coffin. In these hours—a fearful sign—a mortar shell fragment killed the first top official of Russia: the 37-year-old Viktor Vorobyev, a major general from the administrative staff of the MVD.

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I knew Viktor Vasilyevich personally when he was deputy chief of the Stavropol Region Internal Affairs Administration for criminal investigation. An outstanding individual, most decent man, and highly professional. "A person who never hid behind others' backs and who would put merely himself at risk," Zoya Novikova, lieutenant colonel of the militia and leader of the Press Office of the Stavropol Internal Affairs Administration, told me bitterly. Of the multitude of criminal offenses which Vorobyev "untangled," Novikova and I remembered first and foremost two connected with the rescue of children. Viktor Vasilyevich took part in the operation to rescue the Vladikavkaz schoolchildren whose bus had been seized by terrorists. This was the first instance of terrorism in Mineralnyye Vody. Vorobyev and his team tracked down the sadistic maniac—child killer—who was in charge of the adolescents' club in the city of Nevinnomyssk.

But there are sufficient mines, bullets, and shells in Chechnya for thousands and thousands of our children, the majority of whom did not play in the Zarnitsa games even, and for hundreds of those like Vorobyev who are paying with their own blood for the staff efforts of their command colleagues who prepared death for them three years ago even and who are now calculating its trajectories in Moscow and Mozdok headquarters.

The past week passed in furious arguments of military officers and politicians about who left behind in Chechnya the mountains of Soviet weapons in the undoubtedly cynical knowledge that they would sooner or later begin to speak!

The media is avidly giving voice to their mutual recriminations, showing on the television screens very aggrieved people. But there are neither secrets nor sensations: The time is too close to us for anything to be concealed or forgotten behind its thin veil.

I also personally witnessed the events of three years ago. I was visiting the barracks areas of the Grozny Garrison at that time and meeting and talking with many officers and members of their families. A tragedy of betrayal of servicemen planned in the lofty Moscow offices of the Ministry of Defense was unfolding before my eyes. I remember the despair, fury, and bitter perplexity at what was happening.

"We are real hostages here. We have been abandoned to the whim of fate, no one gives a damn about us. Stormy negotiations are going on behind our backs between Moscow and Dudayev, but we know nothing. But we cannot abandon the barracks areas, the stores—there are enough weapons for several divisions here," Petr Sokolov, chief of the Grozny Garrison, told me bitterly at that time.

Shaposhnikov was minister of defense at that time, and he was replaced in this post in May 1992 by Grachev. Which of them dotted the final "i" in this entire business, to whom are we obliged for the "gun on the wall"

hung there by our own hands? This can be answered precisely by a "neutral" individual, who has now disappeared completely from the television screens—Valentin Stepankov, the former general prosecutor of the Russian Federation. Here are extracts from an official letter of V. Stepankov in 1992 on the situation in the Chechen Republic which was made public once in the news media and which has never surfaced since:

"In the time that it has been in existence the Dudayev regime has adopted active armament measures, mainly by way of the capture of the weapons of army units and formations. This is what was revealed by a special inspection carried out by the military procuracy authorities...."

"On 31 March 1992 the parliament of Chechnya adopted a decree bringing all army units, arms, and combat equipment under its jurisdiction. In this atmosphere of consent of the leadership of the armed forces negotiations between Dudayev and the command of the North Caucasus Military District began.

"With the authorization of P.S. Grachev, minister of defense of the Russian Federation, on 25 May 1992 I.N. Strogov, first deputy commander of the North Caucasus Military District, signed with Dudayev a treaty on the withdrawal of the troops and the distribution of assets, according to which half the combat equipment and arms was transferred to Chechnya.

"But even after the signing of the treaty, the militants' armed attacks on the military facilities continued, roads remained blocked, and military transport aircraft were fired at. On 6 June 1993 Dudayev demanded that Russia's troops withdraw without weapons or equipment from the territory of Chechnya within 24 hours. In accordance with an order of P.S. Grachev, minister of defense of the Russian Federation, servicemen and members of their families were in order to avoid bloodshed evacuated without arms, equipment, or other military property. As a result arms, equipment, and military assets worth a total of R1.11 billion were left on the territory of Chechnya.

"P.S. Grachev, minister of defense of the Russian Federation, explained in respect of the stated question that the transfer of arms and military equipment had been agreed with President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin.

"The armament of the Chechen formations was achieved via other, illegal, channels, the population was armed unchecked also...."

How many weapons there are now in Chechnya, no one can say, of course. Even approximately. But what Pavel Grachev and his ilk left there is quite widely known: a developed military infrastructure from the units stationed on the territory of the republic—an armored training division (subsequently converted into the district training center), the proving ground of the North Caucasus Military District, the air training regiment of the Stavropol Aviation School, an air defense unit and

support units, a separate air defense army, an MVD escort regiment, a civil defense regiment, a police regiment, and units and support of the military airfield in Khankala and the Kalinovskaya Air Base. A large quantity of military equipment: two tactical missile launchers, 108 pieces of armored equipment, 590 anti-tank weapons, 153 artillery pieces and mortars, and 41,538 small arms. And the aircraft based at the Kalinovskaya Air Base and the Khankala Air Base.

The huge losses among the peaceful population and servicemen in the dirty war impart a smack of particular cynicism to this deal with the weapons left in Chechnya. It is here that the sources of the moral turmoil and betrayal of their men and officers by cynics in shoulder boards and without lie. Hurling them into hell in blazing tanks and disavowing them, stooping to malicious slander of those that are already dead!

Comment of Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov

I affirm today that while I was minister of defense of the USSR weapons of our army were not transferred to others' hands. In addition, our army subunits were stationed on the territory of Chechnya at that time and guarded our weapons. At the same time, on the other hand, repeated attempts were made in Grozny and elsewhere to capture them, of which I was informed by the commander of the North Caucasus Military District. I repeatedly sent delegations there, and Chechnya was visited twice by General Grachev, the present defense minister, and other generals and officers. A commission, which was headed by the first deputy commander of the North Caucasus Military District, was set up to study this matter.

I ordered a number of additional measures for the safekeeping of these weapons. Specifically, the mining of the stores, the removal of the weapons from a state of operational readiness, their withdrawal to other regions of Russia, and negotiations with the Chechen leadership.

In some things we were successful, in some, not. But the final decision on the fate of these weapons, as also on the withdrawal of the Russian subunits in Chechnya, was adopted in 1992 not by me but by the military leadership of Russia. Grachev was appointed minister of defense in the first days of May 1992, and on 26 May his Directive No. 316/1/0308Sh to the commander of the North Caucasus Military District ordered that these weapons be divided 50 percent each between Dudayev and Russia. The district command adopted the measures for the removal of these weapons on the grounds of this directive. And not 50 percent, but considerably less, of these weapons were removed. If we are speaking of small arms, no more, no less than approximately 10,000 of the 50,000 guns were removed. The Chechens then began to block the airfields and to prevent the further removal of these weapons.

An investigation of all subsequent episodes is of considerable importance also. Who purchased and deceived our servicemen in November 1994? Who armed the

opposition in 1994? Which strategist organized the tank assault and the bombing of Grozny last November and then abandoned his men and officers? Which commanders repeated this preposterous plan on New Year's Day 1995 and left on the streets of Grozny dozens of corpses?

If an investigation is conducted both in respect to the facts of the abandonment of the weapons and the recent events in Chechnya, it seems to me that the last names, first names, patronymics, and addresses of the characters will coincide.

Gromov on Disagreements Over Chechen War

95UM0208A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 1, 8-15 Jan 95 pp 1, 5

[Interview especially for MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI with Colonel General Boris Gromov, deputy minister of defense of the Russian Federation, by MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI military observer Aleksandr Zhilin; place and date not given: "Boris Gromov: 'The Operation Was Prepared in Profound Secrecy....'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Zhilin] Since 26 November, you have sharply opposed a power solution of the Chechen problem. But why did you not state your protest before the start of the military operation?

[Gromov] The operation was prepared in profound secrecy, and I simply knew nothing about it.

[Zhilin] You mean that the Ministry of Defense Military Collegium had not discussed a plan for the use of troops in the Caucasus?

[Gromov] In the past two years, the activity of the Military Collegium has assumed a formal nature. Critical decisions affecting the fate of the country have increasingly been adopted by a limited group of officials. And the more serious the mission, the smaller the group of these persons. The Military Collegium was essentially sidelined from discussion of the problems connected with the START II Treaty, the Partnership for Peace program, and other documents that are very important for the Ministry of Defense. The decision to employ troops in Chechnya was also adopted in secret and was not considered by the Collegium.

I would like to emphasize that I am not opposed to order being brought to bear in Chechnya and in the country generally, but to methods that are incompatible with the concepts of "constitutional order" and "democracy."

[Zhilin] Observers note that the Army has displayed very low professional proficiency in Chechnya....

[Gromov] The Army should not be performing police or gendarme functions—this is not its "profession." Whence the deplorable results. Attempts have been made repeatedly in our history to employ it for power pressure on the "unruly"—it is sufficient to name Novocherkassk, Vilnius.... But it has never used against

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its own people the entire arsenal of combat weapons intended for a full-scale war. In addition, the Army's intervention in domestic political showdowns has not once produced positive results; it has only intensified the crisis.

[Zhilin] How would you evaluate the strategy and tactics of the Armed Forces in the Chechen operation?

[Gromov] There is nothing to evaluate in this case, inasmuch as neither strategy nor tactics are observed. The Afghan experience should have taught us something, it might have seemed. Specifically, if only the fact that when a decision on military operations is being made, it is essential to take account of all local singularities: historical, national, religious, geographical, meteorological, and so forth. Nothing of the sort was done. The decision was adopted spontaneously, by all accounts. The troops taking part in the combat operations had not been prepared for this either morally or physically or professionally. The Armed Forces are not today distinguished by a high degree of training of the personnel, and they lack a sufficient quantity of equipment that is in good working order and combat-ready, communication and control facilities, technical and rear support, and so forth. All this condemned the military campaign in Chechnya in advance to big casualties on both sides.

[Zhilin] You are contradicting the official evaluations of the minister of defense, announcements of the government press center....

[Gromov] Disinformation is an indispensable attribute of war. But in our case it is being directed not against the "enemy" but exclusively against our own people. Overseas television companies are showing the nature of the war without cuts. Compare the destruction of the cities of Argun and Grozny with the consequences of the strikes against Iraq during Operation Desert Storm, and you will understand everything.

[Zhilin] Is the use of salvo-fire missile launchers and the intensive bombing of localities justified from the viewpoint of operational efficiency?

[Gromov] From the viewpoint of operational efficiency you may justify whatever you like, the use of nuclear weapons included. If you proceed from the condition that victory must be achieved at the price of the destruction of each and everything. It is this condition that is operative in Chechnya, it would seem. A barbaric choice of means of combat is a sign of the uncivilized nature of an Army.

[Zhilin] Have you attempted to offer your plan of a solution of the crisis?

[Gromov] I reported my considerations to the minister of defense. I believe that it is essential for a start to halt the combat operations immediately. If only to assess what line we have reached, what we have achieved, and what we have lost. And, most important, to understand, finally, what lies ahead for us. No one has yet formulated

the strategic goal. Voices are being heard: As soon as the irregulars take to the mountains, we will finish them off there. This is either an illusion or a deliberate lie. It is sufficient to recall how many victories we won in the mountains of Afghanistan. It will be the same in Chechnya also....

I see no solution involving violence. However difficult and offensive to both parties, it is essential to sit down at the negotiating table, because there are no winners in a civil war, only losers.

[Zhilin] The minister of defense does not share your viewpoint, it would seem.

[Gromov] I sincerely do not understand what is happening. Pavel Grachev has himself acknowledged repeatedly that he chose for himself deputies from the ranks of those with whom he fought in Afghanistan. There should be no misunderstandings in our team, it would seem. I, at least, have tried to do everything possible to help Grachev become firmly established in the position of minister of defense. Nonetheless, some distrust of his deputies began in time to arise on his part. I suppose that the minister's attitude toward me personally changed after I did not take part in the events of October 1993. I was pursuing no political goals; I did this exclusively from moral considerations. But subsequently, this decision of mine was presented to the country's leaders from a political viewpoint.

[Zhilin] What is behind the minister of defense's decision to downsize the offices of three of his deputies?

[Gromov] An endeavor to rid himself of people to whom he objects, I believe. Inasmuch as simultaneously removing three deputies just like that is difficult, an excuse was thought up: reform of the ministry's managerial staff.

[Zhilin] Have any complaints been made to you?

[Gromov] There was a telephone conversation, in which Grachev set forth his complaints about me. The first concerned my interview in connection with the events in Chechnya on 26 November, in which I spoke against a power solution of the conflict, and also my appeal to Dudayev requesting the release of our prisoners. The minister did not like this.

The second reproach was connected with my condolences in connection with the death of Dmitriy Kholodov. I was told that I had in this way caused the minister moral damage.

The third was due to my presence at a charity hockey match in honor of servicemen who fell in Afghanistan, at which I was asked to perform a symbolic dropping of the puck. Our superstars Fetisov, Bure, and Mogilny took part in this game. I was charged with links with "traitors to Army sport" and with discrediting the Army, as it were.

The fourth complaint concerns my close friendship with a person whom Grachev himself has recently ceased to consider his friend. To this I replied that I choose my friends without regard to the opinion of the minister....

[Zhilin] If you are, for all that, deprived of office "for links with traitors to Army sport," what will you do?

[Gromov] I shall not leave the Army, in which I have served since the age of 12, when I became a student of the Suvorov Military School.

Karpinskiy Explores Possible Effects of War

954F0972A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVCSTI in Russian No 1, 8-15 Jan 95 p 7

[Article by Len Karpinskiy under the rubric "Chechnya": "Captives of Petty Tyranny"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As long as the bloodshed in Chechnya continues, it is very difficult to think of anything other than how to stop it. Nevertheless, we should gradually try to find answers to the main questions: What exactly happened? What, if you wish, are the political platform and ideology of the government's gamble?

All reasoning of supporters of the rocket-and-bomb solution to the Chechen puzzle revolves around the same item: the state ("state interests," "state will," "defense of the state...").

Contrary to Russian citizens' persistent prejudice that the aggregate mass of higher-ups is the same as the Fatherland, the state and the society are not the same thing. The state grows out of the society; however, in the process of serving certain public needs by using its authority, as a rule it separates from the society and moreover, attempts to dominate it. For the state, only that is true which benefits it. Those who found a warm nest in the power hierarchy always argue that a utilitarian state necessarily is good for all citizens.

The Kremlin muscle crowd and the politicians that joined them argue that the Army protects the rights and freedoms of Russian citizens in Chechnya. But the main right is the right to life.

The instigators of the military confrontation in Chechnya attempt to get out of the scandalous situation with the help of phraseological exercises such as: "There is no party of war—there is a party of Constitution." But what does it change in substance if the Constitution is imposed through war? If war is chosen as a means, everything becomes a weapon, including the Constitution.

"Oh war, you foul thing, what have you done!"—this famous poetic line of Bulat Okudzhava also becomes a political formula. All efforts of the government propaganda are aimed at clouding the fundamental circumstances. Whose war is it? Nobody's, and it is not a war anyway—just a series of military measures. If it is

nobody's war, then it is nobody's fault. Our common tragedy; everybody is grieving and sobbing. Grachev and Yerin too.

It was Moscow, however, that unleashed the war. And this is an irremovable fact, in light of which all episodes and events acquire a strange political shape. Humanitarian aid provided by the Russian Government to the population of Chechnya arrives together with weapons and munitions, and I am sure you would agree that a humanitarian bomb is something new and out-of-bounds.

After blood is shed, peace talks become difficult in principle. For some time even impossible, since blood produces hate and thirst for revenge.

The thoroughly false semi-official crowd likes to teach the press objectivity: Show both sides of the conflict, they say. There are no "both sides"—the sides are incomparable in principle! One cannot put on the same scale political ambitions and human lives. The former are worthless, and the latter are priceless. One is therefore amazed at the evolution of "democrat" Kozyrev, with his heartless sophistry. He pontificates with professorial aplomb on the need to "delegitimize Dudayev's regime" at any cost and about "justifiable bloodshed" in order to overcome separatism. I do not know whether Minister Kozyrev will make it into the history of Russian diplomacy, but as a propagandist of "preventive bloodshed" (or retribution before the fact) he will not be forgotten by his country.

This is the war not only of generals who head the national system of the Armed Forces, but also of a considerable number of other heirs of October 1917 and October 1993—those who long ago or recently acquired a taste for living not by labor or capital created and managed by labor, but by a place in the apparatus of a state propped on the crutches of authority and great-power mentality.

This is the war of the all-Russia "seatocracy" against those who work in Russia. The Russian state's treatment of Chechnya is not that of a law-protecting structure—it is that of a law-breaking state.

Most Russian citizens do not protest against the state's right to use force in general—they protest against irresponsible or malicious use of this right. The government's fault is that not only was it unable to find other ways to solve the problem—it did not particularly search for them.

Let me remind you of a few things of the past. In the beginning of 1992, President Yeltsin himself publicly declares that he sees the solution to the Chechnya problem, which has not signed the Federation Treaty, in adding three or four points to this treaty, which are to be discussed at bilateral meetings of respective delegations. Where are these points (and these meetings), through

which the Chechen leadership too hoped to legitimize relations with Moscow "along a horizontal rather than vertical line"?

In 1993, the government and the parliament of Chechnya, tired of the confrontation between the "Chechen wolf" (the wolf is the Chechen Republic's state seal) and the "Russian bear," were in an uplifted mood over the final document signed by Yuriy Yarov, deputy chairman of the RF [Russian Federation] Supreme Council, and Bekhtimar Mezhidov, deputy chairman of the ChR [Chechen Republic] parliament, in which Russia de facto recognized the political independence and state sovereignty of Chechnya. The parties agreed to set up a commission on the questions of state-territorial delineation between the RF and the ChR and expressed the intent to maintain a common military doctrine, common economic space, coordinated monetary-fiscal policy, and so on. Were these agreements built upon, and how did the RF Government later react to the obvious desire on the part of Chechnya to find common points with Russia, to prove to it its capacity for compromise?

The history of government idleness is a graphic example of the state "free-for-all," where authority considers itself sufficient grounds for any arbitrariness.

Such activists of the Kremlin-Chechnya slaughter as SC [Security Council] secretary Lobov or the great thinkers from the FCS [Federal Counterintelligence Service] emphasize the fact that Chechnya is a part of the all-Russian whole. They do not forget to emphasize: an "inalienable" part—while keeping mum about its special, even unique character. The president prefers to use the notion of Russian unity, probably forgetting the worthlessness of various deadening monoliths that held up the totalitarian system.

What is the purpose of this discourse? It is this: The point is not whether the Chechen problem could have been resolved peacefully—it is that a peaceful (by means of talks) solution would have produced some form of legal partnership between the federal center and this particular Federation component. Some clearly did not like this prospect. What the Moscow authorities really have in mind is not the unity and integrity of Russia, but that of its administrative skeleton, which ensures an absolutely unobstructed flow of authoritarian impulses from the center to the periphery. Essentially, the initiators of the war in Chechnya are concerned with only one question: Will a Moscow bureaucrat be able to simply order a Grozny one or will he have to engage in preliminaries?

What Federation components can we talk about altogether in a unitary state? They are here no more than objects of governing (and subjugation) by the administrative center.

What sort of "order" and by what constitution will it be established? Do SC members remember that the cause of the Caucasus peoples' war, including Chechens, against

Russia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was not just their territorial displacement? As is known, Shamil's success was rooted not only in the freedom-loving character of Caucasus peoples, but also in the well-organized political-legal system of imamat he built—a state which along with regular troops had at its disposal volunteer corps, recognized the right to bear arms as a sign of respect for mountain people's traditions, had its own judiciary system, which existed in Chechnya until it was liquidated by Bolsheviks in 1926, had a special variety of representative authority and the system of political self-rule in the form of regular congresses and a permanent Supreme Council, and so on.

Russia cannot do without preservation of its integrity, and Chechnya cannot do without preservation of its independence. The democratic wisdom of the RF president and government should have been in finding such a form of treaty that would have preserved Chechen independence and at the same time ensured the integrity of Russia.

The real meaning of the "state integrity" being imposed in Chechnya will apparently mean that by the logic of unified force-supported construction, in the wake of soldiers come a punitive expedition. The repressive authority, including Chechnya's puppet government, put together in Moscow (how many before it?) will not be long in coming. And what about representative power? Only at the last moment Sergey Shakhrai, famous for his predilection for trying to squeeze real life into all sort of schemes, wrote in a point dealing with the creation of representative power at some (I think, third) stage—of course, after all the priority military and occupying actions. And this is natural, since the war is fulfilling the unifying function.

It is not necessary to deport in order to impose repression. Why move people over great distances, when one can easily organize a normal camp zone on the spot? There will be no deportation of Chechens, but there quite possibly will be a Chechen reservation.

One may assume a certain super-task in Moscow's Chechen action. The incomplete ("velvet") authoritarianism from Moscow is exported to Chechnya, is further developed here to the condition of mature dictatorship based on an occupational regime, and then imported back to Russia, to be used as the method of ensuring all-Russia "integrity" of the repressive political system. It cannot be ruled out that this export-import operation in the sphere of politics was indeed the main driving force behind the Chechen war.

No, the Russian authority did not "overlook" Chechnya. It did not miss the chance—it used the time for its benefit. The method of building relations between peoples (much as between people) determines the quality of the structure itself. If the road toward integrity was smoothed by tank tracks, this original sin of creation penetrated under the surface of what has been created, and violence will rule inside the resulting whole. But it

looks as if this is precisely what the federative center as represented by the president, as well as the government and parliamentary commandos, wanted.

The de facto appropriation of all forms of authority by the presidential oligarchy (in the form of the Security Council) served as an effective method for the state to absorb the society. The important part is that it was impossible to challenge the muscle option of the solution in the SC. This means that the Chechnya adventure is, as they say, of a structural nature. It is predetermined by the "structural behavior" of higher officials, their perception of the rules of hierarchical relations. The Chechen crisis appears to be a manifestation of the general crisis of hierarchical systems, which were given unlimited dominance in the Soviet state and, alas, retained their positions in the new Russian Leviathan. From the outside, it does look as if what we are dealing with is a conglomeration of absurdities, runaway disorganization, and erratic behavior of irrational forces. But the convulsive, chaotically voluntaristic method of action is actually the natural logic of work of the bureaucratic hierarchy, where competition of argument is replaced by competition of authority acquired by virtue of a position held.

More than 100 years ago the great Russian playwright Aleksandr Ostrovskiy introduced the notion of petty tyranny, explaining that "a petty tyrant listens to absolutely no one," and "When he stomps his foot: Who am I?—the entire household are to prostrate themselves at his feet, and stay there, or they are in trouble...." The harm from petty tyranny increases a thousand-fold when it is raised to the level of the state and becomes the essence of the authoritarian regime. It is not accidental that Yeltsin has become the successor and executor of the omnipotent communist party: The presidential rule in his implementation is the closest to the totalitarian system of authority.

The common underpinning of the authorities' uncountable Jesuitical twists around Chechnya—this absolutely worst farce of our times—comes from the new intense round of the state's alienation from the society. Persons acting within the hierarchical system are distinguished by diminished responsibility: Evidence of circumstances and public testimony do not reach them in their own objective meaning—they are filtered in advance "as commensurate with the meanness" of the state's egotism. General Grachev is lying, but it is not just his personal lying—through his lips the grand state is lying. General Stepashin was silent for a long time (using his agency's slang—did not "crack"), covering up recruitment of military servicemen for Chechnya, but through him, the police state was engaged in silence and denial. Chernomyrdin lied when he said that the only mistake the government made was launching the war in Chechnya too late, but the mercenary state was lying together with the prime minister. These persons are only mouthpieces of the internal lie of the state system growing in Russia.

When the president publicly talks about Chechens bribing "some mass media" and of mercenary motives of "some politicians," he not only characterizes himself but also exposes the kitchen brains and malignant soul of the state he is the head of. When Yegorov, the chief of the Chechnya operation, categorically advocates storming Grozny—"or we will be perceived as weak"—he demonstrates his own cave mentality as well as the mentality of the state that nurtures him.

The political behavior, compressed and distorted in the hierarchical cage, becomes essentially extremely adaptive. The bureaucratic function in a way becomes implanted in the individual image of the powers that be, and what is called today cooperation of free specialists is no longer possible as the only effective principle of making flawless decisions in complex conditions.

The war in Chechnya was unleashed on the eve of the new year of 1995—the one that will mark the 10-year anniversary of perestroika. It would seem that there is no way back, that the country is moving irreversibly toward a new civilization. The war in Chechnya shows that we essentially remained where we were.

Nevertheless, we cannot consider the story of military invasion of Chechnya as the past, because it already has taken place. I believe that the story is all in the future.

The place the Chechen conflict will finally be resolved is located in Moscow—in those offices where the main political decisions are made. They not only acutely need new owners, but also are in vital need of radical rearrangement. And if the authors of irresponsible decisions acted as a structure, then we need to get rid both of these persons and the structures.

Chechen Crisis, Lack of Control Examined

95UM0209A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 1, 8-15 Jan 95 p 9

[Commentary by political scientist Andrey Kortunov: "The Quasi-State and the West"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The events in the North Caucasus so far have not resulted in a perceptibly serious crisis in the relations between Russia and the West. If we discount the symbolic gesture of Denmark, which froze its military cooperation with Moscow, our leading Western partners overall accepted the "pacification" in Chechnya with Olympian calm. All they came up with was a modest proposal to involve the CSCE mechanism in the resolution of this problem, several indignant editorials in the liberal press, and biting cartoons of Boris Yeltsin. At the same time as ordinary people in the West watched on CNN the "little Christmas war" in Chechnya, the Council of Europe put off once again the question of Russia's entry into the "family of civilized European peoples."

There are more than enough reasons for the restrained reaction on the part of the West. First of all, for the West,

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Chechnya is something at the far end of the world, or maybe even beyond. I once read in a respectable German newspaper that the "Chechen mafia originates in the faraway Siberian city of Chita...."

Chechnya is not Hungary, Poland, or Lithuania; it is not on geographic maps, and hence not among Western politicians' priorities.

Besides, following the lead of the Russian propaganda, Moscow's actions in Chechnya are frequently perceived as a battle against criminal elements, "bandit formations," and on top of that Islamic fanatics. And the West does not have a particular liking for Islamic fanatics: Not too long ago, fundamentalists attempted to blow up the World Trade Center in New York, killed hostages on a hijacked French airplane, and terrorized civilians in Israel. So the green banner of Islam, which Western television companies' footage frequently shows fluttering over General Dudayev's positions, acts upon Westerners as a red flag does on a bull.

Finally, it should be noted that separatism is a double-edged issue. Few among Western states can boast complete absence of separatist movements. Spain and Great Britain, France and Canada are dealing with this problem, albeit not in such an acute form. And in the United States, too, there is no guarantee that two or three decades from now the Spanish-speaking majority in California will not demand separation of territories in the past forcibly annexed to the United States. If you live in a glass house, do you want to throw stones at your neighbor's windows?

As to those democrats who had hoped fervently that the West would hand down a moral judgment on the events in Chechnya, they would be well advised to recall how the West reacted to the storming of the Russian parliament in October of last year. Call it whatever you wish—cynicism, realism, indifference, but if nobody in the West got really upset over the supreme legislative authority of Russia getting pounded into dust, it is silly to hope that a punitive operation in the remote foothills of the Caucasus will tremendously impress Western liberals.

All of the above does not mean at all that the West does not draw any conclusions from the Chechen events. Because these events are not just an excuse for political demarches or moral admonishments. A much more important point is that Chechnya diagnosed the condition of the Russian military, Russian president, and Russian Constitution.

Let us begin with the military. The course of the Chechnya operation by itself graphically demonstrated to the world that the Russian military is, first, not combat-worthy, and second, is uncontrollable. When over a period of one month the joint efforts of enforcement ministries cannot break the resistance of the Chechen micro-state; when they have to bring troops from almost as far as Khabarovsk to conduct military

operations in the North Caucasus; when deputy ministers of defense openly criticize their superior—Western politicians and military men have serious reasons to contemplate whether they should be dealing with Grachev and his team in the first place in trying to implement such joint programs as Partnership for Peace. If the Russian Army's leadership is incapable of keeping it under control, where are the guarantees that it will be able to fulfill the international obligations and agreements reached with the West?

The same goes for the Russian president. No matter how much the Kremlin spin masters may want to prove otherwise, the Chechen crisis exposed in Russia what the West has long suspected: Boris Yeltsin no longer has control over the actions of his enforcement structures and in general has a very vague idea of what is happening outside the Kremlin. And since this is the case, what is the point of the current summits, talks at the highest level, international conferences and consultations, and so on? Talks with the president become a meaningless exercise in rhetoric.

Finally, the Constitution. Only a year ago, the West enthusiastically welcomed its adoption as the guarantee of Russia's forward movement toward democracy and observance of human rights. Has Russia become a more democratic state over the past year? When the overwhelming majority of the population is against the operation in Chechnya and demands a stop to the bloodshed, while the government calmly ignores all protests and demands, it means that there is no separation of powers and no democracy in Russia today. And a leadership that is willing to ignore public opinion and bomb its own citizens is unlikely to be a reliable partner in international affairs. Overall, the Chechen diagnosis is abundantly clear for the West: Alas, today there is no state as such—as the West understands it—in Russia. Instead, what has emerged over the three post-Soviet years is some sort of "quasi-state," and until a real state grows out of it, nobody in the West will treat Russia as an equal.

Novosibirsk Budget, Economic Development Plan Approved

954F0930A *Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 16 Jan 95 p 3*

[Article by Yelena Sablina: "The Budget Has Been Adopted. Will We Make It?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Quietly, without heated argument or objections, the board under the auspices of the mayor has considered and adopted a plan of the socioeconomic development and the budget of the city for the first quarter of 1995. It is good, in any case, when there is agreement among comrades.

So last year's results have been summed up. Optimistic conclusions have been drawn: Under the conditions of the continuing disarray in the country's economy, the

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decline in production, the growth in the number of unemployed, and the social tension in society—under these conditions the administration of Novosibirsk managed to ensure the steady operation in the past year of the city's main life-support systems. Concluding the discussion of the plan and budget, Mayor Viktor Tolokonskiy gave the assurance that the administration's efforts would once again be directed at the assurance of the stability of the life and operation of the city. The resolution of two problems was made paramount: the targeted social safety net (including the personification of certain types of privileges, for decisions on which Novosibirskers are tired of waiting) and support for the programs of the reprofiling of the conversion enterprises. There are 18 such plants in Novosibirsk, and the extent of military production in the past four years has declined here fivefold, what is more. One major military plant, which has now set up the manufacture of vehicle jacks, was cited as a positive example of conversion.

Mention has to be made of the municipal authorities' desire to make the townspeople themselves active participants in the building of a better future, specifically, the metro, housing, and such. City hall is proposing for this to issue bonds and take out money loans from legal entities and individuals. Foreign investments could be a further source of funding for major programs.

As far as the metro specifically is concerned, temporarily closing down the construction project would be, according to V. Tolokonskiy, many times more expensive than beginning the laying of new lines. For this reason a stoppage of operations on the Sibirskaya-Frunzenskaya line, which is under construction, is out of the question.

Things are more complex when it comes to the construction of housing. City hall is not proposing a move to new construction sites until the homes which other clients once began to build up and then abandoned are completed and commissioned.

However you slice it, any matter comes down to money. Having persuaded itself of the impossibility of planning a budget for a term of more than one quarter, this is what city hall is now doing. At the end of last year enterprise indebtedness to the municipal treasury was in excess of R200 billion. It will be no easier in the present year either. Nonetheless, Novosibirskers may derive some comfort if only from the fact that the imposition of new local taxes is not planned as yet. And this means that the townspeople need have no fear that the budget holes will be patched up thanks to funds from their pockets. On the whole, however, budget policy is built on a tightening of the regime of economies on the expenditure side and replenishment of the revenue side thanks to a reduction in tax receivables on the part of enterprises and the mobilization of additional financial resources for budget revenue.

Municipal Budget Computation for First Quarter of 1995 (billions of rubles)

Number	Area of expenditure	Approved for first quarter of 1995	including municipal budget
1.	National economy	89.2134	81.2334
including:			
1.1.	Transport Committee	31.350	31.350
1.2.	Metro	—	—
1.3.	Maintenance of municipal housing and utilities	8.268	0.778
1.4.	Maintenance of departmental housing	7.2	7.2
1.5.	Social Policy Department	0.8	0.8
1.6.	Civic improvements	1.8594	1.8394
1.7.	Major housing repairs	6	6
1.8.	Water compensation	6.0155	6.0155
1.9.	City Hall General Services Department	0.9	0.9
1.10.	Capital investments	11.1	11.1
1.11.	Heating compensation	15.7205	15.2505
2.	Youth Affairs Committee	0.7195	0.3195
3.	Public education	33.2129	5.1194
4.	Cultural education	0.8057	0.8057
5.	Health-care education	0.653	—
6.	Culture	0.9064	0.772
7.	Health care	39.0897	18.7339

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Municipal Budget Computation for First Quarter of 1995 (billions of rubles) (Continued)

Number	Area of expenditure	Approved for first quarter of 1995	Including municipal budget
8.	Physical culture and sport	0.050	0.050
9.	Administrative authorities	2.612	1.1219
10.	Sundries	2.6969	—
11.	Repayment of credit	3.5	3.5
12.	Allowances and compensation payments	14.0744	—
13.	Social safety net programs	1.2	1.2
14.	Social security	1.35	—
15.	State Automobile Inspectorate Transportation Control Service	0.0411	0.0411
16.	Municipal radio broadcasting system	0.034	0.034
17.	Militia (Tsentralnyy District)	0.0155	—
18.	Measures connected with the cleanup of emergencies and other unforeseen expenditure	12	12
Total		202.1745	124.9309

Abortion as Means of Family Planning Assailed
954F0930B Novosibirsk *VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK*
in Russian 16 Jan 95 p 4

[Article by Galina Krasheninina, candidate of medical sciences and spokesman for the Orthodox Center for Mercy in the Name of the Great Martyr and Healer Panteleymon: "Should I Kill My Own Child? Abortion in Russia Has Become the Main Method of Family Planning"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last year was declared by the United Nations the Year of the Family in order to attract the attention of governments and the community to an extraordinarily complex problem—the process of the disintegration of the family, which has encompassed practically all countries of the world. How urgent is this problem for Russians? One out of every two marriages, according to statistical data, ends in divorce.

According to the data of foreign sources, the number of abortions in the world amounts to 50 million a year, and our country accounts for up to 10 million here, this constituting up to 30,000 a day on average. It is not only the figures but society's total indifference to this problem that is astonishing. It has regrettably to be stated that abortion in Russia has become the main method of family planning since, in 1920, a law legalizing it was promulgated for the first time in the world. In the wake of Russia, the practice of abortion was legalized in 41 countries, among which were Japan, France, the United States, and many countries of the former Eastern bloc, but it is still banned in 70 countries. The long-standing practice of mass abortion and the inadequate information on this matter have led to people's social consciousness believing that prior to birth a child is not a full-fledged person and has a right to life only depending on the wishes of its parents.

Are there convincing scientific arguments in support of this opinion? Is the creature carried in the mother's womb primordially a human life or does it become such as of a particular time? The opinion of scientists of the Department of Embryology of Moscow State University is as follows: "From the viewpoint of modern biology (genetics and embryology) man's life as a biological individual begins as of the moment of the fusion of the nuclei of the male and female sexual cells and the formation of a single nucleus containing unique genetic material. Throughout the intra-uterine development the new human organism cannot be considered a part of the body of the mother. It cannot be likened to an organ or part of an organ of the maternal organism. It is obvious, therefore, that abortion in any term of pregnancy is a deliberate termination of a human life as a biological individual."

Recent scientific data obtained with aid of ultrasonics and radiobiological research methods and embryoscopy testify that a child's heart begins to beat between 18 and 21 days from conception, and cerebral impulses are recorded in the seventh week. We know that an absence of the activity of the two most important organs—the heart and the brain—establish the end of human life. But what about the beginning? Is the start of life not connected with the operation of these organs?!

In the ninth or tenth week of pregnancy a child is already screwing up its eyes, and moving its tongue, and if its palm is touched, it squeezes its fist tight and sucks its finger. At 14 weeks the infant has the sense of hearing.

Does the unborn child feel pain? "As soon as the fetus acquires the pain reflex, it is possible that the methods of abortion that are employed will cause pain by the 45th day even. The later the abortion, the stronger the pain. The algic sensations reach their culmination if saline

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poisoning is used as the method of abortion. The fetus experiences a mortal death struggle" (Noonan).

New scientific data obtained with the help of an ultrasound scan force us to take a different look at the problems of abortion. Little children cry out and give out a soundless scream. These tragic images were taken by the obstetric gynecologist Dr. Bernard Nathanson. His films "The Silent Cry," "The Response," and "Clouding of the Mind," which include a recording of the ultrasound depiction of what happens in the *cavum uteri* with a 12-20-week-old child during an abortion, perturbed all of America.

Will these truly tragic images be as perturbing for us? Or will we, as before, be deaf to this problem, fencing ourselves off by a wall of rejection of the new evidence of the intra-uterine life of infants—our children?

The physical consequences of an abortion for the mother and her future children are serious. And how complex are the spiritual consequences when one of the most mortal sins—murder—is committed! May the prophetic words of the well-known Italian lawyer Raphael Ballistrini serve for our edification: "The most infallible proof that some people have reached the extremity of their fall will be the times when abortion is considered a customary and absolutely acceptable business."

It is essential that we recognize that the presence of an article in legislation according the right to undertake abortion (that is, deprive an infant of life) in certain terms by no means calls for or requires this and that abortion itself is not a means of family planning. Love and compassion for one's own children, where are these? After all, when contemplating an abortion, a pregnant woman is, in fact, asking herself: "Should I kill my own child?..."

Economic Issues

Oil Quota Abolition To Be Offset by Contract Registration

MK2001144095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 20 Jan 95 p 2

[Report by Vadim Bardin under the "Foreign Trade Regulation" rubric: "Export Contracts To Be Registered According to New Rules"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The government decree "On Additions and Amendments to Certain Government Decrees on the State Regulation of the Export of Commodities and Services" (No. 1472), which was released for official distribution 19 January, appears unexceptional and routine only at first glance. In reality it gives a clue not only to characteristic features of the current system of export regulation, but also enables one to appraise upcoming novelties.

The essence of the decree boils down to the creation of a system of export contract registration in 1995. This

regulatory tool (of course, along with the retention of special exporters) is designed to offset the abolition of export quotas in the coming year. For this very reason one of the decree's most important provisions introduces a system for registering contracts on the export of oil and oil products. One may suggest, however, that this registration will have its own hallmarks. As KOMMERSANT-DAILY has repeatedly argued, the abolition of oil export quotas will not free exporters from quantitative restrictions. The newly introduced linkage between access to export pipelines and the oilmen's obligations to supply oil to Russian refineries may also be reinforced by the procedure for contract registration. [passage omitted]

Foreign Banks May Get Access to Russian Clients

MK2001142095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 20 Jan 95 p 2

[Report by Pavel Kuznetsov in the "Prospect" column: "The Central Bank Declares a Tough Monetary Policy. The Duma Is Going To Give Foreign Banks Access to Clients"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The symposium "International Operations by Russian Banks" opened in Moscow 19 January.

Pavel Medvedev, chief of the Duma subcommittee on banking legislation, addressed it with a speech on allowing foreign banks into the Russian banking system. He announced a "historic compromise" which, after many votes, his committee members eventually came to approve: Before next year foreign banks holding a Central Bank license will be able to conduct operations only with local entities, and after this date also with resident individuals. Today the Duma is to give a second reading to the law On Banks and Banking Activity which contains this provision. Medvedev explained that if adopted, it will affect eight banks, while the ninth bank that earlier received a Central Bank license—Chase Manhattan—will not get such a right.

Standing in for [Central Bank chief-designate] Paramonova, expected by all, was Central Bank Deputy Chairman Aleksandr Khandruyev, who made a program speech on Central Bank activity. Describing the Central Bank's former moderately tough monetary policy as forced, he stated that in spite of the role of "scapegoat" imposed on it, the Central Bank was able to normalize the settlements system and made its reasonable contribution to the gradual reduction of the growth in prices by the middle of last year. Shaken by the fall crisis, the Central Bank admits, however, that the switchover to the current tough policy was belated. "We were carried away with successes in fighting inflation and reduced the Central Bank prime rate too quickly," Khandruyev said. In conclusion, he called for a "measured access of first-rate foreign banks, which will also benefit our banks."

The symposium, which will continue till 21 January, will hear statements by bankers (Russian and Western) and representatives of the academic establishment on various matters: from the activity of our banks abroad to yet another discussion of why the ruble collapsed.

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Gaydar on Chechnya Errors, Economic Course

954F0980A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 1-2, 11 Jan 95 pp 1-2

[Interview with Yegor Gaydar, former Russian Federation minister of economics, by Oleg Moroz; place and date not given: "Yegor Gaydar Believes an Economic-Political Turn Is Taking Place in Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Already one month has passed since the outbreak of the events in Chechnya, and Yegor Gaydar has been sounding the alarm with unbelievable intensity, warning Russians of the unprecedented danger that hangs over the country in connection with the Kremlin leaders' escapade into the North Caucasus republic.

[Moroz] Yegor Timurovich, you stated a few days ago that a totalitarian regime could be established in Russia as a result of the events in Chechnya. How serious is this threat?

[Gaydar] I consider it quite a serious threat—otherwise I would not have said so. First of all, the authors of the Chechnya adventure may require such a regime in order to avoid liability. Secondly, when adventures of this variety unfold, especially when they lead to large-scale casualties, a certain fixed logic of events comes into action which can lead entirely of its own accord, independent of personalities and situational aspects, to authoritarianism, to slogans of the variety: "First we bring order to Moscow, then—throughout all of Russia!"

[Moroz] Where do you believe the main threat of dictatorship comes from, from Yeltsin himself, or from those who are manipulating him?

[Gaydar] There is no sense in discussing this. Prior to the August 1991 putsch, it was difficult to tell beforehand who specifically would become the initiator of an impending coup, but it was clear that the threat of such a coup was extremely high. And so today it is entirely evident that we have seen a sharp increase in the danger that our still weak democratic institutions may be destroyed in connection with the events in Chechnya.

[Moroz] What must be done in order to save democracy?

[Gaydar] We must change the policy currently being followed, of course.

[Moroz] The policy with respect to Chechnya?

[Gaydar] That first and foremost. But in general we need to replace the political paradigms that have been implanted with increasing persistence since the end of 1993. It is from this time on that we began to see a turn towards systematic nomenklatura-type operation of the state with no guaranteed property rights, a state in which property is distributed and redistributed at the discretion of the leadership. Attacks on human rights went hand in hand with this. A xenophobia began to take root

in domestic policy, aggression—in foreign policy. We saw renewed attempts to use force to resolve extremely complex national issues....

[Moroz] And it is apparently in the mainstream of this policy that we see the emergence of a new character on the Russian scene—the newly appointed chairman of the State Committee for the Management of State Property, V. Polevanov, and his ideas of deprivatization, nationalization of "improperly" privatized property?

[Gaydar] Yes, entirely within this policy. If we now begin to rock this very fragile structure of property relations that has built up, we will see perhaps one of the most dangerous possible developments of events in the economy. Property relations in general comprise a very delicate structure. They take shape over decades and centuries. In view of the fact that this layer of black earth—property relations—was destroyed in our country, we were faced with an almost unrealizable task—to somehow redistribute property rights, without causing social upheaval, and develop a market. This almost unrealizable task was in fact resolved in Russia. So that now, any radical revision of the results achieved would mean chaos in property relations, a blow to legitimization of property relations, and a most serious blow to any prospects of private capital investments being made to the Russian economy. Such a revision alone would be capable of reducing to zero any chance Russia might have for economic growth. At least economic growth based on private investments. For a long time to come.

[Moroz] Is there anything reasonable about V. Polevanov's program? After all, he is saying that many enterprises were privatized through the commission of various violations, which must now be corrected. Most likely there were in fact violations....

[Gaydar] This is an entirely clear-cut matter. The discovery and elimination of violations is normal, routine work, a natural part of the monitoring functions of the State Committee for the Management of State Property. However, the program announced by the committee's new leader envisages an abrupt redistribution of property across entire sectors of the Russian economy and goes far beyond the framework of the routine work we were discussing.

[Moroz] Do you believe V. Polevanov's program is his own personal initiative? Or are there powerful forces standing behind him?

[Gaydar] Of course there are powerful forces standing behind him—there is no doubt about this. Property relations are always closely intertwined with the authority. They are the fulcrum of the economic policy being conducted. And there always exist interests aimed at changing property relations. And so V. Polevanov's position is not an individual position, but rather one based on groups of interests. And as I have already

stated, it correlates fairly precisely with the general turn in policy that started to be pursued at the end of 1993.

[Moroz] Let us return to Chechnya.... Ilyushin, first assistant to Yeltsin, made a statement recently to the effect that those people who are against military action in the region have nothing else to propose that might resolve the Chechen problem....

[Gaydar] Let me put it this way. Almost every action that might be proposed in its place would be less destructive for the Russian state than that which we see taking place in Chechnya today. Naturally, there exists an entire spectrum of proposals, but it would make no sense to discuss them in the overall scheme of things today. What must be done right now is entirely evident—we must terminate the barbaric bombing and shelling and get the sides in conflict to sit down at the negotiating table.

[Moroz] One particular accusation has recently been made over and over against politicians who oppose the war in Chechnya—that they are motivated by pre-election ambitions. And this is essentially what Yeltsin said in his recent address. It seems to me that you in fact figure predominantly among the people he was referring to in this regard....

[Gaydar] I do not know who was referring to whom. Such accusations could go round and round. In other words, we might say to the authors of the Chechen operation that they undertook this venture in order to attain a victory in a little war and thereby shore up their authority, enhance their prestige. This kind of discussion is not really appropriate, in my opinion. You cannot measure everyone with your own yardstick.

Flaws of 1995 Budget 'Substitute' Viewed

MM2401092395 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Jan 95 First Edition

[Article by Yelizaveta Leontyeva: "Yet Another Budget.... While the State Duma Discusses the 1995 Budget Item by Item, the Country Has To Make Do with Temporary Versions"—from the "Biznes v Rossii" section p 1]

[FBIS Translated Text] While we do not have an approved budget at the moment, we now have two substitute documents. One of them is the law on financing state expenditure from the federal budget in the first quarter. The other is the so-called amendments to the draft budget, submitted to the State Duma by the Finance Ministry. Judging by the texts, neither document will provide proper control of expenditure.

The first one—the law on financing in the first quarter—is extremely brief and nonspecific. You will not find in it revenue and expenditure items, the size of the internal and external loan, budget deficit, and many other things which ought to be contained in a law which is to some extent a substitute for the budget.

It is clear from the law that the Russian Federation Government will now finance expenditure on the basis of the items in the draft it submitted last October. That is, as taxes and other payments come into the federal budget. Moreover, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation will add in advance to the revenue part profits for 1995 totaling 1.75 trillion rubles [R]. The money is to arrive in equal installments in February-March this year.

The Central Bank has also been directed to grant the government credit of R5 trillion in the first quarter to cover the temporary discrepancy between current revenue and expenditure—at 10 percent per annum over six months. There is another interesting point. The Central Bank has been authorized to buy—in exceptional cases and in limited quantities—state securities when first floated. This will also be a way of providing credit for the budget.

It goes on to talk about financing conversion programs (one-fourth of Central Bank rate) and shipping food to regions of the North (one-third of the Central Bank rate). About providing funds to purchase agricultural products for the federal food fund and also to form a federal fund to support the seasonal procurement of fuel for power stations, to pump gas into underground storage facilities, and provide the population with fuel. The rate for using the funds will also be one-third of the Central Bank rate.

Then it says what revenue should be transferred to the budgets of the components of the Russian Federation in the first quarter.

These are perhaps the main articles of the law. One might add just one significant point: It legitimizes the inclusion in the budget of the tax on the profits of enterprises and organizations (including banks and insurers) at a rate of 13 percent.

The second document—on additions to the draft budget that was submitted earlier—is somewhat larger and also interesting in its own way. We learn that budget revenue will be somewhat larger than expected in October 1994. The draft had it at R131.8 trillion; the amendments make it R161.3 trillion. The deficit has decreased: The draft had it at R76.8 trillion, while the amendments say R71.6 trillion.

But the changes affect practically all the main revenue sources of the 1995 budget—"extra" trillions had to be added to the revenue somehow. The external activity rate differential was changed—an extra R12 trillion; the weighted average import duty rate was increased from 5.6 percent to 7.5 percent—another R1.8 trillion; a number of proposals on changing tax legislation was not adopted—adding R1.3 trillion. Adjusted oil and gas export duty added a considerable amount.

[FBIS Translated Text] The expenditure part of the budget looks different too—expenditure has increased. In the draft we saw a total of R208.6 trillion; now the

Finance Ministry reckons it will be R231.9 trillion. The increase in total expenditure is explained by any number of causes, including an increase in minimum pay (the idea that it could have settled at R20,000 seems strange) and a decrease in the volume of "tied" credit obtained. These two amendments alone would increase expenditure by nearly R5 trillion, not to mention the others.

In connection with the adjustments, the federal budget deficit, as a proportion of GDP, will fall to 7.7 percent. As in the past, it will be made up by internal and external loans. Except that internal financing has now been considerably reduced "as a result of the adjustments"—to R30.6 trillion. The idea was that the mass of securities which the state wanted to offer would "not grab" the population. And we were still looking to obtain excessive external credit—R41 trillion. We are unlikely to get that much.

Finally, we come to the most interesting part. Whereas the law "On Financing State Expenditure from the Federal Budget in the First Quarter of 1995" clearly stipulated that the Central Bank was granting the Russian Federation Government credit of R5 trillion, the Finance Ministry's amendments propose a very good way out of the situation. This point now reads: At the request of the Russian Federation Government the Central Bank will grant the Finance Ministry credit at 10 percent per annum for a period of up to six months.... How many times the Finance Ministry will request it is another matter.

Finally, there is no separate "Chechen expenditure" entry in the amendments to the budget. But [Finance Minister] Vladimir Panskov was very clear on this score: This expenditure is to be found in the items relating to this—defense, medical, Ministry of Internal Affairs, construction, and the rest....

International Affairs

Turkmenistan Increases Gas Quotas to Crimea

LD2301181695 Kiev UT-1 Television Network in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] According to information from the Crimean government press service, as a result of talks between the leaders of Ukraine and Turkmenistan, from 22 January gas quotas to Crimea were increased by 116 cubic meters. The peninsula will now receive an average of 1,450,000 cubic meters of gas, which will enable the situation in Crimea's industry to be stabilized.

Turkmen Official Says Russia Stopping Gas Supply

LD2301212695 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1720 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev [dateline as received]—"Russia is stopping Turkmen gas in the pipeline, that is why Ukraine is not receiving it," explained one of Turkmen deputy ministers of oil and gas in a telephone interview for UNIAN.

The Turkmen official said that the central office of Russia's Gazprom company distribution centre had reported Ukraine's balance on 23 January at "zero cubic metres of Turkmen gas".

The delivery of gas, supplied even before President Saparmurat Niyazov's visit to Kiev on 19 January, is being delayed by Russia's introduction of customs declaration for gas supplies, on which it has no appropriate agreement with Ukraine.

According to Ashkhabad officials, Ukrainian and Russian experts were still negotiating on 23 January in Moscow.

Kuchma To Sign Trade, Economic Pact in Moscow

LD2301200995 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1620 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev, 22 Jan—The signing of the major treaty between Ukraine and Russia has been postponed so far. Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma will travel to Moscow on 24 January, accompanied by high government officials, to sign a trade and economic agreement for 1995. They will also discuss the provision of critical imports of fuels and the granting of components for Ukrainian enterprises that are cooperating with Russia.

Observers believe that Russia is seriously concerned by Ukraine's ever increasing activity in establishing economic ties with republics of the CIS and by its growing political influence in the Caucasus. Russia recently signed several agreements with Belarus and Kazakhstan, which in effect signifies the creation of an economic union between these three republics. Russia can afford to

delay signing of the major political and economic treaty with Ukraine, which has been in a state of preparation for such a long time.

In the view of the experts, Russia is aspiring to include Ukraine in those decisions that would be favorable to Russia in terms of transporting and fitting out future oil and gas pipelines from Azerbaijan and Central Asia. In this event, this could be viewed as Russia's reaction to the quite successful Ukrainian-Turkmen agreements, which disturb Russia both from the economic and political points of view. However, because Ukraine can secure certain influences in Central Asia and the Caucasus, it is able to defend its positions and achieve those compromise options where its political and economic interests will be taken into account.

During tomorrow's meeting, the issue of the final decision with regard to Ukraine's accession to the so-called "zero-option" will be raised. Ukraine will probably attempt to propose a number of specific preconditions, as demanded by some politicians and government officials in Ukraine. However, it is known that Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin is categorically opposed to any preconditions, and it is possible that the decision on accession to the "zero-option" will not be resolved.

Edict on Budget Treaty With Ukraine

954F0945A Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jan 95 p 1

[Edict of the President of Crimea: "On Conclusion of a Treaty Between the Governments of Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea"]

[FBIS Translated Text] With a view to effective budget interrelations between the Governments of Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea in 1995,

I DECREE:

1. A treaty "On Budget Interrelations Between the Governments of Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea" shall be prepared and concluded with the following conditions:

1.1. The initiative in resolving the issue of the use of monetary funds acquired on the territory of Crimea from the use of facilities and resources (including on the base of the Black Sea Fleet) must come from the leaders of the Republic of Crimea.

1.2. The authority delegated to Ukraine shall be determined, and this shall be used as a basis for transferring budget funds to Ukraine.

1.3. When determining the contribution to the budget of Ukraine, the complicated situation in Crimea caused by natural disasters in 1994 shall be taken into account.

[Signed] President of the Republic of Crimea Yu. Meshkov Simferopol

13 January 1995, No. 2/95

National Affairs

Decree on Organizations' Property

954F0945B Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jan 95 p 1

[Decree of the Supreme Council of Crimea: "On State-Owned Facilities in the Republic of Crimea and the Property of Public Organizations Located on the Territory of the Republic of Crimea"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In compliance with Article 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea and Article 2 of the law of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR] "On State-Owned Facilities in the Crimean ASSR and CPSU Property Located on the Territory of the Republic," taking into account Article 3 of the law of Ukraine "On the Status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea," and also taking into account the fact that at the present time the legal heirs to the property of Union public organizations of the former USSR have not been legally determined, the Supreme Council of Crimea

DECREES:

1. Until the final division of state property between the Republic of Crimea and Ukraine, state property located on the territory of Crimea shall be regarded as the property of the Republic of Crimea, with the exception of property not subject to privatization.

2. It shall be established that temporarily, until the subjects of the right to ownership of the property of Union public organizations of the former USSR located on the territory of the Republic of Crimea are legislatively determined, said property shall be regarded as state property (of the Republic of Crimea).

The State Property Fund of Crimea shall exercise the right to dispose of this property in compliance with existing legislation, including during the process of privatization.

3. It shall be established that the legal heir of the lessor under agreements for leasing property complexes located on the territory of Crimea, which were concluded with the central organs of Union public organizations of the former USSR and also the organ for management of state property defined in point 1 of the present decree, shall be the State Property Fund of Crimea until the legal heirs of the aforementioned property are legislatively established.

4. The decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of 14 April 1994, No. 238, "On Division of State Property of Ukraine Into State Property and Property of the Republic of Crimea" and of 29 August 1994, No. 594,

"On Transferring State-Owned Property to the Possession of the Republic of Crimea," with respect to objects of the national economy that are still state-owned shall be declared invalid.

5. The Government of Crimea in conjunction with the State Property Fund of Crimea shall prepare and coordinate with the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the State Property Fund of Ukraine proposals for dividing up state-owned facilities not subject to privatization.

6. Materials on dividing up facilities owned by the Republic of Crimea and Ukraine shall be submitted to the Supreme Council of Crimea for approval.

7. Control of the implementation of the present decree shall be the responsibility of the Permanent Commission of the Supreme Council of Crimea on Economic and Budget-Financial Policy.

[Signed] Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council of Crimea A. Melnikov

Simferopol

12 January 1995, No. 303-1

Decree on State Property Fund Branches

954F0945C Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jan 95 p 1

[Decree of the Supreme Council of Crimea: "On the Regional Branch of the State Property Fund of Ukraine for the Republic of Crimea"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with the creation by the State Property Fund of Ukraine of a regional branch of the State Property Fund of Ukraine for the Republic of Crimea and the appointment of its chief unilaterally, without coordination with the Supreme Council of Crimea, in order to improve the structure of management and privatization of state property located on the territory of the Republic of Crimea, the Supreme Council of Crimea

DECREES:

1. The order on the State Property Fund of Ukraine, No. 962 of 16 December 1994, shall be invalid on the territory of the Republic of Crimea.

2. It shall be suggested to the State Property Fund of Ukraine:

2.1. To rescind the order on the State Property Fund of Ukraine, No. 962 of 16 December 1994.

2.2 It shall be considered expedient until a final decision is made on the question of the creation and activity of the regional branch of the State Property Fund of Ukraine for the Republic of Crimea to assign its functions to the State Property Fund of Crimea.

3. Control of the implementation of the present decree shall be the responsibility of the Permanent Commission of the Supreme Council of Crimea on Economic and Budget-Financial Policy.

[Signed] Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council of Crimea A. Melnikov

Simferopol

12 January 1995, No. 304-1

Official on Privatization of Property Fund

954F0945D Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Jan 95 p 1

[Speech by A.I. Kotelnikova, chairman of the State Property Fund of Crimea. Excerpt from recording of the meeting of the Second Session of the Supreme Council of Crimea on 12 January 1995]

[FBIS Translated Text] Esteemed people's deputies!

The Presidium of the Supreme Council, having voted unanimously in favor of including on the agenda of the plenary session the draft decree on property, has made it possible, after an interruption of more than three years since the adoption of the law on property of the Crimean ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], to return to solving one of the most important issues for the republic, because of which Crimea became the only autonomous entity included among the subjects of the development and signing of the Union Treaty. The statehood of the Republic of Crimea is determined also by the Constitution, Article 1 of which says that on its territory the Republic of Crimea shall have the supreme right regarding wealth and material, cultural, and spiritual assets. The bearer of the authority is objectively the one where the property is concentrated.

Crimea had more than three years—considering the date of the adoption by the Supreme Council of Crimea of the law "On property," No. 115-1 of 5 September 1991—to exercise its right to ownership. Having begun large-scale privatization, Ukraine practically canceled the right of Crimea to act independently as the master of the peninsula. If we do not take advantage of the moment, we will be forced to watch as Ukrainian privatization strides over Crimea. If the Republic of Crimea does not become the owner, it will essentially be deprived of the realities of statehood. In other words, the Republic of Crimea must be in possession of sufficient property so that it can provide for solving all problems related to the socioeconomic development of Crimea and its economic sovereignty. The solution to the problem of transferring enterprises and organizations located on its territory to the ownership of Crimea began the moment the State Property Fund was formed.

The main and most critical area of the fund's activity since the moment of its creation has been work for defining the property of the Republic of Crimea, since

resolving this issue is the most important condition for the successful formation of the economy of Crimea, acceleration of the process of privatization, and the formation of a free economic zone, the very concept of which loses all meaning unless Crimea is assigned the corresponding property base.

The organizational process of the formation of the property of Crimea was arranged taking into account the adoption of legislative and normative acts of Ukraine and Crimea and extensive analytical discussion of the problems by specialists at various levels with the participation of labor collectives.

The State Property Fund has had serious misgivings regarding the fact that the transfer of enterprises to the ownership of Crimea will be reflected in their economic activity and that there will be a severance of business and economic ties that have lasted for years. In order to avoid this, the Supreme Council of Crimea created a parliamentary governmental work group, which worked for more than a half year with the direct participation of the State Property Fund of Crimea and the leaders of enterprises. Through joint efforts, they prepared and adopted the decree of the Supreme Council of Crimea of 30 June 1993, No. 362-1, "On Division of State Property Between Property of Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea." Work during the past year and a half has shown the viability of the concept of forming our own property in Crimea. The majority of enterprises were able to maintain the businesslike, constructive nature of relations with the enterprises, associations, and corporations with which they had worked previously. There is reason to assume that in the future the enterprises will be able to work successfully in a common economic space. But in spite of the repeated appeals from Crimea to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, when discussing the question of dividing up the property at the level of the ministries, departments, and the commission of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine created especially for this purpose, two decrees were adopted unilaterally—the decrees of 14 April 1994, No. 238, and of 29 August 1994, No. 594. According to these decrees, the property that will be transferred to Crimea's ownership will be mainly small enterprises and organizations that do not exert a significant influence on the region's economy—trade, food services, local industry, construction organizations, housing and municipal service enterprises, a number of agricultural enterprises, and also budget organizations from the branches of culture, public health, and education.

And Crimea's main economic potential was left as state property of Ukraine, which impedes the creation of a unified national economic complex and retards the region's socioeconomic development.

It should be noted that, countering the unilaterally adopted Decrees of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Nos. 238 and 594, decrees were adopted for actual application for ownership by Ukraine of certain of

Crimea's property complexes. An example might be Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 656 of 22 September 1994, "On Management of the Property of the International Children's Center 'Artek.'" The State Property Fund immediately reacted to this decree; we drafted a decree and submitted it to the Presidium of the Supreme Council.

At the present time, Ukraine's economic position dictates the need to accelerate economic reforms. By an edict of the president of Ukraine No. 699/94 of 26 November 1994, "On Measures Regarding Securing the Rights of Citizens To Use Privatization Investment Certificates," no less than 8,000 facilities were earmarked to be subject to mandatory privatization in 1995, 296 of which, by an order of the State Property Fund of Ukraine, are to be privatized in Crimea. Before 1 February 1995, the State Property Fund of Ukraine is to form a commission for privatization of these facilities. To do this, as we learned from sources that were checked, by order No. 962 of 16 December 1994, a regional branch of the State Property Fund of Ukraine

was created in Crimea without the consent of the organs of legislative and executive power of Crimea. It should be noted that the State Property Fund of Crimea is already ringing the phones of the leaders of enterprises about verbal instructions from the chief of the regional branch of the State Property Fund of Ukraine regarding the plan for preparing these enterprises for privatization. Thus, the machine has gone into motion in spite of the will of the Supreme Council and Government of Crimea. On the other hand, the Government of Crimea has already repeatedly raised the question of the need for the process of privatization in Crimea. While recognizing the need to create legal norms to prevent mutual claims and guarantee property rights in the Republic of Crimea, its citizens and legal entities, considering regulation of property rights to be the most important condition for effective development of production, we offer for your attention the draft decree "On Objects of State Property in the Republic of Crimea and the Property of Public Organizations Located on the Territory of the Republic of Crimea."

Belarus**Belarus, Russia Agree to Establish Closer Ties**

*LD2301145995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1444
GMT 23 Jan 95*

[By BELINFORM correspondents Vladimir Golod and Aleksandr Lushkevich for TASS]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Minsk January 23 TASS—Belarus and Russia should show more coordination in their activities at the international arena.

Such was the conclusion made by participants in the meeting between Belarusian parliament Speaker Mechyslaw Hryb and Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, who came here for an official visit. They agreed on expanding contacts, consultations and other forms of coordinating their foreign activities.

The State Duma's Deputy Konstantin Zatulin, who participated in the meeting, recalled that the State Duma adopted a resolution on expanding Belarusian-Russian contacts last month. On January 26, the State Duma's deputies are to hold hearings on the issue for the second time, Zatulin said and invited Vyacheslav Kuznetsov, first deputy Belarusian parliament speaker, to attend the hearings.

Besides, the Russian party proposed to hold a joint meeting of the State Duma and the Belarusian parliament. Hryb said in response that neither he, nor the parliament's Presidium are not [as received] entitled to make such decisions. The issue is in the competence of the Belarusian parliament only, Hryb explained.

The meeting can occur only on condition that "none of the items on the agenda contradicts the Belarusian Constitution".

The State Duma's Speaker Ivan Rybkin will pay a visit to Minsk on February 2-3, well-informed sources in the Belarusian parliament said.

According to Kozyrev, preparations are under way for Russian President Boris Yeltsin to visit Minsk and sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation between Belarus and Russia.

Kozyrev Addresses Minsk Intellectuals on Chechen Situation

*LD2301201995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1855
GMT 23 Jan 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Minsk, Jan 23 (INTERFAX-West)—Russia's Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev has said that "statements by human rights activist Sergey Kovalev are not always flawless, and in some cases would be appropriate on a barricade." Kozyrev was speaking in Minsk on Monday, as he met with Belarusian intellectuals. The Russian Foreign Ministry said that this was the reason for a number of rude remarks Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev had made against Kovalev.

"Democracy, including the unlimited freedom of the press will help Russia through the Chechen trial, I am quite certain about that," Kozyrev said. He described the events in Chechnya as a struggle against a criminal regime.

Kozyrev said that "Chechnya's sovereignty should not be fought for with arms, and it would do to discuss the advantages and drawbacks of the idea of Chechen independence in a democratic way, in the press, and not on the battle field."

At the same time Kozyrev said that the Russian leadership's decision on amnesty for militants was applicable to Dudayev, too. "If Dudayev lays down arms and gives himself up, he will be amnestied and have the chance to campaign for his ideas and his policies in the press," Kozyrev said.

Kazakhstan

Political Parties, Social Movements Poll

954F0918A Almaty KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jan 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Sociological Survey: Who Is Popular Today? What Political Parties and Social Movements Are You Aware Of? Whom Would You Support in Elections?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is surprising that not a single party or social movement can claim popularity, according to our survey. The populace has an equally poor knowledge of all of them. Perhaps only the Communist Party stands out—mentioned by 31 percent of respondents. The remaining voices were distributed as follows: People's Congress of Kazakhstan—15 percent, Azat—13 percent, Socialist Party—8 percent; with respect to social movements, Lad—7 percent, SNEK—3 percent, Kazak Tili and Youth Alliance—1.5 percent each.

Some 20 percent of the survey respondents have no knowledge of any parties or movements. Seventy percent of Kzyl-Orda residents are not aware that a Socialist Party exists. At the same time, both Russians and Kazakhs know about Azat, the Communist Party, and People's Congress of Kazakhstan. These three parties are the most popular in Kzyl-Orda, according to the survey.

With regard to the question of whom you would support in elections, over 20 percent agreed to vote for the Communists, asserting that life used to be better, and that they were not averse to going back "to socialism." An approximately equal number of respondents indicated their support for People's Congress of Kazakhstan, Lad, Azat, and the Socialist Party (10, 8, 7, and 6 percent, respectively).

No one cited any other social movements. However, some residents of Petropavlovsk are aware of the "party of Zhirinovskiy" and are even prepared to support it. These respondents believe that the leaders of parties and social movements in the capital are far removed from the people and therefore not very well known.

More than one-fourth of those surveyed do not wish to vote for any social organizations, and they will support whoever advances a tough program for improving the economy, fighting crime, and preventing the squandering of the country's national wealth, as well as someone who advocates close cooperation with Russia and the other CIS countries.

Gold Production Increase of Six Percent in 1994

LD2301 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1341 GMT 23 05

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Almaty, Jan 23 (INTERFAX)—Kazakhstan, the third biggest gold producer among the former Soviet republics, mined 6 percent

more gold in 1994 than in 1993, and is planning to increase gold production in the future.

In 1993, the state joint-stock company Altynalmas, uniting Kazakhstan's gold producers, mined about 13 tonnes of gold, said Altynalmas President Abdrahman Begalinov.

Kazakhstan intends to increase gold production following the modernization of the capacities already available and the development of new gold deposits, including large ones, such as the Akbakay, Vasilkovskoye and Bakyrchik gold deposits.

The introduction of new capacities alone will help the republic to increase the production of gold at least twofold, say Altynalmas experts.

PANORAMA Details Economic Improvement in 1994

LD2101120995 Almaty PANORAMA in Russian 14 Jan 95 p3

[FBIS Translated Text] The State Statistics Committee has summed up the results of last year.

The republic's State Statistics Committee has given PANORAMA information on the principal results of Kazakhstan's economic development during 1994. The information includes both macroeconomic indices and information on gross national product [GNP], industry, construction, agriculture, transport and communications, foreign economic activities, price and tariff indexes, finance and credits, privatization, and the population's social situation.

The document says that a preliminary appraisal of the results of the activities of branches of the Kazakhstan economy in 1994 shows a most profound slump of business activities in comparison with 1991-93. The following information indicates this: In comparison with the previous year in comparative prices the decrease in the volumes of gross domestic product [GDP] was 25.4 percent, in industry it was 28.5 percent, in agriculture 21.2 percent. The volume of capital investments fell by 31.1 percent.

The process of diversification in the economy and the development of various forms of property has accelerated. In 1990, 86,791 economic entities functioned in the republic, of which 35,031 or 40.4 percent were non-state owned, but by 1 October 1994 there were 107,845 entities, of which 64,906 enterprises or 60 percent were nonstate owned, thanks to the process of structural reorganization and privatization. The proportion of output produced by enterprises in the nonstate sector increased in total from 7.9 percent in 1990 to 38 percent in 1994.

GDP: Further Reductions in the Share of Goods Production

The estimated volume of GDP for 1994 was in current prices 464.5 billion tenge. In comparison with the previous year the physical volume of GDP fell by a factor of 25 points.

GDP in 1994, broken down by sector, was as follows: industry—120.1 billion tenge (26 percent); agriculture—63.7 billion tenge (14 percent); construction—25.6 billion tenge (6 percent); transport and communications—33.9 billion tenge (7 percent); trade—61.1 billion tenge (13 percent); public health and education—24.3 billion tenge (5 percent); other sectors 86.6 billion tenge (18 percent); taxes—49.2 billion tenge (11 percent).

Structural changes in GDP during the three years shows a further reduction in the share of goods production (industry, agriculture) and a considerable rise in the share of services and trade. Consistently, though slowly, the share in GDP of the spheres of public health and education is increasing (1 percent each a year).

The value of GDP is determined by wages (177.8 billion tenge or 38 percent), profits (the size of compound revenues was 237.5 billion tenge or 51 percent), and tax receipts (49.2 billion tenge or 11 percent). The reduction in the share of wages in 1994 (in 1993 it was 42 percent) is connected to the implementation of the government resolution on regulating money spent on consumption.

Industry: The basic factor in the slump of industrial production is the crisis of payments.

For 1994, industrial enterprises produced production (work, services) worth 323.7 billion tenge in current prices. Recently there has been a certain increase in the volumes of industrial production compared to previous months. If in September it was 0.3 percent, then in October it was 2.9 percent, in November—1.8 percent and in December—1.1 percent.

During the same months the slump in production slowed. In September it was 17.2 percent, but in October it was 17 percent, in November—14.8 percent and in December—13.2 percent. At the same time, over the last four months products worth 5.7 billion tenge were obtained due to the slow down in the slump in production.

At the same time, the abrupt slump in production during the first seven months (on average 29.2 percent monthly) sharply affected the final result of the year. As a whole for the year the slump in industrial production amounted to 28.5 percent.

Production fell least, in comparison with 1993, in the coal industry (by 7 percent), in oil-extraction (by 9 percent), in power engineering (by 14 percent); and fell most in light industry (by 56 percent), mechanical engineering and metal-working (by 43 percent), and industrial construction (by 55 percent).

The structure of industrial production is characterized by the following share of sectors in total volume: electricity production—19 percent; fuel industry—22.8 percent; ferrous metallurgy—12.6 percent; nonferrous metallurgy—12.7 percent; chemical and petrochemical industry—3.6 percent; mechanical engineering and metal-working—6.2 percent; timber, wood-processing, and cellulose-paper industry—0.8 percent; construction materials industry—2.7 percent; light industry—3.8 percent; food industry—8.7 percent.

Stoppages of enterprises (on average 394) had a negative effect on industrial results in 1994 and caused enterprises to lose 4.5 billion tenge of output. The principal reasons for the situation were: the lack of material resources (62 percent of the total loss of working time), including the lack of working capital (18 percent), and also the insolvency of customers (17.5 percent), the lack of a market (11 percent), the lack of electricity (5 percent).

Of the numerous factors causing the slump in industrial production, the payments crisis has been in first place recently. As of 1 December 1994, overdue debtor's debts of the republic's industrial enterprises were 26.2 billion tenge, and creditor's debts were 24.6 billion tenge.

Macroeconomic Indices Characterizing 1994 Results

	1994	as percentage of 1993
GDP (in current prices) million tenge	464,454	74.6
Industrial national income (comparative prices) million tenge	9,961.1	72.3
Volume of industrial production, works, services (in actual prices) million tenge	323,681.3	71.5
Consumer goods (including alcohol and beer) million tenge	60,543.2	66.8
Capital investments from all sources of finance million tenge	511,141.6	66.5
New housing from all sources of finance 1,000 square meters	2,250.9	59.3
Cargo transportation by public transport million tonnes	302.0	58.2

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	1994	as percentage of 1993
Retail turnover for registered trade enterprises), million tenge in actual prices	50,383.3	10.9 times more
in comparative prices	2,304.9	50
Total volume of exports (estimated) millions of US dollars	3,075.6	
of which: to countries to countries of the far abroad	1,265.9	85
Total volumes of imports (estimated) millions of US dollars	3,488.1	
of which: from countries of the far abroad	1,286.0	2.7 times more
Social indicators: The number of officially registered unemployed, thousands	113	144.6
Average salary (November), tenge *November 1994 as a percentage of October 1994	3,359.6	108.7*
December 1994 as a percentage of:	November	December
	1994	1993
Producers' prices index for industrial products	108.1	2,042.8
Index of consumers' prices	110.0	1,258.3

(Read the second and final part in the next issue [due 21 January]).

Uzbekistan

UN Mission Delegates Hold Cooperation Talks

LD2401100695 Tashkent Uzbekistan Television in Russian 1400 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Representatives of a UN mission were received at the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan today. Deputy Prime Minister Saidmukhtar Saidkasymov praised the UN's activity with regard to our country. He noted that the Uzbek Government favors the development of these ties. The problems of economic reforms, ecology, social security, and healthcare are spheres where active contacts with a number of international organizations are being pursued with the UN's help. The prospects for Uzbekistan's development and the implementation of reforms with the support of the world community were discussed at the talks.

The guests were received at the state property committee by the committee's chairman, Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Chzhen. It was noted during the talks that the privatization and denationalization being conducted in the republic are an integral part of reform. Now that it is a full member of the United Nations, Uzbekistan is strictly adhering to the legal standards accepted by the world community.

For the first stage, privatization of housing was conducted in the republic. Now the process of changing enterprises and organizations into joint-stock companies is under way. Following the presidential edicts of 21 January 1994 and 5 January of this year, great opportunities were opened up for the creation of private firms and joint ventures. They have been granted substantial

privileges. The package of measures makes it possible to make wider use of the country's raw resources.

Also today, the UN mission representatives visited the Ministry of Social Security. Matters concerning support for the population during the period when market relationships are being formed were discussed. The guests were familiarized with the new legislation on pension provision, and with the concern being shown for war and labor veterans. Seventeen presidential edicts designed to support the elderly have been adopted in the past two years. There are currently 2.5 million pensioners in the republic. A computer system is being introduced to provide them with timely services. International organizations, including the United Nations, are active in helping invalids, war veterans and poor families. It is planned to continue this cooperation.

The UN mission representatives also visited the Ministry of Health. They were familiarized with the main areas of work and with the transformations which the independent state's reforms are bringing to the health care and preventive medicine services. It was noted that our state receives great help from international organizations in this important work. They include UNICEF, the World Health Organization, and a number of others. Under their aegis, scientific conferences have been held on preventing infectious diseases, maternity and child care, and on supplying vaccines and many other medicines to children's treatment centers. Participants in the meeting held a discussion on training and requalification for medical staff, the privatization process, and the prospects for further expanding cooperation.

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Central Bank Head on Talks With IMF, IBRD Officials

MM2301172395 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Jan 95 First Edition p 6

[Interview with F.M. Mullazhanov, chairman of the board of the Republic of Uzbekistan Central Bank, by V. Petrov; place and date not stated: "They Are Watching Us Closely—Political Stability Will Serve as a Guarantee for Western Investments"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A government delegation from the Republic of Uzbekistan returned from Spain recently after taking part in the annual meeting between the IMF and the World Bank [IBRD]. Our interlocutor today is F.M. Mullazhanov, one of the members of the delegation representing the Republic of Uzbekistan in the IMF and chairman of the board of the Central Bank of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

[Petrov] Faysulla Maksutzhonovich, as far as we know, the economic policy of Uzbekistan is arousing a lively interest in the financial world. Did you sense this at the aforementioned meeting?

[Mullazhanov] Yes, indeed, there is tremendous interest in our reforms.

Apart from participating in the sessions, meetings were held with IMF and World Bank officials. The reforms being implemented by the government of Uzbekistan enjoy the support of the fund's experts and have now been carried out, and, on the basis of the results of the work of the IMF mission in Tashkent, a project will be submitted to the IMF Board of Directors for allocating credit to Uzbekistan in two tranches to the total value of \$140 million. It is also important that the republic budget should remain within the framework of previously planned guidelines, which greatly restrict inflationary processes. Measures undertaken in the sphere of price liberalization are prompting approval, as is the

abolition of the existing system of subsidies, although at the same time the state is helping its citizens by paying out compensation.

[Petrov] What is being done to secure additional investments? What are the factors affecting this process?

[Mullazhanov] During meetings with World Bank Vice President W. Thalwitz, offers to Uzbekistan of rehabilitation credit to develop the irrigation system and the possibilities of allocating credits to implement projects in the oil and gas industry were examined. According to appraisals by bank staff, the economic potential of Uzbekistan opens the way to realize up to three joint projects a year worth between \$400 and \$500 million in total.

In the very near future, the Republic of Uzbekistan will become a member of the Asiatic Development Bank, which will also open the way to make use of the financial resources of this influential international organization.

[Petrov] Aside from the exploitation of the financial resources of the international organizations, something else is also very important for the republic: technical and consultative assistance, the accumulation of experience. What help is the IMF offering in this question?

[Mullazhanov] The Republic of Uzbekistan became a member of the IMF and the World Bank in September 1992. Since then, more than 10 missions from the fund have spent time in the republic for the purpose of offering technical aid and holding consultations. Their activity was directed at bringing about radical changes in the sphere of statistics and bank oversight, offering assistance when introducing a national currency, and determining priority spheres in the financial arena. Survey materials and other documents in the sphere of economic analysis have been worked out by the Central Bank in conjunction with experts from the fund. Work on elaborating a monetary-credit and currency policy is being done with due account of the recommendations of IMF experts.

Armenia

ARFD Decides To Stop Cooperating With Authorities

NC2301173395 Yerevan ARAGIL ELECTRONIC
NEWS BULLETIN in English 0911 GMT 21 Jan 95

["Dashnaktsutyun To Suspend Collaboration With Armenia"—ARAGIL headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan ("Lragir" daily - Past), 01/21/95—Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutyun [ARFD] bureau made the following declaration on January 18:

"By an illegal order of RA [Republic of Armenia] President from December 28, and unjust decision of the Supreme Court of Armenia from January 13, Armenian authorities stopped operation of ARF Dashnaktsutyun in Armenia for six months, as a new expression of their anti-Dashnak, separating Armenians in Armenia from foreign Armenians behavior. Listening to the protest of ARFD members, sympathizing masses and the Armenian people in general, ARFD bureau decided to suspend the initiatives of the diaspora on collaboration with Armenian authorities until the obstacles to operation of ARFD in Armenia are eliminated.

Thus, ARFD bureau decided:

1. To suspend participation in the actions of "Hayastan" pan-Armenian fund on all levels.
2. To suspend financial and moral aid to the Armenian embassies and representations.

These suspension of collaboration with the Armenian authorities should not become an obstacle for ARFD and sympathizing masses to continue their benevolent and humanistic support to the people of Armenia and Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh] and support the sacred struggle of Artsakh".

Chairman of Council on Religion Resigns

NC2301152895 Yerevan ARAGIL ELECTRONIC
NEWS BULLETIN in English 0742 GMT 22 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chairman of the State Council on Religion of the RA [Republic of Armenia] Government Ludvig Khachatryan resigned on January 13.

Mr. Khachatryan was released from this position by a Presidential order on May, 1994, but considered this order illegal and stayed with the job. He called the journalists on January 13 and declared that from now, he refuses to act as the Chairman of the Council on Religion.

L. Khachatryan said that from now, the job will be performed by his deputy Lazr Sujyan, who was assigned to this position by the Government on December 28, 1994.

Mr. Khachatryan explained his resignation by existence of a person to perform his duties so he doesn't want to play a demonstrative hindering role, especially on the eve of such an important religious event, as catholicos elections.

Jan-Nov 1994 Electric Power, Industrial Production Figures

NC2301155195 Yerevan ARAGIL ELECTRONIC
NEWS BULLETIN in English 0742 GMT 22 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan ("RESPUBLICA ARMENIA" daily), 01/13/95—According to State Statistics Department, 5,110.2 mln. KWt/h [million kilowatt hours] of electric power were produced in Armenia in January-November, 1994.

This amount is 89.4 percent from electric power produced in the same period of 1993. (To compare, 14,911.3 mln. KWt/h were produced in 1985, and 10,377.4 mln in 1990).

Compared with October, electricity production in November, 1994 decreased by 11.6 percent.

During the same 11 months, enterprises in Armenia produced 79,368.5 mln drams worth production. They exported 68,641.6 mln. drams worth production, of which 14,624.5 mln. drams worth production to CIS countries, and 7,191.4 mln. to other countries. 46034 mln. drams worth production was sold in the republic.

'RMK Presidential Spokesperson' Gives First Briefing

NC2301164995 Yerevan ARAGIL ELECTRONIC
NEWS BULLETIN in English 0911 GMT 21 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Stepanakert ("Respublica Armenia", "Azg" dailies), 01/21/95—RMK [Republic of Mountainous Karabakh] Presidential spokesperson Aleksandr Grigoryan held his first briefing in Stepanakert on January 20.

Mr. Grigoryan reported about the results of the RMK President Robert Kocharyan's and Prime Minister Leonard Petrosyan's official visit to Armenia on January 16-19. He said that the leaders of Armenia met the Karabakh delegation in a warm atmosphere. The main problems discussed in the official spheres of Armenia were coming economic reforms, creation of interparliamentary links and other problems of inter-state collaboration. "Karabakh should not become an isolated economic isle on the territory of former USSR", said Mr. Grigoryan. "We need to create legislation and normative basis for future improvements".

Presidential spokesperson noted that thanks to relative calmness after the Budapest conference, the problem of the Azeri-Karabakh conflict moved to second plan at the meeting between RMK and RA [Republic of Armenia] leaders.

Karabakh 'Ministers' of Foreign Affairs, Health Named*NC2301154695 Yerevan ARAGIL ELECTRONIC NEWS BULLETIN in English 0742 GMT 22 Jan 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan ("AZG" daily), 01/17/95—RMK [Republic of Mountainous Karabakh] President Robert Kocharyan signed three orders on January 16.

He assigned Arkadi Ghukasyan as the RMK Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Aghasaryan as Minister of Health and Aleksandr Aghasaryan as Chairman of the RMK State Department on National Security.

Before the orders of the President, mentioned officials were acting as leaders of corresponding agencies.

Karabakh 'Deputy Foreign Minister' Appointed*NC2301181695 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1700 GMT 23 Jan 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Valeri Atajanyan has been appointed deputy foreign minister of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] by a decree signed by NKR Prime Minister Leonard Petrosyan on 21 January.

Atajanyan was born in 1947. He received his secondary education in Stepanakert, and his higher education in Yerevan. He graduated from the philology faculty of Yerevan State University. Prior to his new appointment, he directed Mashtots Publications in Stepanakert between 1990-1994. He was the publisher of the newspaper MARTIK of the NKR Defense Ministry. He belongs to no party, is married, and has three children.

Azerbaijan**UN Delegation To Study Humanitarian Aid***NC2301204895 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1700 GMT 23 Jan 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] A UN delegation has arrived in Baku to study the question of humanitarian aid to Azerbaijan. The delegation will establish the amount of humanitarian aid the republic needs and inform the foreign countries on the needs of the refugees, displaced people, and families in the low income bracket. The delegation will visit places where the refugees and displaced people have been temporarily accommodated and study their needs and living and working conditions.

Azerbaijan will receive humanitarian aid after the delegation compiles the information it needs. The republic will receive humanitarian aid as of April 1995.

Aliyev Meets With U.S. Ambassador Kauzlarich*NC2301205095 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1700 GMT 23 Jan 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] President Geydar Aliyev received Richard Kauzlarich, the U.S. ambassador

extraordinary and plenipotentiary in Baku, today. They held talks on the CSCE Minsk Group's work, prospects for the maintenance of the cease-fire agreement in the Karabakh dispute, economic reforms in Azerbaijan, and the parliamentary elections in the republic in 1995. Other issues of mutual concern also were discussed by the two officials.

Aliyev Speaks at Anniversary of 1990 Intervention*LD2001200095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1736 GMT 20 Jan 95*

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Nikolay Zhrebtsov, Andrey Petrovskiy; edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President Geydar Aliyev in a speech to the rally in Baku on Friday [20 January] to commemorate five years since the tragic events there said the blood shed by the Azeris helped the country gain its independence. IF note: More than 130 people were killed, 700 others injured and several hundreds unaccounted for as thousands took to the street in protest at the introduction of Soviet troops in Baku on January 20, 1990. The army was sent to prevent pogroms of the Armenian community there, the erstwhile Soviet government said at the time.

Aliyev described those events as a tragic but also heroic page in the history of Azerbaijan. "We gained our freedom and independence at an immense cost, but we will be prepared for more sacrifice for the sake of our freedom", he said.

The Azeris rose up in protest against injustices by the former Soviet leadership, to defend their land and launch a national liberation struggle, Aliyev said.

The Azeri leader told journalists that the 1990 tragic events had awakened the people's sense of self-identity. In his words, "the former Soviet government moved tanks and troops to subdue the country's national liberation struggle, but the people turned out stronger".

Aliyev said his people had also demonstrated its will and drive for independence during a failed coup attempt last October. IF note: The military seized a government office building, a local airport and other key facilities in the country's second large city of Gyanj at the beginning of last October. However, the government cracked down on the mutiny. Many arrests were made. Aliyev sacked his Prime Minister Suret Guseynov on charges of involvement in the coup attempt.

The people stood up against communist rule in Azerbaijan and the former Soviet Union in 1990, but in defence of the government and the country's independence last October, he said. That is what makes public movements of now and then different, Aliyev believes.

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Georgia

More on Head of State Shevardnadze Interview

LD2301135095 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in
Georgian 0628 GMT 23 Jan 95

[Studio interview with Georgian head of state Eduard Shevardnadze by correspondent Nato Oniani—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Oniani] You have already mentioned the three meetings held last week. One was in the Cabinet of Ministers, another was your meeting with local administrators, and the other was the now traditional all-republic meeting of law enforcement bodies. Some newspapers have published reports on the latter with a headline: The course of the state becomes stricter. How correct and accurate do you think such an assessment is?

[Shevardnadze] [passage omitted] The essential inference to be drawn from the meeting is that in the process of building our state we are now at the stage allowing us to exercise the course toward establishing the society that will ensure the freedom of the individual and of the country as well as the security and well-being of the individual. [passage omitted]

The idea of appointing representatives of the head of state in the regions comes to expectations, especially in certain regions. We have a feeling that they are real representatives of the supreme executive power. By the way, I would like to say that I took a decision yesterday to introduce a similar post for the highly important Imereti region [western Georgia]. You realize what Imereti means. This is Kutaisi [various industrial enterprises], this is Chiatura [manganese mining], this is Tqibuli [coal mining], this is Zestaponi [non-ferrous metals production] with their huge centers, this is Samtredia [strategic railway junction], and many other rayons and towns, the potential of which is utilized only by 10 or 15 percent. Because the Kutaisi Mayor Temur Shashiashvili has displayed the best of his abilities as a creative state figure, I told him yesterday, I instructed him that while retaining the mayor's office, he will be the head of state's representative in the Imereti region. [passage omitted]

This may also be considered as an experiment of Georgia's provincial structure. Before we complete our debates over the draft constitution, we will have a chance to express our views on how effective this institution is and how promising is it becoming a constitutional provision.

[Oniani] Because rumors spread in town, I would like to ask you a question, although you touched upon the issue at the meeting with law enforcement bodies. What will be in effect the opposition's efforts in connection with Tengiz Kitovani's case? They say the authorities will let him free sooner or later.

[Shevardnadze] I feel a little embarrassed having to return to this subject because I have already expressed my opinion. I did it twice. The time for unjustified liberalism and generally liberalism and unjustified experiments with compromises has expired. We have tried everything. You presumably remember the meeting at Republic Square and the manifest announced there [summer 1993; the manifest pardoned everyone and called for unification], which cost us very dear later. However, I am still positive that the authorities had to try this too, and take a step like that.

Now, the interests of a democratic society under construction require the dictatorship of law. Individual deputies demand that Kitovani should be freed. I know about this. Although the group is not very large, they are demanding, anyway. I regard this way as lacking any prospects. The authorities will not get round a law. I appeal to sociological services to study society's opinion. I know what this opinion is. Many unbiased members of our community have been telling me: If you again get round the law and give up, we will finally lose any belief that a Georgian state can be built. This opinion should be studied. I advise the deputies who demonstrate excessive softheartedness not to oppose the society and to oppose the law. [passage omitted]

[Oniani] The final question. The situation in Chechnya is still tense. An interesting thing occurred last week. Despite claims by some of our compatriots, Ardzinba [Abkhaz president] himself has acknowledged that the Abkhaz are fighting in Chechnya. Do you think the Chechen events will result in significant staff changes in Russia's highest echelons? In fact, this process can be said to have started in the Russian Defense Ministry.

[Shevardnadze] As far as any staff changes in Russia are concerned, I do not want to speak about it. It is a rather delicate issue and I would not be right to touch upon it. This should be decided by President Yeltsin himself and I am convinced that he will take the decision that will serve Russia's, and not only Russia's, interest. By the way, there were certain programs last night and the day before defining who was among the fighters and stating that a fresh unit from Abkhazia evidently joined them.

As for Chechnya itself, I will not elaborate because the events have been developing as I envisaged. It is not because I foretold or something like this. This had to happen because this was the consistency we were facing. Many politicians confirm now that Chechen and Abkhaz separatism are as similar as two halves of an apple. I should reiterate that the Chechnya tragedy stems from Abkhazia. It was in Abkhazia that the misfortune taking place in Chechnya started. I believe that all will be settled and Russia's statehood, unity, and integrity will be preserved and this will give us additional confidence that we will be able to resolve our own problems faster and more effectively.

U.S. Delegation in Georgia To Inspect Russian Units*LD2301135195 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1000 GMT 23 Jan 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi, 23 January—An official U.S. military delegation arrived in Tbilisi on 23 January for a working visit. The main purpose of the visit is to inspect military units of the Group of Russian Troops in the Transcaucasus and register combat equipment which remains on the territory of the Republic of Georgia in excess of the quota. U.S. military inspection groups are due to visit the Russian troops' 145th Motor-Rifle Division in Batumi and 147th Motor-Rifle Division in Akhalkalaki.

Antiaircraft Site Can Monitor 'Entire Caucasus' Airspace*LD2301140495 Tbilisi IPRINDA in Russian 1000 GMT 23 Jan 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi [no date as received]—According to the press center of the Georgian Ministry of Defense, Defense Minister Lieutenant General Vardiko Nadibaidze and Deputy Prime Minister Avtandil Margiani inspected the anti-aircraft missile brigade on 23 January. This is a whole complex with a command post that is capable of monitoring the airspace of the entire Caucasus. Great importance is attached to the installation in the defense of Georgian airspace.

Further Repair Work Required on Tbilisi Power Station*LD2301211795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1715 GMT 23 Jan 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tbilisi, Jan 23 (INTERFAX)—A month will be required for repair work on the Tbilisi Hydroelectric Station recently damaged in a fire, an official of the Georgian Main Energy Department told Interfax today.

The official said the fire broke out at the station when it was only just back in operation after repair work.

Electric power supply to all consumers has been cut by about 40 percent as a result of the fire, the same source said.

Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze said he believed that the fire was not accidental but had been provoked by those seeking to destabilize the situation in the country. "It looks like a terrorist act rather than an accident," he said on national radio today.

Shevardnadze said that electric power shortage would be overcome by importing more energy supplies from Azerbaijan and other countries.

Shevardnadze Blamed for 'Defeatist' Abkhaz Policy*LD2301212095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1715 GMT 23 Jan 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tbilisi, Jan 23 (Interfax)—Leader of the prohibited radical Front of National Liberation of Georgia Boris Kakubava has blamed Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze for "the defeatist policy towards Abkhazia and the failure of the policy aimed at peace settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict."

Kakubava told a press conference in Tbilisi today that he did not admit his guilt for the events of January 13 when the illegal armed formation headed by ex-Defense Minister Tengiz Kitovani had been disarmed when trying to launch an offensive on Abkhazia.

Kakubava, against whom a criminal case was instigated after the events of January 13, said that 33 opposition parliamentarians had signed a demand that Kitovani be immediately released along with other members of the Front of National Liberation and that the Georgian parliament call an emergency meeting.

The Front of National Liberation of Georgia was prohibited in early January. It favors resolving the Abkhaz problem by force.

Criminal cases were also instigated against former Georgian premier Tengiz Sigua and former commander of the Georgian Armed Forces Zurab Nakopiya, believed to have sold to Azerbaijan two SU-25 fighters on instructions from Tengiz Kitovani in 1992. Money received from the deal (\$12 million) was to be transferred to the Defense Ministry. However, the sum was never registered, an investigation revealed.

An official of the prosecutor's office said Nakopiya had been detained.

Kakubava Says Georgia is Communist, Police State*LD2401113795 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0800 GMT 24 Jan 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] The authorities want to put me in prison, Boris Kakubava, the leader of the Organization for the Liberation of Abkhazia and member of the Georgian Parliament, told a news conference yesterday. Here is a quotation from Boris Kakubava's address:

[Begin Kakubava recording] What is happening in Georgia now should not be happening in any civilized country. The claim that we are building a democratic state is simply ludicrous. The promotion of Bakur Gulua has completed the establishment of a team of deputy premiers consisting entirely of former rayon [Communist Party] committee chairmen. The communist regime has been restored throughout the country. Moreover,

Georgia has become a police state. Every senior police official is, to put it mildly, a truncheon in the hands of Shevardnadze.

As regards the events of 13 January [abortive march on Abkhazia by Tengiz Kitovani, National Liberation Front leader and former defense minister], it was clear from the outset that the Georgian National Liberation Front was established in order to restore Georgian territorial integrity. Shevardnadze's peace-loving policy in Abkhazia was a failure. You will probably remember the head of state saying that the Abkhaz conflict settlement commission travels abroad to drink coffee and to Sochi to drink beer.

On 13 January, unarmed men, who love their country, went to western Georgia, not Abkhazia. My reservists and myself would have joined them on the 15th or 17th, because I was due to visit Turkey on 12 January. By the way, Turkish and Russian flags fly on the Turkish-Georgian border.

Attempts by the head of state and his retinue to qualify the events of 13 January as a coup are simply ridiculous. In such situations, rebel forces never head for an occupied territory, but take up positions in the capital.

For as long as Shevardnadze is in power, I will not take up arms to liberate Abkhazia. There will never be a better time than now for Georgia to restore its territorial integrity. What I mean is the Chechen war. The Afghan and Chechen wars have dispelled the myth about Russia's invincibility. Chechnya's legal status within Russia, and Abkhazia's legal status within Georgia are absolutely different, and cannot be considered in the same context. [end recording] [passage omitted]

[Announcer] My colleague and I have been asked to comment on this news conference, but we refuse to do so.

Estonia**Luik Dubious Over Staggered Integration Into NATO***LD2301190395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1715 GMT 23 Jan 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Jan 23 (INTERFAX)—Estonian Foreign Minister Juri Luik is pessimistic about the proposal that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe be admitted into European security structures "by zigzags" - put forward by his Latvian counterpart Valdis Birkavs.

Speaking at a news conference in Tallinn, Luik said that the idea of admitting Poland and Latvia into NATO first off, followed by the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Hungary "has no practical value." He added that the idea of exchanging opinions was important. He said the plan for enlarging NATO was now being thought over and all proposals would be appreciated. He said the practical issues of enlarging the alliance must be resolved so no country in the center of Europe be left outside the "safety belt" of NATO.

Luik said he believed that if the decision of enlarging NATO was made "solutions to many security problems must be found, including that for the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and the Baltic states." Luik said that to enlarge NATO step by step was fraught with increased danger as this could lead to some countries finding themselves excluded from the "safety belt" for an extended period.

Luik also criticized performance of OSCE High Commissioner for Human Rights Max Van Der Stoel. He said he believed that the OSCE high commissioner failed to pay enough attention to the problem of ethnic minorities and human rights in Russia, foremost in Chechnya, while strictly controlling the situation in Estonia. "The Chechen problem has been known about for three years already. However, the high commissioner has not yet presented a single report on it, nor on other problems of the Eastern neighbor."

Luik said this made Estonia seriously think over the future and authority of the OSCE.

Foreign Minister Criticizes OSCE in Chechnya*LD2301141895 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1100 GMT 23 Jan 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Estonian Foreign Minister Juri Luik today said that during a visit to France last week he raised the issue of the inactivity of the OSCE [Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe] High Commissioner on National Minorities in solving the crisis in Chechnya. Luik told a news conference that he spoke about the OSCE's role in the Chechen conflict with several French politicians, including Foreign Minister Alain Juppe. Luik noted that Max van der Stoel, the

OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, was very active in Estonia, but when a neighboring state has much more acute problems not a single word about them has been heard from Stoel. Luik added that the problem in Chechnya has been known for three years and over this period Van der Stoel has not made a single report. Luik said that the inactivity of the Commissioner on National Minorities raises a very serious questions about the future and authority of the OSCE.

The foreign minister said that according to French politicians, the question of the Baltic states joining the European treaty this year is realistic. Luik said there are no major differences of opinion between the European Union and Estonia over signing an association agreement. Luik said that this year France intends to organize at least six ministerial level meetings between the EU states and the Central European states. France currently holds the EU presidency.

Trade Official Hopes for EU Treaty Soon*LD2301214895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1855 GMT 23 Jan 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Jan 23 (INTERFAX)—The head of the Estonian Foreign Ministry's trade department has said he hopes Tallinn will sign a treaty on associated European Union membership in the first half of this year. Priit Pallom was speaking at a news conference in Tallinn on Monday [23 January].

As he reviewed last week's first round of talks Estonia had with the EU, Priit Pallom said that a number of subjects remained open. For instance, EU rules and norms must be taken into account already now in adopting Estonian laws. The European Union requested Estonia abolish monopoly state structures by 1998. This applies foremost to the Estonian-Swedish shipping company Estline, which in 1992 received the exclusive right to run sea routes between Tallinn and Stockholm, as well as the Estonian telephone company Eesti Telefon. Estonia says that EU plans for cooperation in fighting crime are very vague and fail to take into account the country's geo-political position as a "European buffer".

Priit Pallom believes that the ratification of the treaty by all members of the EU could take 18 months, and it would take effect at the end of 1996 or at the beginning of 1997. Pallom said it had been agreed to hold a second round of talks in Brussels on February 21-22.

Latvia**Belarus Prime Minister Visits Ulmanis, Gailis***LD2301125395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1058 GMT 23 Jan 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, Jan 23 (INTERFAX)—The Belarusian Prime Minister Mikhail Chyhir arrived for a one-day working visit in Latvia Monday [23 January].

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The press service of the Latvian Government told Interfax he will hold talks with his Latvian counterpart Maris Gailis on the expansion of economic cooperation between the neighboring countries. The two sides will also discuss the crossing of borders by their citizens whilst travelling to and from Belarus and Latvia.

A spokesman for the press service said no documents were planned to be signed.

Premier Chyhir Meets Ulmanis

*LD2301211595 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1800 GMT 23 Jan 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Guntis Ulmanis today met Mikhail Chyhir, prime minister of the Republic of Belarus. The two discussed possibilities of future economic and trade cooperation between the two countries and the issue of setting up Latvian and Belarusian embassies in Minsk and Riga. Ulmanis also indicated interest in the political and economic situation in Belarus in connection with the elections expected in spring. In addition, the Latvian president noted that Latvia is willing to establish goodneighborly relations with all the countries bordering with it, and expressed satisfaction with the fact that through contacts between the two countries it has been possible to tackle almost all the problems.

Gailis Discusses Economic Cooperation

*LD2301220695 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1800 GMT 23 Jan 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Meeting the Belarusian prime minister today, Prime Minister Maris Gailis acknowledged that economic cooperation between Latvia and Belarus would be beneficial in the use of transport communications, as well as in timber processing, textile industry, and trade. The guest said that Belarus is willing to continue to use the services of Latvian ports. Gailis also offered Belarus the opportunity to participate in opening up Liepaja port, by becoming a share-holder. He also proposed the opening of a Latvian trade center in Minsk similar to the one opened by Belarusian enterprises in Riga. The Latvian side is also asking Belarus to provide education in their native language for Latvian children living there.

The Belarusian prime minister for his part acknowledged that problems concerning Belarusians living in Latvia are being tackled.

Czech Republic Agrees to Coordinate Cooperation

*LD2301143395 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1300 GMT 23 Jan 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Latvia and the Czech Republic will coordinate their cooperation with NATO in the

future and will regularly exchange information, the Latvia defense minister stated after a meeting with his Czech counterpart. He noted that so far relations between the two countries have been one-way, because the Czech Republic has been a donor and Latvia a recipient.

Speaking of future cooperation, the minister expressed hope that Czech military experts will help in setting up the Baltic peace-keeping battalion and drafting military legislation. Also, cadets and officers of the National Defense Academy will have an opportunity to get military education in Czech military schools.

The Czech defense minister, who has been visiting Latvia for two days, returns home this afternoon.

Baltic Chiefs of Staff Begin Conference

*LD2301141995 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1000 GMT 23 Jan 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] A two-day conference of the chiefs of staff of the Armed Forces of the Baltic states and their deputies is being held at Adazi near Riga training center of the National Armed Forces to coordinate individual Partnership for Peace programs. The possibility to create a unified system of exchange of information of all three Baltic states' Armed Forces, which would meet the standards accepted by NATO, is being discussed there. Projects of various joint exercises and prospects of future development of the Baltic peace-keeping battalion are also being discussed.

Finland Helps Fight Alcoholism, Drug Abuse

*LD2401110495 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1600 GMT 23 Jan 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Finnish Government has decided to help Latvia implement a national program for curbing and preventing the spread of alcoholism and drug abuse. Janis Strazdins, the senior doctor at the state alcohol and drugs treatment center said after a meeting with Latvian Ambassador to Finland Anna Zigure and Welfare Minister Andris Berzins today [23 January].

The Finnish specialists will help Latvia set up a special laboratory for establishing the quality of alcohol and will provide consultations on issues of working out education programs for schools. Problems related to setting up a rehabilitation center will also be tackled jointly. Strazdins expressed the view that as far as alcohol consumption was concerned, Latvia was currently in the most adverse situation for several years. There are approximately 50,000 alcoholics and 500,000 drug addicts in the country who would need help.

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